Part 42

The question whether early man was in the habit of eating human flesh may thus, I think, be resolved into the question whether his natural shrinking from it may be assumed to have been subdued by any of those factors which in certain circumstances have induced men to become habitual cannibals. For such an assumption I find no sufficient grounds. On the contrary, I maintain that it is made highly improbable by the fact that cannibalism is much less prevalent among the lowest savages than among races somewhat more advanced in culture.[150] In America, instead of being confined to savage peoples, it was practised "to a greater extent and with more horrible rites among the most civilised. Its religious inception," Mr. Dorman adds, "was the cause of this."[151] Humboldt observed long ago:--"The nations who hold it a point of honour to devour their prisoners are not always the rudest and most ferocious . . . . The Cabres, the Guipunavis, and the Caribees, have {579} always been more powerful and more civilised than the other hordes of the Oroonoko; and yet the former are as much addicted to anthropophagy, as the last are repugnant to it."[152] In Brazil, Martius found the cannibalism of the Central Tupis to form a strange contrast to their relatively high state of culture.[153] Cannibals like the Fijians and Maoris were on the verge of semi-civilisation, and the Bataks of Sumatra were already in early times so advanced as to frame an alphabet of their own, though after the Indian model. Among the African Niam-Niam and Monbuttu a great predilection for human flesh coexists with a remarkable degree of culture; whereas in the dwarf tribes of Central Africa, which are of a very low type, Mr. Burrows never heard of a single case of cannibalism.[154]

[Footnote 150: See Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 162 _sq._; Schneider, _Die Naturvölker_, i. 186; Bergemann, _op. cit._ p. 53; Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 352; Sutherland, _Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct_, i. 372.]

[Footnote 151: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 152.]

[Footnote 152: von Humboldt, _op. cit._ v. 424 _sq._]

[Footnote 153: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 199 _sq._]

[Footnote 154: Burrows, _Land of the Pigmies_, p. 149.]

It would be very instructive to follow the history of cannibalism among those peoples who are, or have lately been, addicted to it, if we were able to do so; but the subject is mostly obscure. The most common change which we have had an opportunity to notice is the decline and final disappearance of the practice under European influence; but we must not assume that every change has been in the direction towards extinction. Among the East African Wadoe and Wabembe cannibalism is, according to their own account, of modern origin.[155] Mr. Torday informs me that among some of the Congo natives it is spreading in the present day. In the Solomon Islands it has recently extended itself; it is asserted by the elder natives of Florida that man's flesh was formerly never eaten except in sacrifice, and that human sacrifice is an innovation introduced from further west.[156] Erskine maintains that in Fiji cannibalism, though a very ancient custom, did not prevail in earlier times to the same extent as it did more recently;[157] and Mr. Fornander has arrived {580} at the conclusion that among the Polynesians this practice was not an original heirloom brought with them from their primitive homes in the Far West, but was adopted subsequently by a few of the tribes under conditions and circumstances now unknown.[158] For various reasons, then, it is an illegitimate supposition to regard the cannibalism of modern savages as a survival from the first infancy of mankind, or, more generally, from a stage through which the whole human race has passed.

[Footnote 155: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 214.]

[Footnote 156: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 343.]

[Footnote 157: Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 272.]

[Footnote 158: Fornander, _Account of the Polynesian Race_, i. 132.]

As for the moral opinions about cannibalism, we may assume that peoples who abstain from it also generally disapprove of it, or would do so if they were aware of its being practised. Aversion, as we have often noticed, leads to moral indignation, especially where the moral judgment is little influenced by reflection. Another source of the condemnation of cannibalism may be sympathetic resentment resulting from the idea that the dead is annihilated or otherwise injured by the act, or from the feeling that it is an insult to him to use his body as an article of food; but this could certainly not be the origin of savages disapproval of eating their foes. Among civilised races, as well as among non-anthropophagous savages, horror or disgust is undoubtedly the chief reason why cannibalism is condemned as wrong. This emotion is often so intense that the same people whose moral feelings are little affected by a conquest, with all its horrors, made for the purpose of gain, shudder at the stories of wars waged by famished savages for the purpose of procuring human flesh for food. On the other hand, where the natural aversion to such food is for some reason or other overcome, the disapproval of cannibalism is in consequence no longer felt. But an attitude of moral indifference towards this practice has also been advocated on a totally different ground, by persons whose moral emotions are too much tempered by thought to allow them to pronounce an act as wrong simply because it creates in them {581} disgust. Thus, Montaigne argued that it is more barbarous to torture a man to death under colour of piety and religion than to roast and eat him after he is dead.[159] And he quotes with apparent agreement the opinion of some Stoic philosophers that there is no harm in feeding upon human carcases to avoid starvation.[160]

[Footnote 159: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 30.]

[Footnote 160: Diogenes Laertius, _Vitæ philosophorum_, vii. 1. 64 (121); vii. 7. 12 (188). Zeller, _Stoics_, p. 307.]

CHAPTER XLVII

THE BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL BEINGS

WE now come to the last of those six groups of moral ideas into which we have divided our subject--ideas concerning conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that are regarded as supernatural. But before we enter upon a discussion of human behaviour in relation to such beings, it is necessary to say some words about man's belief in their existence and the general qualities attributed to them.

