Chapter 27
Part 27
[Footnote 146: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 71 _sq._ _Cf._ Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 71 _sq._]
[Footnote 147: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 208.]
[Footnote 148: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 60 _sq._]
[Footnote 149: von Bary, quoted by Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 186.]
[Footnote 150: Dubois, _Timbuctoo_, p. 231.]
[Footnote 151: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 115.]
[Footnote 152: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 144. Professor Stanley Hall observes ('Children's Lies,' in _American Journal of Psychology_, iii. 62) that "truth for our friends and lies for our enemies is a practical, though not distinctly conscious rule widely current with children."]
In point of truthfulness savages are in many cases superior to nations more advanced in culture. "A Chinese," says Mr. Wells Williams, "requires but little motive to falsify, and he is constantly sharpening his wits to cozen his customer--wheedle him by promises and cheat him in goods or work."[153] His ordinary speech is said to be so full of insincerity that it is very difficult to learn the truth in almost any case.[154] He feels no shame at being detected in a lie, nor does he fear any punishment from his gods for it;[155] if you call him a liar, "you arouse in him no sense of outrage, no sentiment of degradation."[156] Yet the moral teachings of the Chinese inculcate truthfulness as a stringent duty. One of their injunctions is, "Let children always be taught to speak the simple truth."[157] Many sayings may be quoted from Confucius in which sincerity is celebrated as highly and demanded as urgently as it ever was by any {89} Christian moralist. Faithfulness and sincerity, he said, should be held as first principles. Sincerity is the way of Heaven, the end and beginning of things, without which there would be nothing. It is as necessary to truly virtuous conduct as a boat is to a man wishing to cross a river, or as oars are to a boat. The superior man ought to feel shame when his conduct is not in accord with his words.[158] But there are instances in which sincerity has to yield to family duties: a father should conceal the misconduct of his son, and a son that of his father.[159] Moreover, the great moralists themselves did not always act up to their lofty principles. Confucius and Mencius sometimes did not hesitate to tell a lie for the sake of convenience.[160] The former could excuse himself from seeing an unwelcome visitor on the ground that he was sick, when there was nothing the matter with him;[161] and he deliberately broke an oath which he had sworn, because it had been forced from him.[162] In Japan, Burma, and Siam, truth is more respected than in China. "In love of truth," says Professor Rein, "the Japanese, so far as my experience goes, are not inferior to us Europeans." [163] The Burmese, though partial to much exaggeration, are generally truthful.[164] And "the mendacity so characteristic of Orientals is not a national defect among the Siamese. Lying, no doubt, is often resorted to as a protection against injustice and oppression, but the chances are greatly in favour of truth when evidence is sought."[165]
[Footnote 153: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 834.]
[Footnote 154: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]
[Footnote 155: Cooke, _China_, p. 414. Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 122. Bowring, _Siam_, i. 106. Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 834.]
[Footnote 156: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]
[Footnote 157: Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 522.]
[Footnote 158: _Lun Yü_, i. 8. 2; vii. 24; ix. 24; xii. 10. 1; xv. 5. 2. _Chung Yung_, xx. 18. Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, pp. 103, 114, 146. Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100.]
[Footnote 159: _Lun Yü_, xiii. 18. 2.]
[Footnote 160: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100. Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 267.]
[Footnote 161: _Lun Yü_, vi. 13.]
[Footnote 162: _Lun Yü_, xvii. 20.]
[Footnote 163: Rein, _Japan_, p. 393.]
[Footnote 164: MacMahon, _Far Cathay and Farther India_, p. 62. Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 45. Fytche, _Burma Past and Present_, ii. 67.]
[Footnote 165: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105.]
Lying has been called the national vice of the Hindus.[166] "It is not too much to assert that the mass of Bengalis have no notion of truth and falsehood."[167] A gentleman {90} who has been brought into the closest intimacy with natives of all classes, declares "that when a question is asked, the full bearing of which on themselves or those connected with them they cannot see, you may rely upon it that the first answer you receive is false; but that, when they see that the truth cannot injure themselves or any one they care for, they will speak the truth."[168] The testimony of a Hindu is not generally regarded as evidence.[169] Forgery is frequently resorted to, cheating is rife. "In almost all business transactions of the smallest kind a written agreement must be made on both sides, and this must be stamped and registered, because it is believed that a man's word is not binding."[170] Nor is a lie held disreputable, especially if not found out.[171] But in India, as elsewhere, the question whether truth or falsehood is to be spoken depends on the relationship between the speaker and the party addressed. In their relations with each other, says Sir W. H. Sleeman, members of a village community spoke as much truth as those of any other community in the world, but in their relations with the government they told as many lies; "if a man had told a lie to _cheat_ his neighbour, he would have become an object of hatred and contempt--if he had told a lie to _save_ his neighbour's fields from an increase of rent or tax, he would have become an object of esteem and respect."[172] Of the Sûdra inhabitants of Central India Sir John Malcolm likewise observes that "they may be said, in their intercourse with strangers and with officers of government, to evade the truth, and often to assert positive falsehoods"; whereas, "in their intercourse with each other, falsehood is not common, and many (particularly some of the cultivators) are distinguished by their adherence to truth."[173] The ancient Hindus were praised for their veracity and good faith; {91} in his History of India, written in the second century of the Christian era, Arrian states that no Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.[174] In the sacred books of India truthfulness is highly celebrated. "If veracity and a thousand horse-sacrifices are weighed against each other, it is found that truth ranks even higher than a thousand horse-sacrifices."[175] "Verily the gods are the truth, and man is the untruth."[176] "There is one law which the gods do keep, namely, the truth. It is through this that their conquest, their glory is unassailable: and so, forsooth, is his conquest, his glory unassailable whosoever, knowing this, speaks the truth."[177] Attendance on, or the worship of, the sacred fire means speaking the truth:--"Whosoever speaks the truth, acts as if he sprinkled that lighted fire with ghee; for even so does he enkindle it: and ever the more increases his own vital energy, and day by day does he become better. And whosoever speaks the untruth, acts as if he sprinkled that lighted fire with water; for even so does he enfeeble it: and ever the less becomes his own vital energy, and day by day does he become more wicked. Let him, therefore, speak nothing but the truth."[178] Fearful denunciations are particularly pronounced against those who deliver false testimony in a court of justice.[179] By giving false evidence concerning small cattle, a witness commits the sin of killing ten men; by false evidence concerning cows, horses, and men, he commits the sin of killing a hundred, a thousand, and ten thousand men respectively; but by false evidence concerning land, he commits the sin of killing the whole human race.[180] The sin of falsehood thus admits of different degrees according to the magnitude of the injury inflicted by it. Indeed, "in some cases a man who, though knowing the facts to be different, gives such false evidence from a pious motive, does not lose heaven; such evidence they call the speech of the gods."[181] {92} Moreover, "whenever the death of a Sûdra, of a Vaisya, of a Kshatriya, or of a Brâhmana would be caused by a declaration of the truth, a falsehood may be spoken; for such falsehood is preferable to the truth."[182] According to Buddhist conceptions of lying, "the magnitude of the crime increases in proportion to the value of the article, or the importance of the matter, about which the lie is told."[183] And it is a lesser wrong to lie in self-defence than to lie with a view to procuring an advantage by injuring one's neighbour. Thus, to deny the possession of any article, in order to retain it, is not a lie of a heinous description, whereas to bear false witness in order that the proper owner may be deprived of that which he possesses, is a lie to which a greater degree of culpability is attached.[184] The Buddhist precept of truthfulness is more restricted than that laid down by Brahmanism:--"It is said by the Brahmans that it is not a crime to tell a lie on behalf of the guru, or on account of cattle, or to save the person's own life, or to gain the victory in any contest; but this is contrary to the precept."[185] One of the conditions that make a Buddha is, never, under the influence of desire and other passions, to utter a conscious lie, for the sake of wealth or any other advantage.[186] From the time that Gautama became a Bodhisattva, or claimant for the Buddhaship, through all his births until the attainment of the Buddhaship, he never told a lie; and "it were easier for the sakwala [or system of worlds] to be blown away than for a supreme Buddha to utter an untruth."[187] His followers are not equally scrupulous. The Buddhists of Ceylon, we are told, lie without compunction, and are not ashamed to be detected in a lie.[188] And religious Mongols "do not hesitate to tell lies even when saying their prayers."[189]
[Footnote 166: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 38. _Cf._ Kearns, _Tribes of South India_, pp. 64 (Reddies and Hindus generally), 68 (Reddies and Naickers); Burton, _Sindh_, pp. 197, 284; _Idem_, _Sind Revisited_, i. 314.]
