Part 28

Finally, as an ordinary curse, so an oath is made efficacious by bringing in the name of a supernatural being, to whom an appeal is made. When the Comanches of Texas make a sacred pledge or promise, "they call upon the great spirit as their father, and the earth as their mother, to testify to the truth of their asseverations."[68] Of the Chukchi we are told that "as often as they would certify the truth of any thing by oath or solemn protestations they take the sun for their guarantee and security."[69] Among the Tunguses an accused person takes a knife in his hand, brandishes it towards the sun, and says, "If I {121} am guilty, may the sun send diseases into my bowels as mortal as a stab with this knife would be!"[70] An Arab from the province of Dukkâla in Morocco presses a dagger against his chest, saying, "By this poison, may God thrust it into my heart if I did so or so!" If a Masai is accused of having done something wrong, he drinks some blood, which is given him by the spokesman, and says, "If I have done this deed may God kill me"; and it is believed that if he has committed the crime he dies, whereas no harm befalls him if he is innocent.[71] Among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, "to make an oath binding on the person who takes it, it is usual to give him something to eat or to drink which in some way appertains to a deity, who is then invoked to visit a breach of faith with punishment."[72] Among the Shekani and Bakele people of Southern Guinea, when a covenant between different tribes is about to be formed, their great spirit, Mwetyi, "is always invoked as a witness, and is commissioned with the duty of visiting vengeance upon the party who shall violate the engagement."[73] It seems to be a common practice in certain parts of Africa to swear by some fetish.[74] The Efatese, of the New Hebrides, invoked punishment from the gods in their oaths.[75] In Florida, of the Solomon Group, a man will deny an accusation by some _tindalo_ (that is, the disembodied spirit of some man who already in his lifetime was supposed to be endowed with supernatural power), or by the ghostly frigate-bird, or by the ghostly shark.[76] When an ancient Egyptian wished to give assurance of his honesty and good faith, he called Thoth to witness, the advocate in the heavenly court of justice, without whose justification no soul could stand in the day of judgment.[77] The Eranians swore by Mithra,[78] the Greeks by Zeus,[79] the {122} Romans by Jupiter and Dius Fidius.[80] A god is more able than ordinary mortals to master the processes of nature, and he may also better know whether the sworn word be true or false.[81] It is undoubtedly on account of their superior knowledge that sun or moon or light gods are so frequently appealed to in oaths. The Egyptian god Ra is a solar,[82] and Thoth a lunar[83] deity. The Zoroastrian Mithra, who "has a thousand senses, and sees every man that tells a lie,"[84] is closely connected with the sun;[85] and Rashnu Razista, according to M. Darmesteter, is an offshoot either of Mithra or Ahura Mazda himself.[86] Dius Fidius seems originally to have been a spirit of the heaven, and a wielder of the lightning, closely allied to the great Jupiter.[87] Zeus is all-seeing, the infallible spy of both gods and men.[88] Now, even though the oath has the form of an appeal to a god, it may nevertheless be of a chiefly magic character, being an imprecation rather than a prayer. The oaths which the Moors swear by Allah are otherwise exactly similar in nature to those in which he is not mentioned at all. But the more the belief in magic was shaken, the more the spoken word was divested of that mysterious power which had been attributed to it by minds too apt to confound words with facts, the more prominent became the religious element in the oath. The fulfilment of the self-imprecation was made dependent upon the free will of the deity appealed to, and was regarded as the punishment for an offence committed by the perjurer against the god himself.[89]

[Footnote 68: Neighbors, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, i. 132.]

[Footnote 69: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183.]

[Footnote 70: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 85 _sq._]

[Footnote 71: Hollis, _Masai_, p. 345.]

[Footnote 72: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 196.]

[Footnote 73: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 392.]

[Footnote 74: Schultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 111.]

[Footnote 75: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 334.]

[Footnote 76: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 217.]

[Footnote 77: Tiele, _History of the Egyptian Religion_, p. 229. Amélineau, _op. cit._ p. 251.]

[Footnote 78: _Yasts_, x.]

[Footnote 79: _Iliad_, iii. 276 _sqq._ Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 70.]

[Footnote 80: von Lasaulx, _Der Eid bei den Römern_, p. 9.]

[Footnote 81: _Cf._ James, _Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mountains_, i. 267 (Omahas); Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 231 (Ostyaks).]

[Footnote 82: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 87 _sq._ Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 14. Erman, _Handbook of Egyptian Religion_, p. 10.]

[Footnote 83: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 145. Erman, _op. cit._ p. 11.]

[Footnote 84: _Yasts_, x. 107.]

[Footnote 85: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii. 122, n. 4. Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 541 _sq._ Geiger, _op. cit._ i. p. lvi.]

[Footnote 86: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii. 168.]

[Footnote 87: Fowler, _Roman Festivals_, p. 141.]

[Footnote 88: _Cf._ _Iliad_, iii. 277; Ovid, _Metamorphoses_, iv. 172; Darmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 107; Usener, _Götternamen_, p. 177 _sqq._]

[Footnote 89: Grotius says (_De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 13. 12) that even he who swears by false gods is bound, "because, though under false notions, he refers to the general idea of Godhead, and therefore the true God will interpret it as a wrong to himself if perjury be committed."]

{123} Owing to its invocation of supernatural sanction, perjury is considered the most heinous of all acts of falsehood.[90] But it has a tendency to make even the ordinary lie or breach of faith a matter of religious concern. If a god is frequently appealed to in oaths, a general hatred of lying and unfaithfulness may become one of his attributes, as is suggested by various facts quoted above. There is every reason to believe that a god is not, in the first place, appealed to because he is looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, but that he has come to be looked upon as a guardian of these duties because he has been frequently appealed to in connection with them.

[Footnote 90: Among various peoples perjury is punished even by custom or law. Thus among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs a person may be fined for taking a false oath in a law case (Brownlee, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 124). In Abyssinia a man convicted of perjury "would not only lose his reputation, and be for ever incapacitated from being witness even on the most trivial question, but he would likewise in all probability be bound and severely fined, and might indeed think himself fortunate if he got off with all his limbs in their proper places, or without his hide being scored" (Parkyns, _Life in Abyssinia_, ii. 258 _sq._). The laws of the Malays punish perjury (Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 90). In India, according to the Laws of Manu (viii. 219 _sq._), he who broke an agreement after swearing to it was to be banished, imprisoned, and fined. Mediæval law-books punished perjurers with the loss of the right hand, by which the oath was sworn (Wilda, _Das Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 983 _sq._; Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 541). In a Danish law of 1537 it is said that the perjurer shall lose the two offending fingers so as to appease the wrath of God (Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 645). In other cases, again, no civil punishment is affixed to a false oath--for instance, among the Rejangs (Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 240) and Bataks of Sumatra (_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 86), the Ossetes (Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 324), Persians (Polak, _Persien_, ii. 83), and, as it seems, the ancient Hebrews (Keil, _Manual of Biblical Archæology_, ii. 348; Greenstone, 'Perjury,' in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, ix. 640), Greeks (Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 245, note), and Teutons in early times (Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 982; Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 681). Cicero says (_De legibus_, ii. 9) that "the divine punishment of perjury is destruction, the human punishment infamy"; but though perjury _per se_ was not punished in Rome, the law appears from very early times to have contained provisions for punishing false testimony (Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 1063; see also Mommsen, _Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 681). However, the fact that perjury is not treated as a crime by no means implies that it is not regarded as a sin. The punishment of it is left to the offended deity (Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 219; _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 86; Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 90 [Javanese]).]

It seems that sometimes the habit of oath-taking has, in another respect also, made it prudential for men to speak the simple truth in all circumstances. Sir W. H. Sleeman {124} observes that among the woods and hills of India the cotton and other trees are supposed by the natives to be occupied by deities who are vested with a local superintendence over the affairs of a district, or perhaps of a single village. "These," he says, "are always in the view of the people, and every man knows that he is every moment liable to be taken to their court, and to be made to invoke their vengeance upon himself or those dear to him, if he has told a falsehood in what he has stated, or tells one in what he is about to state. Men so situated adhere habitually, and I may say religiously, to the truth; and I have had before me hundreds of cases in which a man's property, liberty, or life, has depended upon his telling a lie, and he has refused to tell it to save either."[91] On the other hand, there are peoples among whom a person's word can hardly be trusted unless confirmed by an oath.[92] And one of the arguments adduced by the Quakers against the taking of oaths is that, if on any particular occasion a man swear in addition to his yea or nay, in order to make it more obligatory or convincing, its force becomes comparatively weak at other times when it receives no such confirmation.[93]

[Footnote 91: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 111 _sq._]

[Footnote 92: See, besides _supra_, Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 414; Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 186 _sq._ (Wamsara).]