Men distinguish between two classes of phenomena--"natural" and "supernatural,"[1] between phenomena which they are familiar with and, in consequence, ascribe to "natural causes," and other phenomena which seem to them unfamiliar, mysterious, and are therefore supposed to spring from causes of a "supernatural" character. We meet with this distinction at the lowest stages of culture known to us, as well as at higher stages. It may be that in the mind of a savage the natural and supernatural are often confused, and that no definite limit can be drawn between the phenomena which he refers to the one class and those which he refers to the other; but he certainly sees a difference between events of everyday occurrence or ordinary objects of nature and other events or objects which fill him with mysterious awe. The germ of such a {583} distinction is found even in the lower animal world. The horse fears the whip but it does not make him shy; on the other hand, he may shy when he sees an umbrella opened before him or a paper moving on the ground. The whip is well known to the horse, whereas the moving paper or umbrella is strange and uncanny. Dogs and cats are alarmed by an unusual noise or appearance, and remain uneasy till they have by examination satisfied themselves of the nature of its cause.[2] Professor Romanes frightened a dog by attaching a fine thread to a bone and surreptitiously drawing it from the animal, giving to the bone the appearance of self-movement; and the same dog was frightened by soap-bubbles.[3] Even a lion is scared by an unexpected noise or the sight of an unfamiliar object; a horse, the lion's favourite prey, has been known to wander for days in the vicinity of a troop of these animals and be left unmolested simply because it was blanketed and knee-haltered.[4] And we are told of a tiger which stood trembling and roaring in an ecstasy of fear when a mouse tied by a string to a stick had been inserted into its cage.[5] Little children are apt to be terrified by the strange and irregular behaviour of a feather as it glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air.[6]

[Footnote 1: I do not share the objections raised by various writers to the term "supernatural." It has the sanction of common usage; and I consider it preferable to the word "superhuman," when applied to inanimate things or animals which are objects of worship.]

[Footnote 2: Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 339.]

[Footnote 3: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, 455 _sq._]

[Footnote 4: Gillmore, quoted by King, _The Supernatural_, p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: Basil Hall, quoted _ibid._ p. 81. See also _ibid._ p. 78 _sqq._; Vignioli, _Myth and Science_, p. 58 _sqq._]

[Footnote 6: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 205 _sq._]

But the primitive mind not only distinguishes between the natural and the supernatural, it makes, practically, yet a further distinction. The supernatural, like the natural, may be looked upon in the light of mechanical energy, which discharges itself without the aid of any volitional activity. This is, for instance, the case with the supernatural force inherent in a tabooed object; mere contact with such an object communicates the taboo infection. So also the baneful energy in a curse is originally conceived as a kind of supernatural miasma, which injures or destroys anybody to whom it cleaves; in fact, to {584} taboo a certain thing commonly consists in charging it with a curse. On the other hand, supernatural qualities may also be attributed to the mental constitution of animate beings, especially to their will. Such an attribution makes them supernatural beings, as distinct from any ordinary individuals who, without being endowed with special miraculous gifts, may make use of supernatural mechanical energy in magical practices. This distinction is in many cases vague; a wizard may be looked upon as a god and a god as a wizard. But it is nevertheless essential, and is at the bottom of the difference between religion and magic. Religion may be defined as a belief in and a regardful[7] attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship. Supernatural mechanical power, on the other hand, is applied in magic. He who performs a purely magical act utilises such power without making any appeal at all to the will of a supernatural being.[8]

[Footnote 7: Though somewhat indefinite, the epithet "regardful" seems a necessary attribute of a religious act. We do not call it religion when a savage flogs his fetish to make it submissive.]

[Footnote 8: See _infra_, Additional Notes.]

This, I think, is what we generally understand by religion and magic. But in the Latin word _religio_ there seems to be no indication of such a distinction. _Religio_ is probably related to _religare_, which means "to tie." It is commonly assumed that the relationship between these words implies that in religion man was supposed to be tied by his god. But I venture to believe that the connection between them allows of another and more natural interpretation--that it was not the man who was tied by the god, but the god who was tied by the man. This interpretation was suggested to me by certain ideas and practices prevalent in Morocco. The Moors are in the habit of tying rags to objects belonging to a _síyid_, that is, a place where a saint has, or is supposed to have, his grave, or where such a person is said to have sat or camped. In very many cases, at least, this tying of rags is _[(]âr_ upon the {585} saint, and _l-[(]âr_ implies the transference of a conditional curse.[9] Thus, in the Great Atlas Mountains I found a large number of rags tied to a pole which was stuck in a cairn dedicated to the great saint Mûlai [(]Abd-[)u]l-[k.]âder, and when I asked for an explanation the answer was that petitioners generally fasten a strip of their clothes to the pole muttering some words like these:--"O saint, behold! I promised thee an offering, and I will not release (literally 'open') thee until thou attendest to my business." If the petitioner's wish is fulfilled he goes back to the place, offers the sacrifice which he promised, and unties the knot which he made. A Berber servant of mine from Aglu in Sûs told me that once when in prison he invoked Lälla R[)a][h.]ma Yusf, a great female saint whose tomb is in a neighbouring district, and tied his turban, saying, "I am tying thee, Lälla R[)a][h.]ma Yusf, and I am not going to open the knot till thou hast helped me." Or a person in distress will go to her grave and knot the leaves of some palmetto growing in its vicinity, with the words, "I tied thee here, O saint, and I shall not release thee unless thou releasest me from the toils in which I am at present." All this is what we should call magic, but the Romans would probably have called it _religio_. They were much more addicted to magic than to true religion; they wanted to compel the gods rather than to be compelled by them. Their _religio_ was probably nearly akin to the Greek [Greek: kata/desmos], which meant not only an ordinary tie, but also a magic tie or knot or a bewitching thereby.[10] Plato speaks of persons who with magical arts and incantations bound the gods, as they said, to execute their will.[11] That _religio_, however, from having originally a magical significance, {586} has come to be used in the sense which we attribute to the term "religion," is not difficult to explain. Men make use of magic not only in relation to their fellow men, but in relation to their gods. Magical and religious elements are often almost inseparably intermingled in one and the same act; and, as we shall soon see, the magical means of constraining a god are often externally very similar to the chief forms of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice.