[Footnote 167: Trevelyan, quoted by Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 401.]
[Footnote 168: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 399 _sq._]
[Footnote 169: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288.]
[Footnote 170: Wilkins, _op. cit._ p. 407 _sq._]
[Footnote 171: _Ibid._ p. 400. Caldwell, _op. cit._ p. 40.]
[Footnote 172: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 123. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 118, 129 _sq._; Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh_, ii. 478 (Hâbûra).]
[Footnote 173: Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171. _Cf._ Hislop, _op. cit._ p. 1.]
[Footnote 174: Arrian, _Historia Indica_, xii. 5.]
[Footnote 175: _Institutes of Vishnu_, viii. 36.]
[Footnote 176: _Satapatha-Brâhmana_, i. 1. 1. 4; iii. 3. 2. 2.]
[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ iii. 4. 2. 8. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 1. 1. 5.]
[Footnote 178: _Ibid._ ii. 2. 2. 19.]
[Footnote 179: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 82.]
[Footnote 180: _Gautama_, xiii. 14 _sqq._]
[Footnote 181: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 103.]
[Footnote 182: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 104.]
[Footnote 183: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 486.]
[Footnote 184: _Ibid._ p. 485.]
[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ p. 486.]
[Footnote 186: _Jâtaka Tales_, p. 23.]
[Footnote 187: Hardy, _op. cit._ p. 486.]
[Footnote 188: Knox, quoted by Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 239.]
[Footnote 189: Gilmour, _Among the Mongols_, p. 259.]
{93} According to Zoroastrianism, truthfulness is a most sacred duty. Lying is a creation of the evil spirits, and the most efficacious weapon against it is the holy religion revealed to man by Zarathustra.[190] In one of the Pahlavi texts it is said that when the Spirit of Wisdom was asked, "Through how many ways and motives and good works do people arrive most at heaven?" he answered thus: "The first good work is liberality, the second truth."[191] Contracts are inviolable, both those which are pledged with hand or pawn, and those by a mere word.[192] It is a duty to keep faith even with an unbeliever:--"Break not the contract, O Spitama, neither the one that thou hadst entered into with one of the unfaithful, nor the one that thou hadst entered into with one of the faithful who is one of thy own faith."[193] Greek historians and cuneiform inscriptions also bear witness to the great detestation in which falsehood was held by the ancient Persians. Herodotus writes:--"Their sons are carefully instructed from their fifth to their twentieth year in three things alone--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth. . . . The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think, is to tell a lie; the next worse, to owe a debt: because, among other reasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies."[194] In the inscriptions of Darius lying is taken as representative of all evil. He is favoured by Ormuzd "because he was not a heretic, nor a liar, nor a tyrant." His great fear is lest it may be thought that any part of the record which he has set up has been falsely related; and he even abstains from narrating certain events of his reign "lest to him who may hereafter peruse the tablet, the many deeds that have been done by him may seem to be falsely recorded."[195] Professor Spiegel tries to prove that {94} falsehood, not truthfulness, was a national characteristic of the ancient Eranians, to which their noblest men offered fruitless resistance;[196] but the facts he quotes in support of his opinion refer to their dealings with foreign nations, and have consequently little bearing on the subject. The modern Persians are notorious liars, who do not even claim to be believed, and smile when detected in a lie.[197] The nomad alone is faithful to his word; the expression, "I am a nomad," means, "You may trust me."[198]
[Footnote 190: _Bundahis_, i. 24; xxviii. 14, 16. _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xix. 4, 6; xxx. 5; xxxvi. 29. Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxii. Spiegel, _Erânische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 684 _sq._ Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, i. 164 _sq._ Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 534, 536.]
[Footnote 191: _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxxvii. 2 _sqq._]
[Footnote 192: _Vendîdâd_, iv. 5 _sqq._]
[Footnote 193: _Yasts_, x. 2.]
[Footnote 194: Herodotus, i. 136, 138. _Cf._ Stobæus, _Florilegium_, 44, vol. ii. 227; Xenophon, _Cyri Institutio_, i. 6. 33.]
[Footnote 195: Rawlinson, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 262 _sq._ n. 3.]
[Footnote 196: Spiegel, _op. cit._ iii. 686.]
[Footnote 197: Polak, _Persien_, i. 10. Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iv. 192, 247. Wilson, _Persian Life and Customs_, p. 229 _sqq._]
[Footnote 198: Polak, _op. cit._ ii. 95.]
Falsehood is a prevailing vice in other Muhammedan countries also. "Constant veracity," says Mr. Lane, "is a virtue extremely rare in modern Egypt"; and a deceitful disposition in commercial transactions is one of the most notorious faults of the Egyptian.[199] Mr. Lane partly ascribes this habit to the influence of Islam, which allows, and even commands, falsehood in certain cases. The common Moslem doctrine is, that a lie is permissible when told in order to save one's own life, or to reconcile persons at variance with each other, or to please or persuade one's wife, or to obtain any advantage in a war with the enemies of the faith.[200] But in other cases lying was highly reprobated by the Prophet; and that the people have not forgotten its sinfulness appears from the phrase, "No, I beg forgiveness of God, it was so and so," which they seldom omit when retracting an unintentional mis-statement.[201] I think it is erroneous to regard the want of truthfulness among Muhammedan nations as a result of their religion. The Eastern Christians and Buddhists are no less addicted to falsehood than the Muhammedans.[202]
[Footnote 199: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, i. 382 _sq._ _Cf._ Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 100.]
[Footnote 200: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383. Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, i. p. lxxiii. _sq._ n. [dagger].]
[Footnote 201: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383 _sq._]
[Footnote 202: Vámbéry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_, p. 232.]