[Footnote 93: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of Friends_, p. 327.]

Modes of conduct which are recommended by prudence tend on that account in various ways to be regarded as morally compulsory or praiseworthy. This subject will be discussed in connection with duties and virtues which are called "self-regarding," but in the present place it is necessary to remind ourselves of the share which early education has in making prudence a matter of moral consideration. Few duties owe so much to the training of parents and teachers as does veracity. Children easily resort to falsehood, in self-defence or otherwise, and truthfulness is therefore enjoined on them with particular emphasis.[94]

[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Priestley, in 'Essay III.' introductory to Hartley's _Theory of the Human Mind_, p. xlix. _sq._]

{125} The moral ideas referring to truthfulness are, finally, much influenced by the force of habit. Where lying is frequent it is, other things being equal, less strenuously condemned, if condemned at all, than in communities which are strictly truthful. It is natural to speak the truth. Von Jhering's suggestion that man was originally a liar, and that veracity is the result of human progress,[95] is not consistent with facts. Language was not invented to disguise the truth, but to express it. As Hutcheson remarked long ago, "truth is the natural production of the mind when it gets the capacity of communicating it, dissimulation and disguise are plainly artificial effects of design and reflection."[96] It may be doubted whether there are any other mendacious creatures in the world than men.[97] It is said that "lies are told, if not in speech yet in acts, by dogs";[98] but the instances reported of canine deceitfulness[99] are hardly conclusive. As a cautious writer observes, the question is not whether there may be "objective deceitfulness" in the dog's conduct, but whether the motive is deceit: and "the deceitful intent is a piece, not of the observed fact, but of the observer's inference."[100] Nor is the child, strictly speaking, a born liar. M. Compayré even goes so far as to say that, if the child has not been subjected to bad influences, or if a discipline of repression and constraint has not driven him to seek a refuge in dissimulation, he is usually frankness and sincerity itself.[101] Montaigne remarked that the falsehood of a child grows with its growth.[102] According to M. Perez, useful dissimulations are practised by children already at the age of two years, but generally it is only after they are three or four years old that fear of being scolded or punished will lead {126} them into falsehood.[103] We are even told that certain savages are too stupid or too ignorant to tell lies. A Hindu gentleman of the plains, in the valley of the Nerbudda, when asked what made the uncultured people of the woods to the north and south so truthful, replied, "They have not yet learned the value of a lie."[104] But as we know how readily truthful savages become liars when their social conditions change, we may conclude that their veracity was due rather to absence of temptation than to lack of intelligence. In a small community of savages living by themselves, there is no need for lying, nor much opportunity to practise it. There is little scope for those motives which most commonly induce people to practise falsehood--fear and love of gain, combined with a hope of success.[105] Harmony and sympathy generally prevail between the members of the group, and deception is hardly possible since secrets do not exist.

[Footnote 95: von Jhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606.]

[Footnote 96: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 28. _Cf._ Reid, _op. cit._ vi. 24, p. 428 _sqq._; Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 333.]

[Footnote 97: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Essays_, p. 145.]

[Footnote 98: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 405.]

[Footnote 99: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 443, 444, 451.]

[Footnote 100: Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 400.]

[Footnote 101: Compayré, _L'évolution intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant_, p. 309. See also Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 263 _sq._]

[Footnote 102: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 9 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 16).]

[Footnote 103: Perez, _First Three Years of Childhood_, pp. 87, 89.]

[Footnote 104: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 110.]

[Footnote 105: _Cf._ Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 543 (Veddahs).]

The case is different when savages come into frequent contact with foreigners. To deceive a stranger is easy, and no scruple is made of doing so. On the contrary, as we have seen, he is regarded as a proper object of deception, and this opinion is only too often justified by his own behaviour. But when commonly practised in relation to strangers, falsehood easily becomes a habit which affects the general conduct of the man. Hamzé, the teacher of the Druses, said, "When a man once gets into the way of speaking falsely, it is to be apprehended that, in spite of himself, and by the mere force of habit, he will get to speak falsely towards the brethren"; hence it is advisable to speak the truth at all times and before all men.[106] There is indeed abundant evidence that intercourse with strangers, and especially with people of a different race, has had a destructive influence on savage veracity.

[Footnote 106: Churchill, _Mount Lebanon_, iii. 225 _sq._]

This has been noticed among many of the uncivilised tribes of India. "Formerly," says Mr. Man, "a Sonthal, as a rule, {127} disdained to tell a falsehood, but the influences of civilisation, transfused through the contagious ethics of his Bengali neighbours, have somewhat impaired his truthfulness. In the last four or five years a great change for the worse has become evident, although even now, as a people, they are glorious exceptions to the prevailing idiosyncrasy of the lower class of natives in Bengal. With the latter, speaking the truth has been always an accident; with the Sonthal it was a characteristic principle."[107] Indeed, the Santals in Singbhúm, who live much to themselves, are still described by Colonel Dalton as "a very simple-minded people, almost incapable of deception."[108] The Tipperah, "where he is brought into contact with, or under the influence of the Bengallee, easily acquires their worst vices and superstitions, losing at the same time the leading characteristic of the primitive man--the love of truth."[109] Other tribes, like the Garos and Bhúmij, have likewise been partly contaminated by their intercourse with Bengalis, and acquired from them a propensity to lie, which, in former days, was altogether foreign to them.[110] The Kakhyens are at the present time lazy, thievish, and untrustworthy, "whether their character has been deteriorated by knavish injustice on the part of Chinese traders, or high-handed extortion and wrong on the part of Burmese."[111] The Ladakhis are, in general, "frank, honest, and moral when not corrupted by communication with the dissolute Kashmiris."[112] Of the Pahárias, who according to an earlier authority would sooner die than lie,[113] it is now reported that "those who have most to do with them say they cannot rely on their word, and that they not only lie without scruple, but are scarcely annoyed at being detected."[114] The Todas, whilst they call falsehood one of the worst vices and have a temple dedicated to Truth, seem nowadays only too often to forget both the temple and its object;[115] and we are told that the dissimulation they practise in their dealings with Europeans has been brought about by the habit of paying them for every insignificant item of information.[116] According to an {128} Indian civil servant quoted by Mr. Spencer, various other hill tribes, originally distinguished by their veracity, have afterwards been rendered less veracious by contact with the whites.[117]

[Footnote 107: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 14. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 20.]

[Footnote 108: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, _op. cit._ p. 217.]

[Footnote 109: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 216.]

[Footnote 110: Dalton, _op. cit._ pp. 68, 177.]

[Footnote 111: Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151.]

[Footnote 112: Moorcroft and Trebeck, _Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan_, i. 321.]

[Footnote 113: Shaw, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 274.]

[Footnote 114: Cumming, _In the Himalayas_, p. 404 _sq._]

[Footnote 115: Harkness, _A Singular Aboriginal Race inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 18.]

[Footnote 116: Metz, _Tribes inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 13.]

[Footnote 117: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 234. See also Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152. (Bódo and Dhimáls); Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 206 (Múndas).]

Of the Andaman Islanders Mr. Man observes:--"It has been remarked with regret by all interested in the race, that intercourse with the alien population has, generally speaking, prejudicially affected their morals; and that the candour, veracity, and self-reliance they manifest in their savage and untutored state are, when they become associated with foreigners, to a great extent lost, and habits of untruthfulness, dependence, and sloth engendered."[118] Riedel makes a similar remark with reference to the natives of Ambon and Uliase.[119] Mr. Sommerville believes that the natives of New Georgia, in the Solomon Islands, learned their practice of cheating from European traders.[120]

[Footnote 118: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 92.]