[Footnote 9: See Westermarck, '_L-[(]âr_, or the Transference of Conditional Curses in Morocco,' in _Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 361 _sqq._]

[Footnote 10: I am indebted to my friend Mr. R. R. Marett for drawing my attention to this meaning of the word [Greek: kata/desmos]. So also the verb [Greek: katade/ô] means not only "to tie" but "to bind by magic knots" (Athenaeus, _Deipnosophistæ_, xv. 9, p. 670; Dio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, l. 5), and [Greek: kata/desis] is used to denote "a binding by magic knots" (Plato, _Leges_, xi. 933). See Liddell-Scott, _Greek-English Lexicon_, p. 754; Harrison, _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_, p. 138 _sqq._]

[Footnote 11: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 364.]

That mystery is the essential characteristic of supernatural beings is proved by innumerable facts. It is testified by language. The most prominent belief in the religion of the North American Indians was their theory of _manitou_, that is, of "a spiritual and mysterious power thought to reside in some material form." The word is Algonkin, but all the tribes had some equivalent for it.[12] Thus the Dacotahs express the essential attribute of their deities by the term _wakan_, which signifies anything which they cannot comprehend, "whatever is wonderful, mysterious, superhuman, or supernatural."[13] The Navaho word _d[)i]g[)i]'n_ likewise means "sacred, divine, mysterious, or holy";[14] and so does the Hidatsa term _mahopa_.[15] In Fiji "the native word expressive of divinity is _kalou_, which, while used to denote the people's highest notion of a god, is also constantly heard as a qualification of anything great or marvellous."[16] The Maoris of New Zealand applied the word _atua_, which is generally translated as "god," not only to spirits of every description, but to various phenomena not understood, such as menstruation and foreign marvels, a compass for instance, or a barometer.[17] The natives of Madagascar, {587} says Ellis, designate by the term _ndriamanitra_, or god, everything that exceeds the capacity of their understanding. "Whatever is new and useful and extraordinary, is called god. . . . Rice, money, thunder and lightning, and earthquakes, are all called god. . . . _Taratasy_, or book, they call god, from its wonderful capacity of speaking by merely looking at it."[18] The Monbuttu use the word _kilima_ for anything they do not understand--the thunder, a shadow, the reflection in water, as well as the supreme being in which they vaguely believe.[19] The Masai conception of the deity (_ng[)a]i_), says Dr. Thomson, "seems to be marvellously vague. I was Ng[)a]i. My language was Ng[)a]i. Ng[)a]i was in the steaming holes. . . . In fact, whatever struck them as strange or incomprehensible, that they at once assumed had some connection with Ng[)a]i."[20] Mr. and Mrs. Hinde use "the Unknown" as their equivalent of the word _ng[)a]i_.[21]

[Footnote 12: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 226. Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. lxxix. Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 102. Hoffman, 'Menomini Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xiv. 39, n. 1.]

[Footnote 13: Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_, iv. 642. Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 366. McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' _ibid._ xv. 182 _sq._]

[Footnote 14: Matthews, _Navaho Legends_, p. 37.]

[Footnote 15: _Idem_, _Hidatsa Indians_, p. 47 _sq._]

[Footnote 16: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 183.]

[Footnote 17: Best, 'Lore of the Whare-Kohanga,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ xiv. 210. Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 116, 118. The word _tupua_ (or _tipua_) is used in a very similar way (Tregear, _Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary_, p. 557).]

[Footnote 18: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 390 _sqq._]

[Footnote 19: Burrows, _Land of the Pigmies_, p. 100.]

[Footnote 20: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 260.]

[Footnote 21: Hinde, _Last of the Masai_, p. 99.]