The Homeric poems make us acquainted with gods and men who have recourse to fraud and lying whenever it suits their purpose.[203] The great Zeus makes no difficulty {95} in sending a lying dream to Agamemnon. Pallas Athene is guilty of gross deceit and treachery to Hector; she expressly recommends dissimulation, and loves Odysseus on account of his deceitful character.[204] No man deals more in feigned stories than this master of cunning, who makes a boast of his falsehood.[205] In the period which lies between the Homeric age and the Persian wars veracity made perhaps some progress among the Greeks,[206] but it never became one of their national virtues.[207] Yet in the Greek literature deceit is frequently condemned as a vice, and truthfulness praised as a virtue.[208] Achilles expresses his horror of lying.[209] "Not to tell a lie," was one of the maxims of Solon.[210] Pindar strongly censures a character like that of Odysseus,[211] and ends up his eulogy on Psaumis by the assurance that he never would contaminate his speech with a lie.[212] According to Pythagoras, men become like gods when they speak the truth.[213] According to Plato, the habit of lying makes the soul ugly[214]; "truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to gods and men."[215] Yet a distinction should be made between different kinds of untruth. Though the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places falsehood may often be right,[216] it must be admitted that a lie is in certain cases useful and not hateful, as in dealing with enemies, or when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm.[217] Moreover, the rulers of the State are allowed to lie for the public good, just as physicians make use of medicines; and they will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for this purpose.[218] On the other hand, if the ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in the {96} State, lie will punish him for introducing a practice "which is equally subversive and destructive of ships or State."[219] Next to him who takes a false oath, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors--elders, parents, or rulers--is most hateful to the gods.[220]
[Footnote 203: _Cf._ Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv. 150 _sq._; Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_, p. 26 _sqq._]
[Footnote 204: _Odyssey_, xiii. 331 _sq._]
[Footnote 205: _Ibid._ ix. 19 _sq._]
[Footnote 206: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 413.]
[Footnote 207: _Cf._ Thucydides, iii. 83.]
[Footnote 208: See Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 403 _sqq._]
[Footnote 209: _Iliad_, ix. 312 _sq._]
[Footnote 210: Diogenes Laertius, _Vitæ philosophorum_, i. 2 (60).]
[Footnote 211: Pindar, _Nemea_, viii. 26.]
[Footnote 212: _Idem_, _Olympia_, iv. 17.]
[Footnote 213: Stobæus, _op. cit._ xi. 25, vol. i. 312.]
[Footnote 214: Plato, _Gorgias_, p. 524 _sq._]
[Footnote 215: _Idem_, _Leges_, v. 730.]
[Footnote 216: _Ibid._ xi. 916.]
[Footnote 217: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]
[Footnote 218: _Ibid._ iii. 389; v. 459.]
[Footnote 219: Plato, _Respublica_, iii. 389.]
[Footnote 220: _Idem_, _Leges_, xi. 917. _Idem_, _Respublica_, iii. 389.]
Not without reason did the Romans of the republican age contrast their own _fides_ with the mendacity of the Greeks and the perfidy of the Ph[oe]nicians. "The goddess of faith (of human and social faith)," says Gibbon, "was worshipped, not only in her temples, but in the lives of the Romans; and if that nation was deficient in the more amiable qualities of benevolence and generosity, they astonished the Greeks by their sincere and simple performance of the most burdensome engagements."[221] Their annals are adorned with signal examples of uprightness, which, though to a great extent fictitious, yet bear testimony to the estimation in which that quality was held.[222] The Greeks had no Regulus who "chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than to falsify his word to the enemy."[223] The basest forms of falsehood were severely punished by law. According to the Twelve Tables, any one who had slandered or libelled another by imputing to him a wrongful or immoral act, was to be scourged to death,[224] and capital punishment was also inflicted on false witnesses[225] and corrupt judges.[226] However, already before the end of the Republic dishonesty, perjuries, and forgeries became common in Rome.[227]
[Footnote 221: Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, v. 311.]
[Footnote 222: _Cf._ Inge, _Society in Rome under the Cæsars_, p. 33 _sq._]
[Footnote 223: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]
[Footnote 224: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]
[Footnote 225: _Ibid._ viii. 23. Aulus Gellius, _Noctes Atticæ_, xx. i. 53.]
[Footnote 226: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, ix. 3. Aulus Gellius, _op. cit._ xx. i. 7.]
[Footnote 227: Inge, _op. cit._ p. 35.]
The ancient Scandinavians considered it disgraceful for a man to tell a lie, to break a promise, or to commit a treacherous act.[228] To kill or rob openly was a pardonable offence, if an offence at all; but he who did it secretly was a _nithinger_, a "hateful man," unless indeed he afterwards {97} openly declared his deed.[229] In the Irish Senchus Mór it is said that not only false witness, but lying in general, deprives the guilty person of "half his honour-price up to the third time";[230] and, according to the commentary to the Book of Aicill, the double of his own full honour-price is due from each person who commits the crime of secret murder.[231]
[Footnote 228: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii. 154, 183 _sq._ Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487.]
[Footnote 229: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 569. Nordström, _Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens historia_, ii. 320 _sqq._ Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 361. Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487. von Amira, 'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii. pt. ii. 173.]
[Footnote 230: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, i. 57.]
[Footnote 231: _Ibid._ iii. 99.]
In the Old Testament there are recorded, from the patriarchal age, some cases of lying, which, far from being condemned, in no way prevented the liar being a special object of divine favour. It must be admitted, however, that undue importance has been attached to some of these acts of falsehood,[232] which were committed among foreigners with a view to escaping an impending danger.[233] For instance, when Isaac, dwelling in Gerar, said of his wife that she was his sister, for fear lest the men of the place should kill him,[234] he did a thing which few conscientious men under similar circumstances would hesitate to do. As for Jacob's long course of double-dealing with his father-in-law, who was equally greedy and unscrupulous, it should be remembered that they were natives of different lands.[235] Again, when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, grossly deceived his own blind father, the intriguers, as has been pointed out,[236] manifestly felt that the blessing extorted from Isaac ought to descend upon Jacob rather than upon Esau, and inasmuch as the word of the father was held to carry with it divine validity and potency, the securing of it by fair means or foul was deemed an urgent necessity. It is obvious that the ancient Hebrews did not condemn deceit as wrong in the abstract, and that they were very unscrupulous in the use of means. Whenever {98} David was threatened by any danger, he immediately employed a falsehood which served his turn; though not incapable of generosity, he deceived enemies and friends indifferently, and there is probably no record of treachery and lying consistently pursued which surpasses in baseness his affair with his faithful servant Uriah the Hittite.[237] It is true that his conduct towards Uriah was condemned; "the thing that David had done displeased the Lord."[238] But it is significant that Yahveh himself occasionally had recourse to deceit for the purpose of carrying out his plans. In order to ruin Ahab he commissioned a lying spirit to deceive his prophets;[239] and once he threatened to use deception as a means of taking revenge upon idolaters.[240] But to bear false witness against a neighbour was strictly prohibited;[241] the false witness should suffer the punishment which he was minded to bring upon the person whom he calumniated.[242] In Ecclesiasticus lying is severely censured:--"A lie is a foul blot in a man, yet it is continually in the mouth of the untaught. A thief is better than a man that is accustomed to lie: but they both shall have destruction to heritage. The disposition of a liar is dishonourable, and his shame is ever with him."[243] "Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight."[244] According to the Talmud, "four shall not enter Paradise: the scoffer, the liar, the hypocrite, and the slanderer."[245] Only for the sake of peace, and especially domestic peace, may a man tell a lie without sinning;[246] but he who changes his word commits as heavy a sin as he who worships idols.[247] The duty of truthfulness was particularly emphasised by the Essenes.[248] He who entered their sect had to pledge himself always to love {99} truth and strive to reclaim all liars.[249] "They are eminent for fidelity," says Josephus. "Whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed without [swearing by] God is already condemned."[250]
[Footnote 232: _E.g._, by McCurdy, 'Moral Evolution of the Old Testament,' in _American Journal of Theology_, i. 665 _sq._; von Jhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606 _sq._; Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 402.]
[Footnote 233: _Genesis_, xii. 12 _sq._; xx. 2.]
[Footnote 234: _Ibid._ xxvi. 7.]
[Footnote 235: _Ibid._ ch. xxix. _sqq._]
[Footnote 236: McCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 666.]
[Footnote 237: _Cf._ Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 327; McCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 681.]