[Footnote 119: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua_, p. 41.]

[Footnote 120: Sommerville, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 394.]

Among the Ostyaks increasing civilisation has proved injurious to their ancient honesty, and those who live in the neighbourhood of towns or large villages have become even more deceitful than the colonists.[121] A similar change has taken place with other tribes belonging to the Russian Empire, for instance the Tunguses[122] and Kamchadales.[123]

[Footnote 121: Castrén, _op. cit._ ii. 121.]

[Footnote 122: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 518.]

[Footnote 123: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_, p. 285. Sarytchew, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of Siberia,' in _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, v. 67.]

We hear the same story from America.[124] Among the Omahas "formerly only two or three were notorious liars; but now, there are about twenty who do not lie."[125] The old men of the Ojibwas all agree in saying that before the white man came and resided among them there was less lying than there is now.[126] The Indians of Mexico, Lumholtz writes, "do not tell the truth unless it suits them."[127] But with reference to some of them, the Tarahumares, he adds that, where they have had little or nothing to do with the whites, they are trustworthy, and profit is no inducement to them, as they believe {129} that their gods would be angry with them for charging an undue price.[128]

[Footnote 124: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 69. _Cf._ Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, pp. 307, 308, 310 (Chippewyans); Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 335 _sq._]

[Footnote 125: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 370.]

[Footnote 126: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, ii. 139.]

[Footnote 127: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, ii. 477.]

[Footnote 128: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 244, 418.]

The deceitfulness of many African peoples is undoubtedly in some degree a result of their intercourse with foreigners. In Sierra Leone, says Winterbottom, the natives on the sea coast, who are chiefly engaged in commerce, "are in general shrewd and artful, sometimes malevolent and perfidious. Their long connection with European slave traders has tutored them in the arts of deceit."[129] The Yorubas, according to Burton, are eminently dishonest only "in and around the cities."[130] Among the Kalunda those who live near the great caravan roads and have had much to do with foreign traders are suspicious and false.[131] And the Hottentots, of whose truthfulness earlier writers spoke very highly, are nowadays said to be addicted to lying.[132]

[Footnote 129: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 206.]

[Footnote 130: Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 303.]

[Footnote 131: Pogge, _Im Reiche des Muata Jamwo_, p. 236.]

[Footnote 132: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's_, p. 307 _sq._]

It has also been noticed that mendacity is favoured among children by much intercourse with strangers, when "first impressions" are consciously made, as also by frequent change of environment, or of school or residence, as such changes give rise to a feeling that "new leaves" can be easily turned.[133]

[Footnote 133: Stanley Hall, in _American Journal of Psychology_, iii. 70.]

When a social unit is composed of loosely connected sub-groups, the intercourse between members of different sub-groups resembles in many respects that between foreigners. Social incoherence is thus apt to lead to deceitful habits, as was the case in the Middle Ages. The same phenomenon is to be observed in the East; perhaps also among the Desert Arabs and the Fuegians, who live in small parties which only occasionally meet and soon again separate.

Another factor which has favoured deception is social differentiation. The different classes of society have often little sympathy for each other, their interests are not infrequently conflicting, deceit is a means of procuring advantages, and, for the inferior classes especially, a means of self-protection. As Euripides observes, slaves are in {130} the habit of concealing the truth.[134] In Eastern Africa, says Livingstone, falsehood is a vice prevailing among the free, but still more among the slaves; "one can scarcely induce a slave to translate anything truly: he is so intent on thinking of what will please."[135]

[Footnote 134: Euripides, _Ph[oe]nissæ_, 392. _Cf._ Burton, _Arabian Nights_, i. 176, n. 1.]

[Footnote 135: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 309. See also Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_, ii. 59.]

Hardly anything has been a greater inducement to falsehood than oppression. Whilst the old Makololo were truthful, this is not the case with their sons, "who, having been brought up among the subjected tribes, have acquired some of the vices peculiar to a menial and degraded race."[136] The Wanyoro, who are described as "splendid liars," exercised deception chiefly to evade the intolerable exactions of their own chiefs, whereas they are fairly truthful in contact with Europeans who attempt to treat them justly.[137] The duplicity and cunning of the Malagasy are "the natural result of centuries of superstition, ignorance, and submission to the rule of tyrannical despots, with whom the spy system has always been a necessity."[138] In Morocco the independent Jbâla, or mountaineers of the North, are more to be trusted than the Arabs of the plains, who have long been suffering from the extortions of rapacious officials. The duplicity of Orientals is very largely due to their despotic form of government.[139] In India, Mr. Percival observes, "despotism in one form or other that has so long prevailed, and the consequent oppression attendant thereon, must have rendered it difficult to make way without fraud. Deception and arts of cunning, under such circumstances, being the only means at the command of the inferior portions of the community for gaining their ends, and securing the plainest rights, they would resort to them as the only way of avoiding certain ruin."[140] The Chinese habit of lying has {131} been attributed partly to the truckling fear of officers.[141] In China and many other parts of the East, says Sir J. Bowring, "there is a fear of truth _as_ truth, lest its discovery should lead to consequences of which the inquirer never dreams, but which are present to the mind of the person under interrogation."[142]

[Footnote 136: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 283.]

[Footnote 137: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 591.]

[Footnote 138: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 72.]

[Footnote 139: Vámbéry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_, p. 231.]

[Footnote 140: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288. _Cf._ Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171; Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152.]

[Footnote 141: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 835.]

[Footnote 142: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105 _sq._]

* * * * *

The regard for truth displays itself not only in the condemnation of falsehood, but in the idea that, under certain circumstances, it is a person's duty to inform others of the truth, although there is no deception in withholding it. This duty is limited by utilitarian considerations, and it is less insisted on than the duty of refraining from falsehood; positive commandments, as we have seen, are generally less stringent than the corresponding negative commandments.[143] But to disclose the truth for the benefit of others, when it is attended with injurious consequences for the person who discloses it, can hardly fail to evoke moral approval, and may be deemed a merit of the highest order.

[Footnote 143: _Supra_, i. 303 _sqq._]

The regard for truth goes a step further still. It may be obligatory or praiseworthy not only to spread the knowledge of truth, but to seek for it. The possession of knowledge, of some kind or other, is universally respected. A Wolof proverb says, "Not to know is bad, not to wish to know is worse."[144] In the moral and religious systems of the East knowledge is one of the chief pursuits of man. Confucius described virtue as consisting of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour.[145] The ancients, he says, "wishing to rectify their hearts, . . . first desired to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things."[146] Knowledge is to be pursued not for theoretical, but for {132} moral purposes; the Master said, "It is not easy to find a man who has learned for three years without coming to be good."[147] The Hindus maintain that ignorance is the greatest of evils, and that the sole and ultimate object of life should be to give and receive instruction.[148] It is said in the Laws of Manu, "A man is not therefore considered venerable because his head is gray; him who, though young, has learned the Veda, the gods consider to be venerable."[149] According to the Mahabharata, it is by knowledge that a creature is liberated, by knowledge that he becomes the Eternal, Imperceptible, and Undecaying.[150] Buddhism regards sin as folly and delusion as the cause of crime;[151] "the unwise man cannot discover the difference between that which is evil and that which is good, as a child knows not the value of a coin that is placed before him."[152] And the highest of all gifts, the source of abiding salvation, is the knowledge of the identity between the individual and God, in whom and by whom the individual lives, and moves, and has his being.[153] According to one of the Pahlavi texts, wisdom is better than wealth of any kind;[154] through the power of wisdom it is possible to do every duty and good work;[155] the religion of the Mazda-worshippers is apprehended more fully by means of the most perfect wisdom, and "even the struggle and warfare of Irân with foreigners, and the smiting of Aharman and the demons it is possible to effect through the power of wisdom."[156] A strong dash of intellectualism is a prominent feature in the Rabbinic religion. The highest virtue lies not only in the fulfilment but in the study of the law. There is a special merit bound up in it that will assist man both in this world and in the world to come; and it is said that even a bastard who is learned in {133} the law is more honoured than a high-priest who is not.[157] Among Muhammedans, also, great respect is shown to men of learning.[158] Knowledge, the Prophet said, "lights the way to Heaven"--"He dies not who gives life to learning"--"With knowledge the servant of God rises to the heights of goodness and to a noble position"--"The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr."[159]

[Footnote 144: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 6.]