The testimony of language is corroborated by kindred facts referring to the nature of those objects which are most commonly worshipped.[22] Among all the American tribes, says Mr. Dorman, "any remarkable features in natural scenery or dangerous places became objects of superstitious dread and veneration, because they were supposed to be abodes of gods."[23] A great cataract, a difficult and dangerous ford in a river, a spring bubbling up from the ground, a volcano, a high mountain, an isolated rock, a curious or unusually large tree, the bones of the mastodon or of some other immense animal--all were looked upon by the Indians with superstitious respect {588} or were propitiated by offerings.[24] In Fiji "every object that is specially fearful, or vicious, or injurious, or novel," is eligible for admission to the native Pantheon.[25] It is said that when the Aëtas of the Philippines saw the first locomotive passing through their country "they all fell upon their knees in abject terror, worshipping the strange monster as some new and powerful deity."[26] Of the shamanistic peoples in Siberia Georgi writes, "All the celestial bodies, and all terrestrial objects of a considerable magnitude, all the phenomena of nature that can do good or harm, every appearance capable of conveying terror into a weak and superstitious mind, are so many gods to whom they direct a particular adoration."[27] Among the Samoyedes "a curiously twisted tree, a stone with an uncommon shape would receive, and in some quarters still receives, not only veneration but actual ceremonial worship."[28] Castrén states that the Ostyaks worshipped no other objects of nature but such as were very unusual and peculiar either in shape or quality.[29] The Lapps made offerings not only to large and strange-looking objects, but to places which were difficult to pass, or where some accident had occurred, or where they had been either exceptionally unlucky or exceptionally lucky in fishing or the chase.[30] The Ainu of Japan deify all objects and phenomena which seem to them extraordinary or dreadful.[31] In China "a steep mountain, or any mountain at all remarkable, is supposed to have a special local spirit, who acts as guardian."[32] The average middle-class Hindu, according to Sir Alfred Lyall, worships stocks or stones which are unusual or grotesque in size, shape, or position; or inanimate things which are gifted with mysterious {589} motion; or animals which he fears; or visible things, animate or inanimate, which are directly or indirectly useful and profitable or which possess any incomprehensible function or property.[33] From all parts of Africa we hear of similar cults.[34] The Negroes of Sierra Leone dedicate to their spirits places which "inspire the spectator with awe, or are remarkable for their appearance, as immensely large trees rendered venerable by age, rocks appearing in the midst of rivers, and having something peculiar in their form, in short, whatever appears to them strange or uncommon."[35] When Tshi-speaking natives of the Gold Coast take up their abode near any remarkable natural feature or object, they worship and seek to propitiate its indwelling spirit; whereas they do not worship any of the heavenly bodies, the regularity of whose appearance makes little impression upon their minds.[36] Throughout East Africa the people seem to attach religious sanctity to anything of extraordinary size; in the island of Zanzibar, where the hills are low, they reverence the baobab tree, which is the largest growing there, and in all parts of the country where hills are not found they worship some great stone or tall tree.[37] In Morocco places of striking appearance are generally supposed to be haunted by _jnûn_ (_jinn_) or are associated with some dead saint.[38] As I have elsewhere tried to show, the Arabic _jinn_ were probably "beings invented to explain what seems to fall outside the ordinary pale of nature, the wonderful and unexpected, the superstitious imaginations of men who fear";[39] and the saint was in many cases only the successor of the _jinn_. Indeed, the superstitious dread of unusual objects is not altogether dead even among ourselves.{590} It survives in England to this day in the habit of ascribing grotesque and striking landmarks or puzzling antiquities to the Devil, who became the residuary legatee of obsolete pagan superstitions in Christian countries.[40]

[Footnote 22: See, besides the instances referred to below, Karsten, _Origin of Worship_, p. 14 _sqq._; von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 220 (Bataks); _Mitteil. d. Geograph. Gesellsch. zu Jena_, iii. 14 (Bannavs, between Siam and Annam). In Lord Kames's _Essays on the Principles of Morality and Religion_ there is (p. 309 _sqq._) an interesting discussion on the dread of unknown objects.]

[Footnote 23: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 300. See also Müller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_, i. 52; Harmon, _Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America_, p. 363 _sq._; Smith, 'Myths of the Iroquois,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ii. 51.]

[Footnote 24: Dorman, _op. cit._ pp. 279, 290, 291, 302, 303, 308, 313-315, 319. Chamberlain, in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_, i. 157 (Mississagua Indians). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 237 _sq._ (Aleuts.)]

[Footnote 25: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 183.]

[Footnote 26: Lala, _Philippine Islands_, p. 96.]

[Footnote 27: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 256.]

[Footnote 28: Jackson, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 398. _Cf._ Castrén, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, iii. 230.]

[Footnote 29: Castrén, _op. cit._ iii. 227.]

[Footnote 30: _Ibid._ iii. 210. Högström, _Beskrifning öfver de til Sveriges Krona lydande Lapmarker_, p. 182. Leem, _Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper_, p. 442 _sq._ Friis, _Lappish Mythologi_, p. 133 _sq._]

[Footnote 31: Sugamata, quoted in _L'Anthropologie_, x. 98.]

[Footnote 32: Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 221.]

[Footnote 33: Lyall, _Asiatic Studies_, p. 7.]

[Footnote 34: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 388 (Mpongwe). Mockler-Ferryman, _British Nigeria_, p. 255. Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's_, p. 340 (Hottentots).]

[Footnote 35: Winterbottom, _Native Africans of Sierra Leone_, i. 223.]

[Footnote 36: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 282. _Idem_, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 21.]

[Footnote 37: Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 188.]

[Footnote 38: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of Holiness (Baraka)_, _passim_.]

[Footnote 39: _Idem_, 'Nature of the Arab _[vG]inn_,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix. 268.]