[Footnote 238: _2 Samuel_, xi. 27; xii. 1 _sqq._]
[Footnote 239: _1 Kings_, xxii. 20 _sqq._]
[Footnote 240: _Ezekiel_, xiv. 7 _sqq._ _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 402.]
[Footnote 241: _Deuteronomy_, v. 20.]
[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ xix. 1 6 _sqq._]
[Footnote 243: _Ecclesiasticus_, xx. 24 _sqq._]
[Footnote 244: _Proverbs_, xii. 22.]
[Footnote 245: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]
[Footnote 246: Hershon, _Treasures of the Talmud_, p. 69 _sq._]
[Footnote 247: _Sanhedrin_, fol. 92 A, quoted by Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 558.]
[Footnote 248: Philo Judæus, _Quod liber sit quisque virtuti studet_, p. 877 (_Opera_, ii. 458).]
[Footnote 249: Josephus, _De bello Judaico_, ii. 8. 7.]
[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ ii. 8. 6.]\
"Speak every man truth with his neighbour,"[251] was from early times regarded as one of the most imperative of Christian maxims.[252] According to St. Augustine, a lie is not permissible even when told with a view to saving the life of a neighbour; "since by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told."[253] Yet all lies are not equally sinful; the degree of sinfulness depends on the mind of the liar and on the nature of the subject on which the lie is told.[254] This became the authorised doctrine of the Church.[255] Thomas Aquinas says that, although lying is always sinful, it is not a mortal sin if the end intended be not contrary to charity, "as appears in a jocose lie, that is intended to create some slight amusement, and in an officious lie, in which is intended even the advantage of our neighbour."[256] Yet from early times we meet within the Christian Church a much less rigorous doctrine, which soon came to exercise a more powerful influence on the practice and feelings of men than did St. Augustine's uncompromising love of truth. The Greek Fathers maintained that an untruth is not a lie when there is a "just cause" {100} for it; and as a just cause they regarded not only self-defence, but also zeal for God's honour.[257] This zeal, together with an indiscriminate devotion to the Church, led to those "pious frauds," those innumerable falsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries of every description, which made the Catholic Church a veritable seat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in the minds of Christians.[258] By a fiction, Papacy, as a divine institution, was traced back to the age of the Apostles, and in virtue of another fiction Constantine was alleged to have abdicated his imperial authority in Italy in favour of the successor of St. Peter.[259] The Bishop of Rome assumed the privilege of disengaging men from their oaths and promises. An oath which was contrary to the good of the Church was declared not to be binding.[260] The theory was laid down that, as faith was not to be kept with a tyrant, pirate, or robber, who kills the body, it was still less to be kept with an heretic, who kills the soul.[261] Private protestations were thought sufficient to relieve men in conscience from being bound by a solemn treaty or from the duty of speaking the truth; and an equivocation, or play upon words in which one sense is taken by the speaker and another sense intended by him for the hearer, was in some cases held permissible.[262] According to Alfonso de' Liguori--who lived in the eighteenth century and was beatified in the nineteenth, and whose writings were declared by high authority not to contain a word that could be justly found fault with,[263]-- {101} there are three sorts of equivocation which may be employed for a good reason, even with the addition of a solemn oath. We are allowed to use ambiguously words having two senses, as the word _volo_, which means both to "wish" and to "fly"; sentences bearing two main meanings, as "This book is Peter's," which may mean either that the book belongs to Peter or that Peter is the author of it; words having two senses, one more common than the other or one literal and the other metaphorical--for instance, if a man is asked about something which it is in his interest to conceal, he may answer, "No, I say," that is "I say the word 'no'"[264] As for mental restrictions, again, such as are "purely mental," and on that account cannot in any manner be discovered by other persons, are not permissible; but we may, for a good reason, make use of a "non-pure mental restriction," which, in the nature of things, is discoverable, although it is not discovered by the person with whom we are dealing.[265] Thus it would be wrong secretly to insert the word "no" in an affirmative oath without any external sign; but it would not be wrong to insert it in a whispering voice or under the cover of a cough. The "good reason" for which equivocations and non-pure mental restrictions may be employed is defined as "any honest object, such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal."[266] In support of this casuistry it is uniformly said by Catholic apologists that each man has a right to act upon the defensive, that he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he possesses in the same way as he may defend his goods; and as for there being any deceit in the matter--why, soldiers use stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.[267]
[Footnote 251: _Ephesians_, iv. 25.]
[Footnote 252: Gass, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, i. 90.]
[Footnote 253: St. Augustine, _De mendacio_, 6 (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, xl. 494 _sq._).]
[Footnote 254: _Idem_, _Enchiridion_, 18 (Migne, _op. cit._ xl. 240); _Idem_, _De mendacio_, 21 (Migne, xl. 516). For St. Augustine's views on lying see also his treatise _Contra mendacium_, addressed to Consentius (Migne, xl. 517 _sqq._), and Bindemann, _Der heilige Augustinus_, ii. 465 _sqq._]
[Footnote 255: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 22. 2. 12, 17. _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, iii. 9. 23.]
[Footnote 256: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. **110. 3 _sq._ St. Augustine says (_De mendacio_, 2 [Migne, _op. cit._ xl. 487 _sq._]; _Quæstiones in Genesim_, 145, _ad Gen._ xliv. 15 [Migne, xxxiv. 587]) that jokes which "bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the joker a most evident indication that he means no deceit," are not accounted lies, though the thing he utters be not true. This statement is also incorporated in Gratian's _Decretum_ (ii. 22. 2. 18).]
[Footnote 257: Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 92, 236 _sqq._ Newman, _Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 349 _sq._]
[Footnote 258: von Mosheim, _Institutes of Ecclesiastical History_, i. 275. Middleton, _Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church_, _passim_. Lecky, _Rise, and Influence of Rationalism in Europe_, i. 396 _sqq._ Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 235. von Eicken, _System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, pp. 654-656, 663.]
[Footnote 259: von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 656. Poole, _Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought_, p. 249.]
[Footnote 260: Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24. 27.]
[Footnote 261: Simancas, _De catholicis institutionibus_, xlvi. 52 _sq._ p. 365 _sq._]
[Footnote 262: Alagona, _Compendium manualis D. Navarri_, xii. 88, p. 94 _sq._:--"Fur, qui est furatus aliquid, si interrogetur a judice non competenti, vel non juridice, an sit furatus tale quid, potest secura conscientia respondere simpliciter, non sum furatus, intelligendo intra se in tali die, vel anno." See also Kames, _op. cit._ iv. 158 _sq._]
[Footnote 263: Meyrick, _Moral and Devotional Theology of the Church of Rome_, i. 3.]