[Footnote 145: _Chung Yung_, xx. 8. Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 105.]

[Footnote 146: _Tâ Hsio_, 4.]

[Footnote 147: _Lun Yü_, viii. 12. _Cf._ Faber, _Digest of the Doctrines of Confucius_, p. 60; de Lanessan, _La morale des philosophes chinois_, p. 27.]

[Footnote 148: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 263.]

[Footnote 149: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 156.]

[Footnote 150: Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 327.]

[Footnote 151: Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on the History of Buddhism_, p. 208.]

[Footnote 152: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 505.]

[Footnote 153: Rhys Davids, _op. cit._ p. 209.]

[Footnote 154: _Dinâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xlvii. 6.]

[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ i. 54.]

[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ lvii. 15 _sq._]

[Footnote 157: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 495. Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 35.]

[Footnote 158: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p. 301 _sq._]

[Footnote 159: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islâm_, pp. 47, 49.]

In Christianity the knowledge of truth became a necessary requirement of salvation. But here, as in the East, the truth which alone was valued was religious truth. All knowledge that was not useful to salvation was, indeed, despised, and science was regarded not only as valueless, but as sinful.[160] "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God."[161] If it happened that any one gave himself to letters, or lifted up his mind to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, he passed instantly for a magician or a heretic.[162] So also every mental disposition which is essential to scientific research was for centuries stigmatised as offensive to the Almighty; it was a sin to doubt the opinions which had been instilled in childhood before they had been examined, to notice any objection to those opinions, to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it might lead.[163] Yet we are told, even by highly respectable writers, that the modern world owes its scientific spirit to the extreme importance which Christianity {134} assigned to the possession of truth, of _the_ truth.[164] According to M. Réville, "it was the orthodox intolerance of the Church in the Middle Ages which impressed on Christian society this disposition to seek truth at any price, of which the modern scientific spirit is only the application. The more importance the Church attached to the profession of the truth--to the extent even of considering involuntary error as in the highest degree a damnable crime--so much the more the sentiment of the immense value of this truth arose in the general persuasion, along with a resolve to conquer it wherever it was felt not to be possessed. How otherwise," M. Réville asks, "can we explain that science was not developed and has not been pursued with constancy, except in the midst of Christian societies?"[165] This statement is characteristic of the common tendency to attribute to the influence of the Christian religion almost anything good which may be found among Christian nations. But, surely, the patient and impartial search after hidden truth, for the sake of truth, which constitutes the essence of scientific research, is not congenial to, but the very opposite of, that ready acceptance of a revealed truth for the sake of eternal salvation, which was insisted upon by the Church. And what about that singular love of abstract knowledge which flourished in ancient Athens, where Aristotle declared it a sacred duty to prefer truth to everything else,[166] and Socrates sacrificed his life on its altar? It seems that the modern scientific spirit is only a revival and development of a mental disposition which was for ages suppressed by the persecuting tendencies of the Church and the extreme contempt for learning displayed by the barbarian invaders and their descendants. Even when they had settled in the countries which they had conquered, the {135} Teutons would not permit their children to be instructed in any science, for fear lest they should become effeminate and averse from war;[167] and long afterwards it was held that a nobleman ought not to know letters, and that to write and read was a shame to gentry.[168]

[Footnote 160: Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, ii. 185. von Eicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, pp. 128-130, 589 _sqq._]

[Footnote 161: _1 Corinthians_, iii. 19. _Cf._ Lactantius, _Divines Institutiones_, iii. 3 (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, vi. 354 _sqq._); St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, viii. 10 (Migne, xli. 234).]

[Footnote 162: Chapelain, _De la lecture des vieux romans_, p. 20. As late as the middle of the seventeenth century a powerful party was rising in England who said that all learning was unfavourable to religion, and that it was sufficient for everyone to be acquainted with his mother-tongue alone (Twells, _Life of Pocock_, p. 176). The Duke de Saint Simon, who in 1721 and 1722 was the French ambassador in Madrid, states (_Mémoires_, xxxv. 209) that in Spain science was a crime, and ignorance and stupidity the chief virtues.]

[Footnote 163: Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 87 _sq._]

[Footnote 164: Ritchie, _Natural Rights_, p. 172. _Cf._ Kuenen, _Hibbert Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions_, p. 290.]

[Footnote 165: Réville, _Prolegomena of the History of Religions_, p. 226.]

[Footnote 166: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, i. 6. 1. Prof. Ritchie argues (_op. cit._ p. 172 _sq._) that a devotion to truth as such was in the ancient world known only to a few philosophers. Prof. Fowler is probably more correct in saying (_Principles of Morals_, ii. 45, 220 _sq._; _Progressive Morality_, p. 114) that it was more common amongst the Greeks than amongst ourselves.]

[Footnote 167: Procopius, _De bello Gothorum_, i. 2. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 234. Millingen, _op. cit._ i. 22 _sq._ n. [dagger]]

[Footnote 168: Alain Chartier, quoted by Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ ii. 104. See also De la Nouë, _Discours politiques et militaires_, p. 238; Lyttleton, _Life of Henry II._ ii. 246 _sq._ The ignorance of the mediæval clergy has been somewhat exaggerated by Robertson (_op. cit._ pp. 21, 22, 278 _sq._). Even in the dark ages it was not a very uncommon thing for the clergy to be able to read and write (Maitland, _The Dark Ages_, p. 16 _sqq._).]

The regard for knowledge springs in the first instance from the love of it. As Aristotle said, "all men are by nature desirous of knowledge."[169] But this feeling is not equally strong, nor equally deep, in all. The curiosity of savages, however great it often may be,[170] has chiefly reference to objects or events which immediately concern their welfare or appear to them alarming, or to trifles which attract attention on account of their novelty. If their curiosity were more penetrating, they would no longer remain savages; an extended desire of knowledge leads to civilisation. But curiosity or love of knowledge, whether in savage or civilised men, is not resolvable merely into views of utility; as Dr. Brown observed, we feel it without reflecting on the pleasure which we are to enjoy or the pain which we are to suffer.[171] When highly developed, it drives men to scientific investigations even though no practical benefits are expected from the results. This devotion to truth for its own sake, pure and disinterested as it is, has a singular tendency to excite regard and admiration in everyone who has come under its influence. From the utilitarian point of view it has been defended on {136} the ground that, on the whole, every truth is in the long run useful and every error harmful, and that we can never exactly tell in advance what benefits may accrue even from a knowledge which is apparently fruitless. But it seems that our love of truth is somewhat apt to mislead our moral judgment. When duly reflecting on the matter, we cannot help making a moral distinction between him who pursues his studies merely from an instinctive craving for knowledge, and him who devotes his life to the search of truth from a conviction that he may thereby promote human welfare.

[Footnote 169: Aristotle, _Metaphysica_, i. 1. 1, p. 980. _Cf._ Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 4.]

[Footnote 170: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42 (Eskimo). Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 177. Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151 (Kakhyens). Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 188 (Tagálog natives of the North). Bock, _Head Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209 (Dyaks). Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 320 (natives of Timor-laut). Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 108.]

[Footnote 171: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 336. Brown, _Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, lec. 67, p. 451.]

CHAPTER XXXII

THE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN'S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING PRIDE--POLITENESS

THERE are many acts, forbearances, and omissions, the offensiveness of which mainly or exclusively springs from men's desire to be respected by their fellow-men and their dislike of being looked down upon. Foremost among these are attacks upon people's honour and good name. A man's honour may be defined as the moral worth he possesses in the eyes of the society of which he is a member, and it behoves other persons to acknowledge this worth and, especially, not to detract from it by imputing to him, on insufficient grounds, such behaviour as is generally considered degrading.

The censure to which he is subject or the contempt in which he is held may no doubt affect his welfare in various ways, but it is chiefly painful as a violation of his personal dignity. Hence the duty of respecting a man's honour is on the whole contained in the more comprehensive obligation of showing deference, in words and deeds, for his feeling of self-regarding pride.