[Footnote 40: Lyall, _op. cit._ p. 9.]

The common prevalence of animal worship is no doubt due to the mysteriousness of the animal world; the most uncanny of all creatures, the serpent, is also the one most generally worshipped. Throughout India we meet with the veneration of animals which by their appearance or habits startle human beings.[41] In the Indian tribes of North America animals of an unusual size were objects of some kind of adoration.[42] In certain parts of Africa a cock crowing in the evening or a crane alighting on a house-top is regarded as supernatural.[43] White men have often been taken for spirits by red, yellow, or black savages, when seen by them for the first time.[44] Religious veneration is among various races bestowed on persons suffering from some abnormality, such as deformity, albinoism, or madness.[45] Some South American Indians "regard as divinities all phenomenal children, principally such as are born with a larger number of fingers or toes than is natural."[46] The Hindus venerate persons remarkable for any extraordinary qualities great valour, virtue, or even vice.[47] By performing miracles men directly prove that they are supernatural beings. The Muhammedan saints, like the Christian in olden days, are believed to perform all kinds of wonders, such as flying in the air, passing unhurt {591} through fire, walking upon water, transporting themselves in a moment of time to immense distances, or supporting themselves and others with food in desert places.[48] When Muhammed first claimed to be the Prophet of Allah, he was urged to give proof of his calling by working some miracle; and though he uniformly denied that he possessed such power, it was nevertheless ascribed to him even by his contemporaries.[49]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._ p. 13.]

[Footnote 42: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 258. Harmon, _op. cit._ p. 364.]

[Footnote 43: Macdonald, _Religion and Myth_, p. 39.]

[Footnote 44: Avebury, _Origin of Civilisation_, pp. 272, 273, 375. Goblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God_, p. 67. Schultze, _Fetischismus_, p. 224. In Australia and elsewhere white people were taken for ghosts by the natives (Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 248; Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, ii. 269 _sq._; Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 5 _sq._; Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 170 _sq._).]

[Footnote 45: Schultze, _op. cit._ p. 222. _Supra_, i. 270 _sq._ "Among many savage or barbarous peoples of the world albinos have been reserved for the priestly office" (Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 460).]

[Footnote 46: Guinnard, _Three Years' Slavery among the Patagonians_, p. 144.]

[Footnote 47: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_, p. 350. For criminal-worship in Sicily, see Peacock, 'Executed Criminals and Folk-Medicine,' in _Folk-Lore_, vii. 275.]

[Footnote 48: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 49. Westermarck, 'Sul culto del santi nel Marocco,' in _Actes du XII. Congrès International des Orientalistes_, iii. 153 _sqq._ _Idem_, _The Moorish Conception of Holiness_, p. 77 _sqq._]

[Footnote 49: Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, i. p. lxv. _sq._ Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and Mohammedanism_, p. 19. Sell, _Faith of Islám_, p. 218.]

The dead are objects of worship much more commonly than are the living. Whilst the human individual consisting of body and soul is as a rule well-known, the disembodied soul, seen only in dreams or visions, is a mysterious being which inspires the survivors with awe. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Grant Allen even regard the worship of the dead as "the root of every religion."[50] But this is to carry the ghost theory to an extreme for which there is no justification in facts. The spirits of the dead are worshipped because they are held capable of influencing, in a mysterious manner, the welfare of the living; but there is no reason to assume that they were originally conceived as the only supernatural agents existing. We have noticed that even the lower animals show signs of the same feeling as underlies the belief in supernatural beings; and we can hardly suppose that they are believers in ghosts.

[Footnote 50: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 411. Grant Allen, _The Evolution of the Idea of God_, pp. 91, 433, 438, &c.]

On account of their wonderful effects medicines, intoxicants, and stimulants, are frequently objects of veneration. Most of the plants for which the American Indians had superstitious feelings were such as have medical qualities;[51] tobacco was generally held sacred by them,[52] and so was cocoa in Peru.[53] The Vedic deification {592} of the drink _soma_ was due to its exhilarating and invigorating effects.[54]

[Footnote 51: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 298 _sq._ Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 428.]

[Footnote 52: Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xix. 439. Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 295.]

[Footnote 53: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 295.]

[Footnote 54: Whitney, 'Vedic Researches in Germany,' in _Jour. American Oriental Soc._ iii. 299. Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 108.]

Among all the phenomena of nature none is more wonderful, impressive, awe-inspiring than thunder, and none seems more generally to have given rise to religious veneration. But with growing reflection man finds a mystery even in events of daily occurrence. The Vedic poet, when he sees the sun moving freely through the heavens, asks how it comes that it does not fall downward, although "unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, and downward turned";[55] and it seems to him a miracle that the sparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever filling it.[56] "Verily," says the Koran, "in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the succession of night and day, are signs to those possessed of minds."[57]

[Footnote 55: _Rig-Veda_, iv. 13. 5.]

[Footnote 56: _Ibid._ v. 85. 6.]

[Footnote 57: _Koran_, iii. 87.]