[Footnote 264: Alfonso de' Liguori, _Theologia moralis_, iii. 151, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 265: _Ibid._ iii. 152, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 266: _Ibid._ iii. 151, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 267: Meyrick, _op. cit._ i. 25]
Adherence to truth and especially perfect fidelity to a promise were strongly insisted upon by the code of Chivalry.[268] However exacting or absurd the vow might {102} be, a knight was compelled to perform it in all the strictness of the letter. A man frequently promised to grant whatever another should ask, and he would have lost the honour of his knighthood if he had declined from his word.[269] We are told by Lancelot du Lac that when King Artus had given his word to a knight to make him a present of his wife, he would neither listen to the lamentations of the unfortunate woman, nor to any representations which could be made him; he replied that a king must not go from his word, and the queen was accordingly delivered to the knight.[270] The knights taken in war were readily allowed liberty for the time they asked, on their word of honour that they would return of their own accord, whenever it should be required.[271] So great, it is said, was the knight's respect for an oath, a promise, or a vow, that when they lay under any of these restrictions, they appeared everywhere with little chains attached to their arms or habits to show all the world that they were slaves to their word; nor were these chains taken off till their promise had been performed, which sometimes extended to a term of four or five years.[272] It cannot be expected, of course, that reality should have always come up to the ideal. In the thirteenth century the Count of Champagne declared that he confided more in the lowest of his subjects than in his knights.[273] Moreover, the knightly duty of sincerity seems to have gone little beyond the formal fulfilment of an engagement. "The age of Chivalry was an age of chicane, and fraud, and trickery, which were not least conspicuous among the knightly classes."[274] It is significant that the English law of the thirteenth century, though quite willing to admit in vague phrase that no one should be suffered to gain anything by fraud, was inclined to hold that a man has himself to thank if he is misled by deceit, the king's court generally providing no remedy for him who to {103} his disadvantage had trusted the word of a liar.[275] Towards the end of the Middle Ages and later, crimes against the Mint and the offence of counterfeiting seals, usually accompanied by that of forging letters or official documents, were extremely common in England;[276] and false weights, false measures, and false pretences of all kinds were ordinary instruments of commerce.[277]
[Footnote 268: _Book of the Ordre of Chyualry_, foll. 18 b, 31 b, 34 b. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 84. Sainte-Palaye, _Mémoires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_, i. 76 _sq._]
[Footnote 269: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, p. 152.]
[Footnote 270: Lancelot du Lac, vol. ii. fol. 2 a.]
[Footnote 271: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ i. 135.]
[Footnote 272: _Ibid._ i. 236 _sq._]
[Footnote 273: _Ibid._ ii. 47. _Cf._ Kames, _op. cit._ iv. 157.]
[Footnote 274: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, i. 283.]
[Footnote 275: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 535 _sq._]
[Footnote 276: Pike, _op. cit._ i. 265, 269; ii. 392.]
[Footnote 277: _Ibid._ i. 142; ii. 238.]
In modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records testify a decrease of deception in England.[278] Commercial honesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the reigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions frequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a lower grade of society.[279] At present, in the civilised countries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity implies varies not only in different individuals, but among different classes or groups of people, as also among different nations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than in a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common in England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it,[280] appears strange at least to some foreigners;[281] and in certain countries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person ostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe, say, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes of speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable as being inconsistent with truth.[282] Certain philosophers have expressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty, which is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be respected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether {104} our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in our house.[283] Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called necessary lies is "the most wicked argument possible amongst men."[284] Dymond says, "If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose."[285] But this rigorous view is not shared by common sense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology.[286] Jeremy Taylor asks, "Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his friend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?"[287] Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says Professor Sidgwick, "common sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not know the truth."[288] In the case of grown-up people, however, this principle seems to require the modification made by Hutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party deceived himself does not consider it an injury to be deceived.[289] Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give support to "pious fraud," which in its crudest form is nowadays generally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has many advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a shell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they were facts we are really performing an act of substantial veracity.[290] But this argument seems chiefly to have been invented for the {105} purpose of supporting a dilapidated structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in the case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be obliged to supply another with information which he has no right to exact.[291] The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him.[292] A promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount.[293] If, before the time comes to fulfil a promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst others would maintain that a considerable alteration of circumstances has removed the obligation.[294] How far promises obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed question.[295] According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence.[296] Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made it, and that "a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise {106} which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without ignominy."[297]
[Footnote 278: _Ibid._ i. 264. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 474.]
[Footnote 279: _Ibid._ ii. 14 _sq._]
[Footnote 280: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 316. Paley, _Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy_, iii. 15 (_Complete Works_, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by Cicero (_De officiis_, ii. 14).]
[Footnote 281: See also Dymond, _Essays on the Principles of Morals_, ii. 5, p. 50 _sqq._]
[Footnote 282: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of Friends_, p. 401.]
[Footnote 283: Kant, 'Ueber ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen,' in _Sämmtliche Werke_, vii. 309.]
[Footnote 284: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 371; English translation, p. 303 _sq._]
[Footnote 285: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 57.]
[Footnote 286: Reinhard, _System der Christlichen Moral_, iii. 193 _sqq._ Martensen, _Christian Ethics_, 'Individual Ethics,' p. 216 _sqq._ Newman, _Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 274.]
[Footnote 287: Taylor, _Whole Works_, xii. 162.]
[Footnote 288: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]
[Footnote 289: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 32.]
[Footnote 290: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]
[Footnote 291: Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, § 17 (_Sämmtliche Werke_, vi. 247 _sqq._).]
[Footnote 292: Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, p. 156. Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305.]
[Footnote 293: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell, _op. cit._ p. 156 _sq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305. This is also the opinion of Thomas Aquinas (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5).]
[Footnote 294: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 306 _sq._ Thomas Aquinas says (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do what he has promised is excused "if the conditions of persons and things are changed."]
[Footnote 295: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55 _sq._ Whewell, _op. cit._ pp. 155, 159 _sqq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305 _sq._ Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 486 _sqq._]
[Footnote 296: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 34.]
[Footnote 297: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ p. 489.]
In point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between duties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe to foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is particularly conspicuous in the relations between different states, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of deceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently of the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive.[298] Deceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the eighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained through a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than successes in regular battles.[299] Lord Wolseley writes:--"As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever."[300] At the same time, there are some exceptions to the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy. Under the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts and signs shall have a specific meaning in order that belligerents {107} may carry on certain necessary intercourse, and it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an enemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained under the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as hospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons not covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not be protected by its cross.[301] A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be recognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell.[302] Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail grave dishonour; for "in actual battle enemies are bound to combat loyally, and are not free to ensure victory by putting on a mask of friendship."[303] But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not easy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it serves its purpose.[304] Finally, it is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought to be kept;[305] this was admitted even by Machiavelli[306] and Bynkershoek,[307] who did not in general burden belligerents with particularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which "international law" {108} lays on deceit against enemies do not seem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and promises given by one state to another, either in war or peace, are hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep them. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt necessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.
[Footnote 298: _Conférence de Bruxelles_, art. 14. _Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_, art. 16, 101. _Conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye_, 1899, 'Règlement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,' art. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employment of stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 23. 2. 2; Ayala, _De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari_, i. 8. 1 _sq._; Ferraris, quoted by Adds, _Catholic Dictionary_, p. 945; Nys, _Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius_, p. 128 _sq._), on the authority of St. Augustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness (_Quæstiones in Jesum Nave_, 10, _ad Jos._ viii. 2 [Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiv. 781]:--"Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest").]
[Footnote 299: Halleck, _International Law_, i. 567. Maine, _International Law_, p. 149 _sqq._]
[Footnote 300: Wolseley, _Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service_, p. 169.]
[Footnote 301: _Conférence de Bruxelles_, art. 13 _sq._ _Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_, art. 101, 114, 117. _Manual of the Laws of War on Land, prepared by the Institute of International Law_, (art. 8 (_d_). Hall, _Treatise on International Law_, p. 537 _sq._]
[Footnote 302: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 538 _sq._ Bluntschli, _Droit international_, § 565, p. 328 _sq._]
[Footnote 303: Bluntschli, _op. cit._ § 565, p. 329.]
[Footnote 304: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 539.]
[Footnote 305: Heffter, _Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart_, § 125, p. 262.]
[Footnote 306: Machiavelli, _Discorsi_, iii. 40 (_Opere_, iii. 164).]