This feeling, or at least the germ of it, is found already in some of the lower animals. Among "high-life" dogs, says Professor Romanes, "wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of producing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain." A reproachful word or look from any of his friends made a {138} Skye terrier miserable for a whole day; and another terrier, who when in good humour used to perform various tricks, was never so pleased as when his joke was duly appreciated, whereas "nothing displeased him so much as being laughed at when he did not intend to be ridiculous."[1] Monkeys also, according to Dr. Brehm, are "very sensitive to every kind of treatment they may receive, to love and dislike, to encouraging praise and chilling blame, to pleasant flattery and wounding ridicule, to caresses and chastisement."[2]

[Footnote 1: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 439, 444.]

[Footnote 2: Brehm, _From North Pole to Equator_, p. 299. _Cf._ _ibid._ pp. 304-306, Brehm, _Thierleben_, i. 75, 157; Schultze, _Vergleichende Seelenkunde_, i. pt. i. 110; Perty, _Das Seelenleben der Thiere_, p. 66.]

Among the savage races of men, as among civilised peoples, self-regarding pride is universal, and in many of them it is a very conspicuous trait of character.[3] The Veddah of Ceylon, says Mr. Nevill, "is proud in the extreme, and considers himself no man's inferior. Hence he is keenly sensitive to ridicule, contempt, and even patronage. There is nothing he dreads more than being laughed at as a savage, because he dislikes clothes and cultivation."[4] Australian aborigines are described as "extravagantly proud,"[5] as "vain and fond of approbation."[6] In Fiji "anything like a slight deeply offends a native, and is not soon forgotten."[7] The Negroes of Sierra Leone "possess a great share of pride, and are easily affected by an insult: they cannot hear even a harsh expression, or a raised tone of voice, without shewing that {139} they feel it."[8] The Araucanians, inhabiting parts of Chili, "are naturally fond of honourable distinction, and there is nothing they can endure with less patience than contempt or inattention."[9] The North American Indians, says Perrot, "ont généralement touts beaucoup de vaine gloire dans leurs actions bonnes ou mauvaises. . . . L'ambition est en un mot une des plus fortes passions qui les anime."[10] The Indian of British Columbia, for instance, "watches that he may receive his proper share of honour at festivals; he cannot endure to be ridiculed for even the slightest mistake; he carefully guards all his actions, and looks for due honour to be paid to him by friends, strangers, and subordinates. This peculiarity appears most clearly in great festivals."[11] Thus, in numerous instances, "persons who have been hoarding up property for ten, fifteen, or twenty years (at the same time almost starving themselves for want of clothing), have given it all away to make a show for a few hours, and to be thought of consequence."[12] Speaking of the Eskimo about Behring Strait, Mr. Nelson observes, "As with all savages, the Eskimo are extremely sensitive to ridicule and are very quick to take offence at real or seeming slights."[13] Among the Atkha Aleuts it has happened that men have committed suicide from disappointment at the failure of an undertaking, fearing that they would become the laughing-stock of the village.[14] Among many other savages shame or wounded pride is not uncommonly a cause of suicide.[15] The Hos of Chota Nagpore have a saying that for a wife who has been reproved by her husband {140}"nothing remains but the water at the bottom of the well";[16] and in New Zealand native women sometimes killed themselves because they had been rebuked for negligence in cooking or for want of care towards a child.[17]

[Footnote 3: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 107; Colenso, _Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 56. Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 54. Raffles, _History of Java_, i. 249. St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, ii. 323 (Malays of Sarawak). Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 94. Stewart, 'Notes on Northern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 609 (Nagas). Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalmüken_, ii. 290, 295, 296, 312. Högström, _Beskrifning öfver de til Sveriges Krona lydande Lapmarker_, p. 152 (Lapps). Dall, _Alaska_, p. 392 _sq._ (Aleuts). Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 103.]

[Footnote 4: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i. 192. _Cf._ Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 537.]

[Footnote 5: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 109.]

[Footnote 6: Mathew, in Curr, _The Australian Race_, iii. 155.]

[Footnote 7: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 105. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 103 _sq._]

[Footnote 8: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 211.]

[Footnote 9: Molina, _History of Chili_, ii. 113.]

[Footnote 10: Perrot, _Memoire sur les m[oe]urs, coustumes et relligion des sauvages de l'Amerique septentrionale_, p. 76. _Cf._ Buchanan, _Sketches of the History, Manners, and Customs of the North American Indians_, p. 165; Matthews, _Ethnography and Philology of the Hidatsa Indians_, p. 41.]

[Footnote 11: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes of Canada_, p. 19.]

[Footnote 12: Duncan, quoted by Mayne, _Four Years in British Columbia_, p. 295.]

[Footnote 13: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 300.]

[Footnote 14: Yakof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_, p. 158. _Cf._ Dall, _op. cit._ p. 391 (Aleuts).]

[Footnote 15: See _infra_, on Suicide; Lasch, 'Besitzen die Naturvölker ein persönliches Ehrgefühl?' in _Zeitschr. f. Socialwissenschaft_, iii. 837 _sqq._]

[Footnote 16: Bradley-Birt, _Chota Nagpore_, p. 104. _Cf._ Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 206.]

[Footnote 17: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 57.]

Like other injuries, an insult not only affects the feelings of the victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and is consequently disapproved of as wrong. Among the Maoris, if anybody wantonly tried to hurt another's feelings, it was immediately repressed, and "such a person was spoken of as having had no parents, or, as having been born (laid) by a bird."[18] In the Malay Archipelago, "among some of the tribes, abusive language cannot with impunity be used even to a slave. Blows are still more intolerable, and considered such grievous affronts, that, by law, the person who receives them is considered justified in putting the offender to death."[19] The natives of the Tonga Islands hold no bad moral habit to be more "ridiculous, depraved, and unjust, than publishing the faults of one's acquaintances and friends . . . . ; and as to downright calumny or false accusation, it appears to them more horrible than deliberate murder does to us: for it is better, they think, to assassinate a man's person than to attack his reputation."[20] According to the customary laws of the Fantis in West Africa, "where a person has been found guilty of using slanderous words, he is bound to retract his words publicly, in addition to paying a small fine by way of compensation to the aggrieved party. Words imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all words which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they are spoken are actionable."[21]

[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ p. 53.]

[Footnote 19: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 119 _sq._]

[Footnote 20: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 163 _sq._]

[Footnote 21: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 94.]

Among the Aztecs of ancient Mexico he who wilfully calumniated another, thereby seriously injuring his {141} reputation, was condemned to have his lips cut off, and sometimes his ears also; whilst in Tezcuco the slanderer suffered death.[22] In the Chinese penal code a special book is provided for the prevention and punishment of opprobrious and insulting language, as "having naturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays."[23] Among Arabs all insulting expressions have their respective fines ascertained in the _[k.]ady_'s court.[24] It is said in the Talmud:--"Let the honour of thy neighbour be to thee like thine own. Rather be thrown into a fiery furnace than bring any one to public shame."[25]

[Footnote 22: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 463.]