The attribution of miraculous power to a certain object or being may be due to direct experience of some effect produced by it, as in the case of a medical plant, or a poisonous snake, or a miracle-working spring, or a Christian or Muhammedan saint. Or it may be based on the inference that objects with a strange and mysterious appearance also possess strange and mysterious powers. This inference, too, is in a way supported by facts. The unusual appearance of the object makes an impression on the person who sees it, and predisposes him to the belief that the object is endowed with secret powers. If then anything unusual actually happens in its neighbourhood or shortly after it has been seen, the strange event is attributed to the influence of the strange object. Thus a Siberian tribe came to regard the camel as the small-pox demon because, just when the animal had appeared among them for the first time with a passing caravan, the small-pox broke out.[58] Of the British Guiana Indian we are {593} told by Sir E. F. Im Thurn that if his eye falls upon a rock in any way abnormal or curious, and if shortly after any evil happens to him, he regards rock and evil as cause and effect, and perceives a spirit in the rock.[59] With the lapse of time the data of experience readily increase. If a certain object has gained the reputation of being supernatural, it is looked upon as the cause of all kinds of unusual events which may possibly be associated with it. When I visited the large cave Imi-nta[k.][k.]ándut in the Great Atlas Mountains, the interior of which is said to contain a whole spirit city, my horse happened to stumble on my way back to my camp, and fell upon one of my servants who was carrying a gun. The gun was broken and the man became lame for some days. I was told that the accident was caused by the cave spirits, because they were displeased at my visit. When the following day I again passed the cave with my little caravan, heavy rain began to fall; and now the rain was attributed to the ill-temper of the spirits.

[Footnote 58: Tiele, _Elements of the Science of Religion_, i. 70.]

[Footnote 59: Im Thurn, _Indians of Guiana_, p. 354.]

Startling events are ascribed to the activity not only of visible, but of invisible supernatural agents. Thus sudden or strange diseases are, at the lower stages of civilisation, commonly supposed to be occasioned by a supernatural being, which has taken up its abode in the sick person's body, or otherwise sent the disease.[60] Among the Maoris, for instance, "each disease was supposed to be occasioned by a different god, who resided in the part affected."[61] The Australian Kurnai maintain that phthisis, pneumonia, bowel complaints, and insanity are produced by an evil spirit, "who is like the wind."[62] According to Moorish beliefs convulsions, epileptic or paralytic fits, rheumatic or neuralgic pains, and certain rare and violent epidemics, like the cholera, are caused by spirits, which either strike their victim, or enter his body, or sometimes, in the case of an epidemic, shoot at the {594} people with poisonous arrows. Indeed, unexpected events of every kind are readily ascribed to supernatural influence, in Morocco and elsewhere. Among the North American Indians "the storms and tempests were generally thought to be produced by aërial spirits from hostile lands."[63] Among the Hudson Bay Indians "everything not understood is attributed to the working of one of the numerous spirits."[64] "Dans toute l'Afrique," says M. Duveyrier in his description of the Touareg, "il n'y a pas un individu, éclairé ou ignare, instruit ou illettré, qui n'attribue aux génies tout ce qui arrive d'extraordinaire sur la terre."[65] Of the South African natives Livingstone writes, "Everything not to be accounted for by common causes, whether of good or evil, is ascribed to the Deity."[66] With the progress of science the chain of natural causes is extended, and, as Livy puts it, it is left to superstition alone to see the interference of the deity in trifling matters. Among ourselves the ordinary truths of science are so generally recognised that in this domain God is seldom supposed to interfere. On the other hand, with regard to social events, the causes of which are often hidden, the idea of Providence is still constantly needed to fill up the gap of human ignorance.

[Footnote 60: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 146 _sqq._ Schneider, _Die Naturvölker_, i. 217. Bartels, _Die Medicin der Naturvölker_, p. 27 _sqq._ Höfler, 'Krankheits-Dämonen,' in _Archiv für Religionswissenschaft_, ii. 86 _sqq._ Karsten, _op. cit._ p. 27 _sqq._]

[Footnote 61: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 137.]

[Footnote 62: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 250.]

[Footnote 63: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 350.]

[Footnote 64: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 272.]

[Footnote 65: Duveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 418. See also Schneider, _Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker_, p. 103.]

[Footnote 66: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 521 _sq._]

Man's belief in supernatural agents, then, is an attempt to explain strange and mysterious phenomena which suggest a volitional cause.[67] The assumed cause is the will of a supernatural being. Such beings are thus, in the first place, conceived as volitional. But a being which has a will must have a mind, with emotions, desires, and a certain amount of intelligence. Neither the savage nor ourselves can imagine a volitional being {595} which has nothing but a will. If an object of nature, therefore, is looked upon as a supernatural agent, mentality and life are at the same time attributed to it as a matter of course. This I take to be the real origin of animism. It is not correct to say that "as the objects of the visible world are conceived as animated, volitional, and emotional, they may be deemed the originators of those misfortunes of which the true cause is unknown."[68] This is to reverse the actual order of ideas. Inanimate things are conceived as volitional, emotional, and animate, _because_ they are deemed the originators of startling events. The savage does not speculate upon the nature of things unless he has an interest in doing so. He is not generally inquisitive as to causes.[69] The natives of West Australia, says Eyre, "are not naturally a reasoning people, and by no means given to the investigation of causes or their effects."[70] In matters not concerning the common wants of life the mind of the Brazilian Indian is a blank.[71] When Mungo Park asked some negroes, what became of the sun during the night? they considered his question a very childish one; "they had never indulged a conjecture, nor formed any hypothesis, about the matter."[72] I often found the Beduins of Morocco extremely curious, but their curiosity consisted in the question, What? rather than in the question, Why?