[Footnote 307: Bynkershoek, _Quæstiones juris publici_, i. 1, p. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, "Fides servanda hosti" (Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the principle, "Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam praestitum non tenet" (Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24, 27. See Nys, _Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius_, p. 126 _sq._).]
CHAPTER XXXI
THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (_concluded_)
THE condemnation of untruthfulness and bad faith springs from a variety of sources. In the first place, he who tells a lie, or who breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another person. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment, and becomes an object of moral censure.
Men have a natural disposition to believe what they are told. This disposition is particularly obvious in young children; it is acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and, as Adam Smith observes, they very seldom teach it enough.[1] Even people who are themselves pre-eminent liars are often deceived by the falsehoods of others.[2] When detected a deception always implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas; and such a conflict gives rise to a feeling of pain,[3] which may call forth resentment against its volitional cause, the deceiver.
[Footnote 1: Reid, _Inquiry into the Human Mind_, vi. 24, p. 430 _sqq._ Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 494 _sq._ Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man_, ii. 340 _sq._]
[Footnote 2: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 106 (Mpongwe).]
[Footnote 3: Lehmann, _Hovedlovene for det menneskelige Følelseliv_, p. 181. _Cf._ Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 218.]
But men are not only ready to believe what they are told, they also like to know the truth. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is coeval with the first operations of the intellect; it seems to be an ultimate fact in the human {110} frame.[4] In our endeavour to learn the truth we are frustrated by him who deceives us, and he becomes an object of our resentment.
[Footnote 4: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 334, 340.]
Nor are we injured by a deception merely because we like to know the truth, but, chiefly, because it is of much importance for us that we should know it. Our conduct is based upon our ideas; hence the erroneous notion as regards some fact in the past, present, or future, which is produced by a lie or false promise, may lead to unforeseen events detrimental to our interests. Moreover, on discovering that we have been deceived, we have the humiliating feeling that another person has impertinently made our conduct subject to his will. This is a wound on our pride, a blot on our honour. Francis I. of France laid down as a principle, "that the lie was never to be put up with without satisfaction, but by a base-born fellow."[5] "The lie," says Sainte-Palaye, "has always been considered the most fatal and irreparable affront that a man of honour could receive."[6]
[Footnote 5: Millingen, _History of Duelling_, i. 71.]
[Footnote 6: Sainte-Palaye, _Mémoires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_, i. 78.]
How largely the condemnation of falsehood and bad faith is due to the harm suffered by the victim appears from the fact that a lie or breach of faith is held more condemnable in proportion to the magnitude of the harm caused by it. But even in apparently trifling cases the reflective mind strongly insists upon the necessity of truthfulness and fidelity to a given word. Every lie and every unfulfilled promise has a tendency to lessen mutual confidence, to predispose the perpetrator to commit a similar offence in the future, and to serve as a bad example for others. "The importance of truth," says Bentham, "is so great, that the least violation of its laws, even in frivolous matters, is always attended with a certain degree of danger. The slightest deviation from it is an attack upon the respect we owe to it. It is a first transgression which facilitates a second, and familiarises the odious ideal {111} of falsehood."[7] Contrariwise, as Aristotle observes, he who is truthful in unimportant matters will be all the more so in important ones.[8] Similar considerations, however, require a certain amount of reflection and farsightedness; hence intellectual development tends to increase the emphasis laid on the duties of sincerity and good faith. At the earlier stages of civilisation it is frequently considered good form to tell an untruth to a person in order to please him, and ill-mannered to contradict him, however much he be mistaken,[9] for the reason that farther consequences are left out of account. The utilitarian basis of the duty of truthfulness also accounts for those extreme cases in which a deception is held permissible or even a duty, when promoting the true interests of the person subject to it.
[Footnote 7: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 260.]
[Footnote 8: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iv. 7. 8.]
[Footnote 9: Besides statements referred to above, see Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 137; Hennepin, _New Discovery of a Vast Country in America between New France and New Mexico_, ii. 70; Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398 (Aleuts); Oldfield, in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 255 (West Australian natives). "The natives of Africa," says Livingstone (_Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 309), "have an amiable of desire to please, and often tell what they imagine will be gratifying, rather than the uninteresting naked truth." An English sportsman, after firing at an antelope, inquired of his dark attendant, "Is it wounded?" The answer was, "Yes! the ball went right into his heart." These mortal wounds never proving fatal, he asked a friend, who understood the language, to explain to the man that he preferred the truth in every case. "He is my father," replied the native, "and I thought he would be displeased if I told him that he never hits at all." The wish to please is likewise a fertile source of untruth in children, especially girls (Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 256).]
The detestation of falsehood is in a very large measure due to the motive which commonly is at the bottom of a lie. It is doubtful whether a lie ever is told simply from love of falsehood.[10] The intention to produce a wrong belief has a deeper motive than the mere desire to produce such a belief; and in most cases this motive is the deceiver's hope of benefiting himself at the expense of the person deceived. A better motive makes the act less detestable, or may even serve as a justification. But the broad doctrine that the end sanctifies the means is generally rejected; and the principle which sometimes allows {112} deceit from a benevolent motive has been restricted within very narrow limits by a higher conception of individual freedom and individual rights. Thus the emancipation of morality from theology has brought discredit on the old theory that religious deception is permissible when it serves the object of saving human souls from eternal perdition. The opinion that no motive whatsoever can justify an act of falsehood has been advocated not only by intuitional moralists, but on utilitarian grounds.[11] But it certainly seems absurd to the common sense of mankind that we should be allowed to save our own life or the life of a fellow-man by killing the person who wants to take it, but not by deceiving him.
[Footnote 10: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 342.]
[Footnote 11: Macmillan, _Promotion of General Happiness_, p. 166 _sq._]
It is easy to see why falsehood is so frequently held permissible, praiseworthy, or even obligatory, when directed against a stranger. In early society an injury inflicted on a stranger calls forth no sympathetic resentment. On the contrary, being looked upon with suspicion or hated as an enemy, he is considered a proper object of deception. Among the Bushmans "no one dare give any information in the absence of the chief or father of the clan."[12] "A Bedouin," says Burckhardt, "who does not know the person interrogating him, will seldom answer with truth to questions concerning his family or tribe. The children are taught never to answer similar questions, lest the interrogator may be a secret enemy and come for purposes of revenge."[13] Among the Beni Amer a stranger can never trust a man's word on account of "their contempt for everything foreign."[14] That even civilised nations allow stratagem in warfare is the natural consequence of war itself being allowed; and if good faith is to be preserved between enemies, that is because only thereby useless cruelty can be avoided and an end be put to hostilities.
[Footnote 12: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South Africa_, i. 76.]
[Footnote 13: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys_, p. 210.]
[Footnote 14: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 337.]
However, deceit is not condemned merely because it is {113} an injury to the party deceived and as such apt to arouse sympathetic resentment, but it is an object of disinterested, moral resentment also because it is intrinsically antipathetic. Lying is a cheap and cowardly method of gaining an undue advantage, and is consequently despised where courage is respected.[15] It is the weapon of the weak, the woman,[16] and the slave.[17] Fraud, says Cicero, is the property of a fox, force that of a lion; "both are utterly repugnant to society, but fraud is the more detestable."[18] "To lie is servile," says Plutarch, "and most hateful in all men, hardly to be pardoned even in poor slaves."[19] On account of its cowardliness, lying was incompatible with Teutonic and knightly notions of manly honour; and among ourselves the epithets "liar" and "coward" are equally disgraceful to a man. "All . . . in the rank and station of gentlemen," Sir Walter Scott observes, "are forcibly called upon to remember that they must resent the imputation of a voluntary falsehood as the most gross injury."[20] Fichte asks, "Whence comes that internal shame for one's self which manifests itself even stronger in the case of a lie than in the case of any other violation of conscience?" And his answer is, that the lie is accompanied by cowardice, and that nothing so much dishonours us in our own eyes as want of courage.[21] According to Kant, "a lie is the abandonment, and, as it were, the annihilation, of the dignity of a man."[22]
[Footnote 15: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, § 17 (_Sämmtliche Werke_, vi. 250); Grote, _Treatise on the Moral Ideals_, p. 254.]