[Footnote 23: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, p. 354 n.*]

[Footnote 24: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys_, p. 70 _sq._]

[Footnote 25: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]

The Roman Law of the Twelve Tables contained provisions against libellers,[26] and throughout the whole history of Roman law an attack upon honour or reputation was deemed a serious crime.[27] As for wrongful prosecution, which may be regarded as an aggravated form of defamation, the law of the later Empire required that any one bringing a criminal charge should bind himself to suffer in case of failure the penalty that he had endeavoured to call down upon his adversary.[28] Among Teutonic peoples defamatory words and libelling were already at an early date punished with a fine.[29] The Salic Law decrees that a person who calls a freeborn man a "fox" or a "hare" or a "dirty fellow," or says that he has thrown away his shield, must pay him three solidi;[30] whilst, according to one text of the same law, it cost 188 solidi (or nearly as much as was paid for the murder of a Frankish freeman)[31] to call a freeborn woman a witch or a harlot, in case the truth of the charge could not be proved.[32] {142} The oldest English laws exacted _bót_ and _wíte_ from persons who attacked others with abusive words.[33] In the thirteenth century, in almost every action before an English local court, the plaintiff claimed compensation not only for the "damage," but also for the "shame" which had been done him.[34] We further find that regular actions for defamation were common in the local courts; whereas in later days the ecclesiastical procedure against defamatory speech seems to have been regarded as the usual, if not the only, engine which could be brought to bear upon cases of libel and slander.[35] In England, as in Rome, there was a strong feeling that men should not make charges which they could not prove: before the Conquest a person might lose his tongue, or have to redeem it with his full _wer_, if he brought a false and scandalous accusation; and under Edward I. a statute decreed that if the appellee was acquitted his accuser should lie in prison for a year and pay damages by way of recompense for the imprisonment and infamy which he had brought upon the innocent.[36]

[Footnote 26: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]

[Footnote 27: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 25. _Codex Justinianus_, ix. 36. Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 1069 _sq._ Mommsen, _Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 794 _sq._]

[Footnote 28: Günther, _Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 141 _sqq._ Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 496 _sq._]

[Footnote 29: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 776 _sqq._ Nordström, _Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens historia_, ii. 293 _sqq._ Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 686 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 672 _sqq._]

[Footnote 30: _Lex Salica_, xxx. 4, 5, 2; Hessel's edition, col. 181 _sqq._]

[Footnote 31: _Ibid._ xv. col. 91 _sqq._]

[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ lxvii. 2, col. 403.]

[Footnote 33: _Laws of Hlothhaere and Eadric_, 11.]

[Footnote 34: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law till the Time of Edward I._ ii. 537.]

[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ ii. 538. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii. 409.]

[Footnote 36: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 539.]

The condemnation of an insult is greatly influenced by the _status_ of, or the relations between, the parties concerned. Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia a poor man may be insulted with impunity, when the same treatment to a rich man would cause certain bloodshed.[37] In Nias an affront is punished with a fine, which varies according to the rank of the parties.[38] The Chinese penal code lays down that a person who is guilty of addressing abusive language to his or her father or mother, or father's parents, or a wife who rails at her husband's parents or grandparents, shall be strangled;[39] and the same punishment is prescribed for a slave who abuses his master.[40] {143} According to the Laws of Manu, a Kshatriya shall be fined one hundred _panas_ for defaming a Brâhmana, a Vaisya shall be fined one hundred and fifty or two hundred _panas_, and a Sûdra shall suffer corporal punishment; whereas a Brâhmana shall pay only fifty _panas_ for defaming a Kshatriya, twenty-five for defaming a Vaisya, and twelve for defaming a Sûdra.[41] In ancient Teutonic law the fines for insulting behaviour were graduated according to the rank of the person offended.[42] The starting-point of the Roman law was that an _injuria_--which was pre-eminently an affront to the dignity of the person--could not be done to a slave as such, only to the master through the medium of his slave;[43] and even in later times, in the case of trifling injuries, such as mere verbal insults, the master had no action, unless by leave of the Praetor, or unless the insult were meant for the master himself.[44] These and similar variations spring from the same causes as do corresponding variations in the case of other injuries dealt with above. But there are also special reasons why social superiority or inferiority influences moral opinions concerning offences against persons self-regarding pride. The respect due to a man is closely connected with his station, and in the case of defamation the injury suffered by the loss of honour or reputation is naturally proportionate to the esteem in which the offended party is held. At the same time the harmfulness of an insult also depends upon the reputation of the person who offers it. According to the Gotlands Lag, one of the ancient provincial laws of Sweden, a slave can not only be insulted with impunity, but has himself to pay no fine for insulting another person[45]--obviously because he was too degraded a being to be able to detract from anybody's honour or good name.

[Footnote 37: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in _Proceed. Roy. Geo. Soc._ N.S. vii. 786.]

[Footnote 38: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 167.]

[Footnote 39: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxxix. p. 357.]

[Footnote 40: _Ibid._ sec. cccxxvii. p. 356.]

[Footnote 41: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 267 _sq._ _Cf._ _Gautama_, xii. 8 _sqq._ It is also said that "a once-born man (a Sûdra), who insults a twice-born man with gross invective, shall have his tongue cut out; for he is of low origin" (_ibid._ viii. 270. See also _Institutes of Vishnu_, v. 23; _Gautama_, xii. 1; _Âpastamba_, ii. 10. 27. 14).]

[Footnote 42: Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 295.]

[Footnote 43: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 164. Mommsen, _Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 786, n. 3.]

[Footnote 44: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 35. Hunter, _op. cit._ p. 165.]

[Footnote 45: _Gotlands-Lagen_, i. 19. 37.]

{144} The condemnation of such conduct as is offensive to other persons' self-regarding pride includes condemnation of pride itself, when displayed in an excessive degree; whereas the opposite disposition--modesty--which implies regard for other people's "self-feeling," is praised as a virtue. The Fijians say of a boasting person, "You are like the _kaka_ (parrot); you only speak to shout your own name."[46] On the other hand, among the Tonga Islanders "a modest opinion of oneself is esteemed a great virtue, and is also put in practice."[47] Confucius taught that humility belongs to the characteristics of a superior man.[48] Such a man, he said, is modest in his speech, though he exceeds in his actions;[49] he has dignified ease without pride, whereas the mean man has pride without a dignified ease;[50] he prefers the concealment of his virtue, when it daily becomes more illustrious, whereas the mean man seeks notoriety when he daily goes more and more to ruin.[51] So also humility has a distinguished place in the teachings of Lao-tsze:--"I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize, namely, compassion, economy, and humility"; "He who knows the glory, and at the same time keeps to shame, will be the whole world's valley . . . , eternal virtue will fill him, and he will return home to Taou."[52] In the Book of the Dead the soul of the ancient Egyptian pleads, "I am not swollen with pride."[53] According to Zoroastrianism, the sin of pride has been created by Ahriman.[54] Overbearingness was censured in ancient Scandinavia,[55] Greece,[56] and Rome. During our prosperity, says Cicero, "we ought with great care to {145} avoid pride and arrogance."[57] The Hebrew prophets condemned not only pride but eminence, because an eminent man is apt to be proud.[58] We read in the Talmud:--"He who humiliates himself will be lifted up; he who raises himself up will be humiliated. Whosoever runs after greatness, greatness runs away from him; he who runs from greatness, greatness follows him."[59] Christianity enjoined humility as a cardinal duty in every man.[60] In the Koran it is said, "God loves not him who is proud, and boastful."[61] Pride has thus come to be stigmatised not only as a vice, but as a sin of great magnitude. One reason for this is that it is regarded as even more offensive to the "self-feeling" of a great god or the Supreme Being than it is to that of a man. But pride must also appear as irreligious arrogance to those who maintain that man is by nature altogether corrupt, and that everything good in him is a gift of God.[62]

[Footnote 46: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 107.]

[Footnote 47: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 164.]

[Footnote 48: _Lun Yü_, v. 15. _Chung Yung_, xxvii. 7.]

[Footnote 49: _Lun Yü_, xiv. 29.]

[Footnote 50: _Ibid._ xiii. 26. _Cf._ _ibid._ xx. 2. 1.]

[Footnote 51: _Chung Yung_, xxxiii. 1.]

[Footnote 52: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 194 _sq._ _Tâo Teh King_, xxviii. 1.]

[Footnote 53: _Book of the Dead_, ch. 125, p. 216. _Cf._ Amélineau, _Essai sur l'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypt Ancienne_, p. 353.]

[Footnote 54: _Vendîdâd_, i. 11.]

[Footnote 55: Maurer, _Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes zum Christenthume_, ii. 150.]

[Footnote 56: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 253. Hermann, _Lehrbuch der Griechischen Antiquitäten_, ii. pt. i. 34 _sq._ Blümner, _Ueber die Idee des Schicksals in den Tragödien des Aischylos_, p. 131.]

[Footnote 57: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 26.]

[Footnote 58: _Cf._ Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 62 _sq._]

[Footnote 59: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58.]

[Footnote 60: _St. Matthew_, v. 11, 12, 39; vi. 25, 26, 30 _sqq._; xviii. 4; &c.]