[Footnote 67: Already Hobbes (_Leviathan_, i. 12, p. 79) traced, in part, the origin of religion to the fact that when man cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, he supposes causes of them. See also Meiners, _Geschichte der Religionen_, i. 16.]

[Footnote 68: Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 245.]

[Footnote 69: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 86 _sq._; Karsten, _op. cit._ p. 43 _sq._]

[Footnote 70: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia_, ii. 355.]

[Footnote 71: Bates, _The Naturalist on the River Amazons_, ii. 163.]

[Footnote 72: Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, i. 413.]

Whilst belief in supernatural agents endowed with a will made the savage an animist, the idea that a mind presupposes a body, when thought out, led to anthropomorphism. Impossible as it is to imagine a will without a mind, it is hardly less impossible to imagine a mind without a body. The immaterial soul is an abstraction to which has been attributed a metaphysical reality, but of which no clear conception can be formed. As Hobbes observed, the opinion that spirits are incorporeal or immaterial, "could {596} never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words . . . . as _Spirit_ and _Incorporeall_; yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them."[73] Descartes himself frankly confessed, "What the soul itself was I either did not stay to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtile, like wind, or flame, or ether, spread through my grosser parts."[74] The supernatural agents were consequently of necessity considered to possess a more or less material constitution. The disembodied human soul which the savage saw in dreams or visions, in the shadow or the reflection, was only the least material being which he could imagine; and when raised to the dignity of an ancestor-god, it by no means lost its materiality, but, on the contrary, tended to acquire a more substantial body.

[Footnote 73: Hobbes, _op. cit._ i. 12, p. 80.]

[Footnote 74: Descartes, _Meditationes_, 2, p. 10.]

Of a grosser substantiality and very unlike the human shape are the inanimate objects of nature which receive divine veneration. It has been said of savages that they do not worship the thing itself, only the spirit dwelling in it. But such a distinction cannot be primitive. The natural object is worshipped because it is believed to possess supernatural power, but it is nevertheless the object itself that is worshipped.[75] Castrén, who combined great personal experience with unusual acuteness of judgment, states that the Samoyedes do not know of any spirits attached to objects of nature, but worship the objects as such; "in other words, they do not separate the spirit from the matter, but adore the thing in its totality as a divine being."[76] Of the deification of the Nerbudda river Sir W. H. Sleeman likewise observes, "As in the case of the Ganges, it is the river itself to whom they address themselves, and not to any deity residing in it, or presiding over it--the stream itself is the deity which fills their imaginations, and receives their {597} homage."[77] The animist who endows an inanimate object with a soul regards the visible thing itself as its body.[78] How a being with such a body, like a tree or a stone, can hear the words of men, can see their doings, and can partake of the food they offer, might be difficult to explain--if it had to be explained. But, as I have said, the inquisitiveness of savage curiosity does not go to the roots of things, and religion is in its essence mystery.

[Footnote 75: _Cf._ Tiele, _Max Müller und Fritz Schultze über ein Problem der Religionswissenschaft_, p. 35; Parkman, _op. cit._ p. lxvii. (North American Indians).]

[Footnote 76: Castrén, _op. cit._ iii. 192. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 161, 200 _sq._]

[Footnote 77: Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official_, i. 20.]

[Footnote 78: Castrén, _op. cit._ iii. 164 _sq._]

However, in proportion as a supernatural being comes more and more to occupy the thoughts of its worshippers and to stir their imagination, a more distinct personality is attributed to it; and at length neither the ethereal or vaporous materiality of a departed human soul, nor the crude substantiality of an inanimate object is considered a satisfactory body for such a being. It is humanised also with regard to its essential shape. The Koriaks of Siberia believe "that objects and phenomena of nature conceal an anthropomorphic substance underneath their outer forms"; but they also show the first signs of a belief in spiritual owners or masters ruling over certain classes of things or over large objects.[79] The supernatural being which is originally embodied in a natural phenomenon is gradually placed behind it. In the Vedic hymns we may study this anthropomorphism as a process in growth. The true gods of the Veda are almost without exception the deified representatives of the phenomena or forces of nature,[80] which are personified, though in varying degrees. When the name of the god is the same as that of his natural basis, the personification has not yet advanced beyond the rudimentary stage; names like Dyaus ("heaven"), P[r.]thiv[=i] ("earth"), S[=u]rya ("sun"), U[s.]as ("dawn"), represent the double character of natural phenomena and of the personalities presiding over them. Speaking of the nature of the gods, the ancient Vedic interpreter Y[=a]ska remarks that "what is seen of the gods is certainly not {598} anthropomorphic, for example the sun, the earth, and so forth."[81] Again, when the name of the god is different from that of the physical substance he is supposed to inhabit, the anthropomorphism is more developed, though never very distinct. The Vedic people always recognised behind its gods the natural forces of which they were the expression, and their physical appearance often only represents aspects of their natural bases figuratively described to illustrate their activities. The sun is spoken of as the eye with which Varuna observes mankind;[82] or it is said that the all-seeing sun, rising from his abode, goes to the dwellings of Mitra and Varuna to report the deeds of men.[83] Even to this day the Hindu, to whatever sect he may belong, does homage to the rising sun every morning of his life by repeating a text of the Veda.[84] The god does not very readily change his old solid body for another which, though more respectable, has the disadvantage of being invisible. The simple unreflecting mind finds it easier to worship a material thing which may be seen, than a hidden god, however perfect in shape. To the common Japanese the sun is still the god to whom he prays morning and evening.[85] Whilst Chinese scholars declare that the sacrifice offered to Heaven "is assuredly not addressed to the material and sensible heaven, which our eyes see, but to the Master of heaven, earth, and all things,"[86] the people are less metaphysical; and the Russian peasant to this day makes an appeal to the Svarog of the old religion when crying, "Dost thou hear, O Sky? dost thou see, O Sky?"[87] That the worship of animals survives at comparatively late stages of civilisation is probably due to the double advantage of their bodies being both visible and animate.