[Footnote 16: Women are commonly said to be particularly addicted to falsehood (Schopenhauer, _Parerga und Paralipomena_, ii. 497 _sq._ Galton, _Inquiries into Human Faculty_, p. 56 _sq._ Krauss, _Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven_, pp. 508, 514. Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammmes_, ii. 159 [ancient Scandinavians]. Döllinger, _The Gentile and the Jew_, ii. 234 [ancient Greeks]. Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 219. Le Bon, _La civilisation des Arabes_, p. 433. Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United Brethren_, i. 16 [Iroquois]. Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 307 _sq._ [Northern Indians]. Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 349 [Eskimo of Igloolik]. Dalager, _Grønlandske Relationer_, p. 69; Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 175).]
[Footnote 17: See _infra_, p. 129 _sq._]
[Footnote 18: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]
[Footnote 19: Plutarch, _De educatione puerorum_, 14.]
[Footnote 20: Scott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose Works_, vi. 58.]
[Footnote 21: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 370; English translation, p. 302 _sq._]
[Footnote 22: Kant, _Metaphysische Anfangungsgründe der Tugendlehre_, p. 84.]
{114} But a lie may also be judged of from a very different point of view. It may be not only a sign of cowardice, but a sign of cleverness. Hence a successful lie may excite admiration, a disinterested kindly feeling towards the liar, genuine moral approval; whereas to be detected in a lie is considered shameful. And not only is the clever liar an object of admiration, but the person whom he deceives is an object of ridicule. To the mind of a West African native, Miss Kingsley observes, there is no intrinsic harm in lying, "because a man is a fool who believes another man on an important matter unless he puts on the oath."[23] A Syrian proverb says, "Lying is the salt (goodness) of men, and shameful only to one who believes."[24]
[Footnote 23: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 414. _Cf._ Sommerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 394.]
[Footnote 24: Burton and Drake, _Unexplored Syria_, i. 275. See also Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 44 _sq._]
The duties of sincerity and good faith are also to some extent, and in certain cases principally, founded on prudential considerations. Although, as the _Märchen_ tells us, it happens every day in the world that the fraudulent is successful,[25] there is a widespread notion that, after all, "honesty is the best policy." "Nothing that is false can be lasting," says Cicero.[26] "The liar is short-lived" (that is, soon detected), say the Arabs.[27] According to a Wolof proverb, "lies, however numerous, will be caught by truth when it rises up."[28] The Basutos have a saying that "cunning devours its master."[29] It has been remarked that "if there were no such thing as honesty, it would be a good speculation to invent it, as a means of making one's fortune."[30]
[Footnote 25: Grimm, _Kinder und Hausmärchen_, 'Katze und Maus in Gesellschaft,' 'Die drei Spinnerinnen,' 'Das tapfere Schneiderlein,' &c.]
[Footnote 26: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 12.]
[Footnote 27: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 119.]
[Footnote 28: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 15.]
[Footnote 29: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 307.]
[Footnote 30: Quoted by Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 64.]
Moreover, lying is attended not only with social disadvantages, but with supernatural danger. The West African Fjort have a tale about a fisherman who every day used to catch and smuggle into his house great quantities of fish, {115} but denied to his brother and relatives that he had caught anything. All this time the fetish Sunga was watching, and was grieved to hear him lie thus. The fetish punished him by depriving him of the power of speech, that he might lie no more, and so for the future he could only make his wants known by signs.[31] In another instance, the Fjort tell us, the earth-spirit turned into a pillar of clay a woman who said that she had no peas for sale, when she had her basket full of them.[32] The Nandi of the Uganda Protectorate believe that "God punishes lying by striking the untruthful person with lightning."[33] The Dyaks of Borneo think that the lightning god is made angry even by the most nonsensical untruth, such as the statement that a man has a cat for his mother or that vermin can dance.[34] In Aneiteum, of the New Hebrides, the belief prevailed that liars would be punished in the life to come;[35] according to the Banks Islanders, they were excluded from the true Panoi or Paradise after death.[36] We have already noticed the emphasis which some of the higher religions lay on veracity and good faith, and other statements maybe added testifying the interest which gods of a more civilised type take in the fulfilment of these duties. In ancient Egypt Amon Ra, "the chief of all the gods," was invoked as "Lord of Truth";[37] and Ma[=a], or Maat, represented as his daughter, was the goddess of truth and righteousness.[38] In a Babylonian hymn the moon god is appealed to as the guardian of truth.[39] The Vedic gods are described as "true" and "not deceitful," as friends of honesty and righteousness;[40] and Agni was the lord of vows.[41] The {116} Zoroastrian Mithra was a protector of truth, fidelity, and covenants;[42] and Rashnu Razista, "the truest true," was the genius of truth.[43] According to the Iliad, Zeus is "no abettor of falsehoods";[44] according to Plato, a lie is hateful not only to men but to gods.[45] Among the Romans Jupiter and Dius Fidius were gods of treaties,[46] and Fides was worshipped as the deity of faithfulness.[47] How shall we explain this connection between religious beliefs and the duties of veracity and fidelity to promises?
[Footnote 31: Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, p. 88 _sq._]
[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ p. 5.]
[Footnote 33: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 879.]
[Footnote 34: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 47.]
[Footnote 35: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326.]
[Footnote 36: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 274.]
[Footnote 37: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 112. _Cf._ Brugsch, _Die Aegyptologie_, pp. 49, 91, 92, 97; Amélineau, _Essai sur l'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte Ancienne_, pp. 182, 188, 251.]
[Footnote 38: Wiedemann, 'Ma[=a], déesse de la vérité,' in _Annales du Musée Guimet_, x. 561 _sqq._ Amélineau, _op. cit._ p. 187. _Infra_, p. 699.]
[Footnote 39: Mürdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens_, p. 37.]
[Footnote 40: Bergaigne, _La religion védique_, iii. 199. Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 18.]
[Footnote 41: _Satapatha-Brâhmana_, iii. 2. 2. 24.]
[Footnote 42: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 78. Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, pp. lvii., 164. Spiegel, _Erânische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 685.]
[Footnote 43: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii. 168.]
[Footnote 44: _Iliad_, iv. 235.]
[Footnote 45: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]
[Footnote 46: Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic_, pp. 141, 229 _sq._]
[Footnote 47: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 29. _Idem_, _De natura deorum_, ii. 23; iii. 18. _Idem_, _De legibus_, ii. 8, 11. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Romanæ_, ii. 75.]
Apart from the circumstances which in some cases make gods vindicators of the moral law in general, as conceived of by their worshippers, there are quite special reasons for their disapproval of insincerity and bad faith. Here again we notice the influence of magic beliefs on the religious sanction of morality.