[Footnote 61: _Koran_, iv. 40. _Cf._ Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islâm_, p. 44.]

[Footnote 62: Manzoni, _Osservazioni sulla morale cattolica_, p. 182 _sqq._]

At the same time, whilst pride is held blamable, humility may also go too far to be approved of, and may even be an object of censure. In early ethics, as we have noticed above, revenge is enjoined as a duty and forgiveness of enemies is despised; and this is the case not only among savages.[63] The device of Chivalry was, "It is better to die than to be avenged by shame";[64] and side by side with the nominal acceptance of the Christian doctrine of absolute placability the idea still prevails, in many European countries, that an assault upon honour shall be followed by a challenge to mortal combat. Too great humility is regarded as a sign of weakness, cowardice, hypocrisy, or a defective sense of honour. We are not allowed to be indifferent to the estimation in which we are held by our neighbours. Such indifference springs either from a feeble moral constitution and absence of moral shame, or from {146} a depreciation of other people's opinions in comparison with our own, and this is offensive to their _amour-propre_. Outward humility may thus suggest inward pride and appear arrogant.

[Footnote 63: _Supra_, i. 73 _sq._]

[Footnote 64: Laurent, _Études sur l'histoire de l'Humanité_, vii. 184.]

A person's "self-feeling" may be violated in innumerable ways, by words and deeds. Almost any deviation from what is usual may arouse a suspicion of arrogance. This largely accounts for the fact mentioned in a previous chapter that habits have a tendency to become true customs, that is, rules of duty. Transgressions of the established forms of social intercourse are particularly apt to be offensive to people's self-regarding pride. Many of these forms originated in a desire to please, but by becoming habitual they at the same time became obligatory. Politeness is a duty rather than a virtue.

There is probably no people on earth which does not recognise some rules of politeness. Many savages are conspicuous for their civility.[65] It has been observed that Christian missionaries working among uncivilised races often are in manners much inferior to those they are teaching, and thus lower the native standard of refinement.[66] The Samoans, we are told, "are a nation of gentlemen," and contrast most favourably with the generality of Europeans who come amongst them.[67] On their first intercourse with Europeans, the Maoris "always manifest a degree of politeness which would do honour to a more civilised people"; but by continued intercourse they lose a great part of this characteristic.[68] Among the Fijians "the rules of politeness are minute, and receive scrupulous attention. They affect the language, and are seen in forms of salutation, in attention to strangers, at meals, in dress, and, indeed, influence their manners in-doors and {147} out. None but the very lowest are ill-behaved, and their confusion on committing themselves shows that they are not impudently so."[69] The Malagasy "are a very polite people, and look with contempt upon those who neglect the ordinary usages and salutations";[70] "even the most ragged and tattered slave possesses a natural dignity and ease of manner, which contrasts favourably with the rude conduct and boorish manners of the lower class at home."[71] Of the Point Barrow Eskimo Mr. Murdoch observes that "many of them show a grace of manner and a natural delicacy and politeness which is quite surprising"; and he mentions the instance of a young Eskimo being so polite in conversing with an American officer that "he would take pains to mispronounce his words in the same way as the latter did, so as not to hurt his feelings by correcting him bluntly."[72] The forms of Kafir politeness "are very strictly adhered to, and are many."[73] Of the Negroes of Fida Bosman wrote, "They are so civil to each other and the inferior so respectful to the superior, that at first I was very much surprised at it."[74] Monrad found the Negroes of Accra surpass many civilised people in politeness.[75] So also in Morocco even country-folks are much more civil in their general behaviour than the large majority of Europeans. "The conversations of the Arabs," says d'Arvieux, "are full of civilities; one never hears anything there that they think rude and unbecoming."[76] Politeness is a characteristic of all the great nations of the East. The Chinese have brought the practice of it "to a pitch of perfection which is not only unknown in Western lands, but, previous to experience, is unthought of and almost unimaginable. The rules of ceremony, we are reminded in the Classics, are three {148} hundred, and the rules of behaviour three thousand."[77] In Europe courtesy was recommended as the most amiable of knightly qualities; and from "the wild and overstrained courtesies of Chivalry" has been derived our present system of manners.[78]

[Footnote 65: Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der Naturvölker_, vi. 143 _sqq._ (Polynesians). Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 195 (Efatese). Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 157. MacGregor, 'Lagos, Abeokuta and the Alake,' in _Jour. African Soc._ July, 1904, p. 466 (Yorubas).]

[Footnote 66: Brenchley, _Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. 'Curaçoa' among the South Sea Islands_, p. 349.]

[Footnote 67: Hood, _Cruise in H.M.S. 'Fawn' in the Western Pacific_, p. 59 _sq._]

[Footnote 68: Dieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 108 _sqq._ See also Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 53 _sqq._]

[Footnote 69: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 129. _Cf._ _ibid._ pp. 128, 131 _sq._; Anderson, _Notes of Travel in Fiji_, p. 135.]

[Footnote 70: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 325.]

[Footnote 71: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 71.]

[Footnote 72: Murdoch, 'Ethn. Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42.]

[Footnote 73: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 203.]

[Footnote 74: Bosman, _Description of the Coast of Guinea_, p. 317.]

[Footnote 75: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 9.]

[Footnote 76: d'Arvieux, _Travels in Arabia the Desart_, p. 141.]

[Footnote 77: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 35.]

[Footnote 78: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 46. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 84. Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, iv. 211. Turner, _History of England_, iii. 473. Mills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 161 _sq._ Scott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose Works_, vi. 58.]

The rules of politeness and good manners refer to all sorts of social intercourse and vary indefinitely in detail. They tell people how to sit or stand in each other's presence, or how to pass through a door; a Zulu would be fined for going out of a hut back first.[79] They prescribe how to behave at a meal; the Indians of British Columbia consider it improper to talk on such an occasion,[80] and it appears that in England also, in the fifteenth century, "people did not hold conversation while eating, but that the talk and mirth began with the liquor."[81] Politeness demands that a person should never interrupt another while speaking;[82] or that he should avoid contradicting a statement;[83] or, not infrequently, that he should rather tell a pleasant untruth than an unpleasant truth.[84] At times it requires the use of certain phrases, words of thanks, flattery, or expressions of self-humiliation. In Chinese there is "a whole vocabulary of words which are indispensable to one who wishes to pose as a 'polite' person, words in which whatever belongs to the speaker is treated with scorn and contempt, and whatever relates to the person addressed is honourable. The 'polite' Chinese will refer to his wife, if driven to the extremity of referring {149} to her at all, as his 'dull thorn,' or in some similar elegant figure of speech."[85]

[Footnote 79: Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 190 _sq._]

[Footnote 80: Woldt, _Kaptein Jacobsens Reiser til Nordamerikas Nordvestkyst_, p. 99.]

[Footnote 81: Wright, _Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England during the Middle Ages_, p. 396.]

[Footnote 82: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 72. Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 385 (Kutchin). Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 157. Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 136 _sq._ d'Arvieux, _op. cit._ p. 139 _sq._; Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iii. 259 (Bedouins).]

[Footnote 83: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 334 _sq._; Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 157 (Greenlanders). Dobrizhofifer, _op. cit._ ii. 137 (Abipones). d'Arvieux, _op. cit._ p. 141 (Bedouins).]

[Footnote 84: _Supra_, ii. 111.]

[Footnote 85: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 274.]

Politeness enjoins the performance of certain ceremonies upon persons who meet or part. The custom of salutation is of world-wide prevalence, though there are certain savages who are said to have no greetings except when they have learnt the practice from the whites.[86] As a ceremony prescribed by public opinion it is an obligatory tribute paid to another person's "self-feeling," whatever be the original nature of the act which has been adopted for the purpose. The form of salutation has sometimes been borrowed from questions springing from curiosity or suspicion. Among the Californian Miwok, when anybody meets a stranger he generally salutes him, "Whence do you come? What are you at?"[87] The Abipones "would think it quite contrary to the laws of good-breeding, were they to meet any one and not ask him where he was going";[88] and a similar question is also a very common mode of greeting among the Berbers of Southern Morocco. Very frequently a salutation consists of some phrase which is expressive of goodwill. It may be an inquiry about the other person's health or welfare, as the English "How are you?" "How do you do?" Among the Burmese two relatives or friends who meet begin a conversation by the expressions, "Are you well? I am well," if they have been some time separated; whereas those who are daily accustomed to meet say, "Where are you going?"[89] The Moors ask, "What is your news?" or, "Is nothing wrong?" The ordinary salutation of the Zulus is, "I see you, are you well?" after which the snuffbox, the token of friendship, is passed round.[90] Among several tribes of California, again, a person when greeting another {150} simply utters a word which means "friendship."[91] The goodwill is often directly expressed in the form of a wish, like our "Good day!" "Good night!" Among the Hebrews the salutation at meeting or entering another's house seems at first to have consisted most commonly in an inquiry after mutual welfare,[92] but in later times "Health!" or "Peace to thee!" became the current greeting.[93] According to the Laws of Manu, a Brâhmana should be saluted, "May thou be long-lived, O gentle one!"[94] The Greeks said [Greek: chai=re] ("Be joyful!"); the Romans, _Salve!_ ("Be in health!") especially on meeting, and _Vale!_ ("Be well!") on parting. The good wish may have the form of a prayer. The Moors say, "May God give thee peace!" "May God give thee a good night!" and the English "Good-bye" and the French _Adieu_ are prayers curtailed by the progress of time. But there is no foundation for Professor Wundt's assertion that "the words employed in greeting are one and all prayer formulæ in a more or less rudimentary state."[95] A salutation may, finally, be a verbal profession of subjection, as the Swedish "Ödmjukaste tjänare," that is, (I am your) "most humble servant."

[Footnote 86: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 177. Dall, _op. cit._ p. 397 (Aleuts). Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 125; Rink, _Danish Greenland_, p. 223; Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 157 (Greenlanders). Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, iii. 244 (Dacotahs). Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, pp. 230 (Kumi), 256 (Kukis).]

[Footnote 87: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 347.]

[Footnote 88: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 138.]

[Footnote 89: Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 90: Tyler, _op. cit._ p. 190.]

[Footnote 91: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 58.]

[Footnote 92: _Genesis_, xliii. 27. _Exodus_, xviii. 7.]

[Footnote 93: _Judges_, xix. 20. _1 Chronicles_, xii. 18. _Cf._ Keil, _Manual of Biblical Archæology_, ii. 183.]

[Footnote 94: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 125.]

[Footnote 95: Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 179.]

Salutations may consist not only in words spoken, but in conventional gestures, either accompanied by some verbal expression or performed silently.[96] They may be tokens of submission or reverence, as cowering, crouching, and bowing. Or they may originally have been signs of disarming or defencelessness, as uncovering some particular portion of the body. Von Jhering suggests that the offering of the hand belongs to the same group of salutations, its object being to indicate that the other person has nothing to fear;[97] but in many cases at least handshaking seems to have the same origin as other ceremonies consisting {151} in bodily contact. Salutatory gestures may express not only absence of evil intentions but positive friendliness; among respectable Moors it is a common mode of greeting that each party places his right hand on his heart to indicate, as Jackson puts it, "that part to be the residence of the friend."[98] Various forms of salutation by contact, such as clasping, embracing, kissing, and sniffing, are obviously direct expressions of affection;[99] and we can hardly doubt that the joining of hands serves a similar object when we find it combined with other tokens of goodwill. Among some of the Australian natives, friends, on meeting after an absence, "will kiss, shake hands, and sometimes cry over one another."[100] In Morocco equals salute each other by joining their hands with a quick motion, separating them immediately, and kissing each his own hand. The Soolimas, again, place the palms of the right hands together, carry them then to the forehead, and from thence to the left side of the chest.[101] But bodily union is also employed as a method of transferring either blessings or conditional curses, and it seems probable that certain salutatory acts have vaguely or distinctly such transference in view. Among the Masai, who spit on each other both when they meet and when they part, spitting "expresses the greatest goodwill and the best of wishes";[102] and in a previous chapter I have endeavoured to show that the object of certain reception ceremonies is to transfer a conditional curse to the stranger who is received as a guest.[103] On the same principle as underlies these ceremonies, handshaking may be a means of joining in compact, analogous to a common meal[104] and the blood-covenant.[105]

[Footnote 96: See Tylor, 'Salutations,' in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, xxi. 235 _sqq._; Ling Roth, 'Salutations,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 166 _sqq._]

[Footnote 97: von Jhering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, ii. 649 _sqq._]

[Footnote 98: Jackson, _Account of Timbuctoo, &c._ p. 235.]

[Footnote 99: See _infra_, on the Origin and Development of the Altruistic Sentiment.]

[Footnote 100: Hackett, 'Ballardong or Ballerdokking Tribe,' in Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 343.]

[Footnote 101: Laing, _Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko, and Soolima Countries_, p. 368.]

[Footnote 102: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 166.]

[Footnote 103: _Supra_, i. 590 _sq._]

[Footnote 104: _Supra_, i. 587.]

[Footnote 105: See _infra_, on the Origin and Development of the Altruistic Sentiment.]

Being an homage rendered to other persons self-regarding {152} pride, the rule of politeness is naturally most exacting in relation to superiors. Many of its forms have, in fact, originated in humble or respectful behaviour towards rulers, masters, or elders, and, often in a modified shape, become common between equals after they have lost their original meaning.[106] It has been noticed that the cruelty of despots always engenders politeness, whereas the freest nations are generally the rudest in manners.[107] Politeness is further in a special degree shown by men to women, not only among ourselves, but even among many savages;[108] in this case courtesy is connected with courtship. Strangers or remote acquaintances, also, have particular claims to be treated with civility, whereas politeness is of little moment in the intercourse of friends; it imitates kindness, and is resorted to where the genuine feeling is wanting.[109] And in the capacity of guest, the stranger is often for the time being flattered with exquisite marks of honour, for reasons which have been stated in another connection.

[Footnote 106: See Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 'Ceremonial Institutions,' _passim_.]

[Footnote 107: Johnston, _Uganda_, ii. 685.]

[Footnote 108: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur Ethn._ iii. 270. Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 485 (Wakamba). See also _supra_, i. ch. xxvi.]

[Footnote 109: _Cf._ Tucker, _Light of Nature_, ii. 599 _sqq._; Joubert, _Pensées_, i. 243.]

CHAPTER XXXIII

REGARD FOR OTHER PERSONS' HAPPINESS IN GENERAL--GRATITUDE--PATRIOTISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

IN previous chapters we have dealt with moral ideas concerning various modes of conduct which have reference to other men's welfare--to their life or bodily comfort, their liberty, property, knowledge of truth, or self-regarding pride. But the list of duties which we owe to our fellow-creatures is as yet by no means complete. Any act, forbearance, or omission, which in some way or other diminishes or increases their happiness may on that account become a subject of moral blame or praise, being apt to call forth sympathetic retributive emotions.

To do good to others is a rule which has been inculcated by all the great teachers of morality. According to Confucius, benevolence is the root of righteousness and a leading characteristic of perfect virtue.[1] In the Taouist 'Book of Secret Blessings' men are enjoined to be compassionate and loving, and to devote their wealth to the good of their fellow-men.[2] The moralists of ancient India teach that we should with our life, means, understanding, and speech, seek to advance the welfare of other creatures in this world; that we should do so without expecting reciprocity; and that we should enjoy the prosperity of others even though ourselves unprosperous.[3] The writers {154} of classical antiquity repeatedly give expression to the idea that man is not born for himself alone, but should assist his fellow-men to the best of his ability.[4] In the Old Testament we meet with the injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself";[5] and this was declared by Christ to be of equal importance with the commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God."[6]

[Footnote 1: _Lun Yü_, xvii. 6. Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 108.]

[Footnote 2: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 272 _sq._]

[Footnote 3: Muir, _Religious and Moral Sentiments rendered from Sanskrit Writers_, p. 107 _sq._ Monier Williams, _Indian Wisdom_, p. 448.]

[Footnote 4: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 275 _sqq._]

[Footnote 5: _Leviticus_, xix. 18.]

[Footnote 6: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 39.]