There is something uncanny in the untrue word itself. As Professor Stanley Hall points out, children not in frequently regard every deviation from the most painfully literal truth as alike heinous, with no perspective or degrees of difference between the most barefaced intended and unintended lies. In some children this fear of telling an untruth becomes so neurotic that to every statement, even to yes or no, a "perhaps" or "I think" is added mentally, whispered, or aloud. One boy had a long period of fear that, like Ananias and Sapphira, he might some moment drop down dead for a chance and perhaps unconscious lie.[48] On the other hand, an acted lie is felt to be much less harmful than a spoken one; to point the wrong way when asked where some one is gone is less objectionable than to speak wrongly, to nod is less sinful than to say yes. Indeed, acted lies are for the most {117} part easily gotten away with, whereas some mysterious baneful energy seems to be attributed to the spoken untruth. That its evil influence is looked upon as quite mechanical appears from the palliatives used for it. Many American children are of opinion that a lie may be reversed by putting the left hand on the right shoulder and that even an oath may be neutralised or taken in an opposite sense by raising the left instead of the right hand.[49] Among children in New York "it was sufficient to cross the fingers, elbows, or legs, though the act might not be noticed by the companion accosted, and under such circumstances no blame attached to a falsehood."[50] To think "I do not mean it," or to attach to a statement a meaning quite different from the current one, is a form of reservation which is repeatedly found in children.[51] Nor are feelings and ideas of this kind restricted to the young; they are fairly common among grown-up people, and have even found expression in ethical doctrines. They lie at the root of the Jesuit theory of mental reservations. According to Thomas Aquinas, again, though it is wrong to tell a lie for the purpose of delivering another from any danger whatever, it is lawful "to hide the truth prudently under some dissimulation, as Augustine says."[52] It is not uncommonly argued that in defence of a secret we may not "lie," that is, produce directly beliefs contrary to facts; but that we may "turn a question aside," that is, produce indirectly, by natural inference from our answer, a negatively false belief; or that we may "throw the inquirer on a wrong scent," that is, produce similarly a positively false belief.[53] This extreme formalism may no doubt to some extent be traced to the influence of early training. From the day we learned to speak, the duty of telling the truth has been strenuously enjoined upon us, and the word "lie" has been associated with sin of the {118} blackest hue; whereas other forms of falsehood, being less frequent, less obvious, and less easy to define, have also been less emphasised. But after full allowance is made for this influence, the fact still remains that a mystic efficacy is very commonly ascribed to the spoken word. Even among ourselves many persons would not dare to praise their health or fortune for fear lest some evil should result from their speech; and among less civilised peoples much greater significance is given to a word than among us. Herodotus, after mentioning the extreme importance which the ancient Persians attached to the duty of speaking the truth, adds that they held it unlawful even "to talk of anything which it is unlawful to do."[54] I think, then, we may assume that, if for some reason or other, falsehood is stigmatised, the mysterious tendency inherent in the word easily develops into an avenging power which, as often happens in similar cases, is associated with the activity of a god.
[Footnote 48: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American Journal of Psychology_, iii. 59 _sq._]
[Footnote 49: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American Journal of Psychology_, iii. 68 _sq._]
[Footnote 50: Bergen and Newell, 'Current Superstitions,' in _Journal of American Folk-lore_, ii. 111.]
[Footnote 51: Stanley Hall, _loc. cit._ p. 68.]
[Footnote 52: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 110. 3. 4.]
[Footnote 53: See Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 317.]
[Footnote 54: Herodotus, i. 139.]
The punishing power of a word is particularly conspicuous in the case of an oath. But the evil attending perjury does not come from the lie as such: it is in the first place a result of the curse which constitutes the oath. An oath is essentially a conditional self-imprecation, a curse by which a person calls down upon himself some evil in the event of what he says not being true. The efficacy of the oath is originally entirely magical, it is due to the magic power inherent in the cursing words. In order to charge them with supernatural energy various methods are adopted. Sometimes the person who takes the oath puts himself in contact with some object which represents the state referred to in the oath, so that the oath may absorb, as it were, its quality and communicate it to the perjurer. Thus the Kandhs swear upon the lizard's skin, "whose scaliness they pray may be their lot if forsworn," or upon the earth of an ant-hill, "like which they desire that, if false, they may be reduced to powder."[55] The Tunguses regard it as the most dreadful {119} of all their oaths when an accused person is compelled to drink some of the blood of a dog which, after its throat has been cut, is impaled near a fire and burnt, or has its flesh scattered about piece-meal, and to swear:--"I speak the truth, and that is as true as it is that I drink this blood. If I lie, let me perish, burn, or be dried up like this dog."[56] In other cases the person who is to swear takes hold of a certain object and calls it to inflict on him some injury if he perjure himself. The Kandhs frequently take oath upon the skin of a tiger, "from which animal destruction to the perjured is invoked."[57] The Angami Nagas, when they swear to keep the peace, or to perform any promise, "place the barrel of a gun, or a spear, between their teeth, signifying by this ceremony that, if they do not act up to their agreement, they are prepared to fall by either of the two weapons."[58] The Chuvashes, again, put a piece of bread and a little salt in the mouth and swear, "May I be in want of these, if I say not true!" or "if I do not keep my word!"[59] Another method of charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch, or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the occasion when the oath is taken. The Iowa have a mysterious iron or stone, wrapped in seven skins, by which they make men swear to speak the truth.[60] The people of Kesam, in the highlands of Palembang, swear by an old sacred knife,[61] the Bataks of South Tóba on their village idols,[62] the Ostyaks on the nose of a bear, which is regarded by them as an animal endowed with supernatural power.[63] Among the Tunguses a criminal may be compelled to climb one {120} of their sacred mountains, repeating as he mounts, "May I die if I am guilty," or, "May I lose my children and my cattle," or, "I renounce for ever all success in hunting and fishing if I am guilty."[64] In Tibetan law-courts, when the great oath is taken, "it is done by the person placing a holy scripture on his head, and sitting on the reeking hide of an ox and eating part of the ox's heart."[65] Hindus swear on a copy of the Sanskrit _haribans_, or with Ganges water in their hands, or touch the legs of a Brâhmana in taking an oath.[66] Muhammedans swear on the Koran, as Christians do on the Bible. In Morocco an oath derives efficacy from contact with, or the presence of, any lifeless object, animal, or person endowed with _baraka_, or holiness, such as a saint-house or a mosque, corn or wool, a flock of sheep or a horse, or a shereef. In mediæval Christendom sacred relics were generally adopted as the most effective means of adding security to oaths, and "so little respect was felt for the simple oath that, ere long, the adjuncts came to be looked upon as the essential feature, and the imprecation itself to be divested of binding force without them."[67]
[Footnote 55: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 83.]
[Footnote 56: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 86.]
[Footnote 57: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 83. _Cf._ Hose, 'Natives of Borneo,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiii. 165 (Kayans).]
[Footnote 58: Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 154. Mac Mahon, _Far Cathay_, p. 253. Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale internationale_, v. 490. _Cf._ Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, pp. 193 (Toungtha), 244 _sq._ (Pankhos and Bunjogees); St. John, 'Hill Tribes of North Aracan,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 242.]
[Footnote 59: Georgi, _op. cit._ i. 110.]
[Footnote 60: Hamilton, quoted by Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 427.]
[Footnote 61: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 104.]
[Footnote 62: von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 213.]
[Footnote 63: Castrén, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 307, 309; iv. 123 _sq._ _Cf._ Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicæ_, xiv. 298.]
[Footnote 64: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 86.]
[Footnote 65: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 569, n. 7.]
[Footnote 66: Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 401. Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official_, ii. 116.]
[Footnote 67: Lea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 29. See also Kaufmann, _Deutsche Geschichte_, ii. 297; Ellinger, _Das Verhältniss der öffentlichen Meinung zu Wahrheit und Lüge im 10. 11. und 12. Jahrhundert_, pp. 30, 111.]