[Footnote 79: Jochelson, 'Koryak Religion and Myth,' in _Jesup North Pacific Expedition_, vi. 115, 118.]

[Footnote 80: Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 591 _sqq._]

[Footnote 81: _Nirukta_, vii. 4, quoted by Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 209.]

[Footnote 82: _Rig-Veda_, i. 50. 6. Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 67. _Cf._ _Rig-Veda_, i. 25. 10 _sq._; i. 136. 2.]

[Footnote 83: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 60. 1 _sq._ See Macdonell, _op. cit._ pp. 2, 15, 17, 23; Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 6; Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 178; Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 591 _sqq._]

[Footnote 84: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_, p. 342.]

[Footnote 85: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 87.]

[Footnote 86: Legge, _Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits_, p. 38.]

[Footnote 87: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 362.]

{599} But though man created his gods in his own image and likeness, endowing them with a mind and a body modelled after his own, he never lost sight of the difference between him and them. He always ascribed to them a superior power of action; otherwise they would have been no gods at all. In many cases, at least, he also attributed to them a superior knowledge. The Bechuanas maintain that their gods are much wiser than they are themselves.[88] In the admonitions of an Aztek mother to her daughter reference is made to a god who "sees every secret fault."[89] The gods of the Greeks and Romans were possessed of superhuman wisdom,[90] and so was Yahveh. It is true that the anthropomorphic god acquires knowledge of the affairs of men through his senses. When hearing the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah, Yahveh said, "I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know."[91] But the senses of a god are generally superior to those of a man. "A god," says Orestes, "can hear even from a distance."[92] Varuna has an all-seeing eye, and the Zoroastrian Mithra has a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes.[93] In other respects, also, the bodies of gods excel the bodies of men. Sometimes they are more beautiful, sometimes they have a gigantic shape. When Ares is felled to the ground by the stone flung by Athene, his body covers seven roods of land. [94] When Here takes a solemn oath, she grasps the earth with one hand and the sea with the other.[95] In three steps Poseidon goes an immense distance;[96] in three paces Vishnu traverses earth, air, and sky.[97]

[Footnote 88: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 341.]

[Footnote 89: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España_, vi. 19, vol. ii. 131.]

[Footnote 90: _Cf._ Westcott, _Essays in the History of Religious Thought_, p. 101.]

[Footnote 91: _Genesis_, xviii. 20 _sq._]

[Footnote 92: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 297.]

[Footnote 93: _Yasts_, x. 7.]

[Footnote 94: _Iliad_, xxi. 407.]

[Footnote 95: _Ibid._ xiv. 272 _sq._]

[Footnote 96: _Ibid._ xiii. 20.]

[Footnote 97: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 325.]

However, the tendency to make gods more and more {600} perfect--of which I shall say more in a following chapter--gradually led to the notion that materiality is a quality which is not becoming to a god; hence men endeavoured, to the best of their ability, to grasp the idea of a purely spiritual being, endowed with a will and even with human emotions, but without a material body. Like Xenophanes in Greece, the Inca Yupangui in Peru protested against the prevailing anthropomorphism, declaring that purely spiritual service was befitting the almighty creator, not tributes or sacrifices.[98] In the Bible we notice a successive transformation of the nature of the deity, from crude sensuousness to pure spirituality. According to the oldest traditions, Yahveh works and rests, he plants the garden of Eden, he walks in it in the cool of the day, and Adam and Eve hear his voice. In a great part of the Old Testament he is expressly bound by conditions of time and space. He is attached in an especial manner to the Jerusalem temple or some other shrine, and his favour is gained by definite modes of sacrifice. At the time of the Prophets the cruder anthropomorphisms of the earlier religion have been overcome; Yahveh is no longer seen in person, and by a prophet like Isaiah his residence in Zion is almost wholly dematerialised. Yet, as Professor Robertson Smith observes, not even Isaiah has risen to the full height of the New Testament conception that God, who is spirit and who is to be worshipped spiritually, makes no distinction of spot with regard to worship, and is equally near to receive men's prayers in every place.[99] Moslem theologians take pains to point out that God neither is begotten nor begets, and that he is without figure, form, colour, and parts. He hears all sounds, whether low or loud; but he hears without an ear. He sees all things, even the steps of a black ant on a black stone in a dark night; {601} but he has no eyes, as men have. He speaks; but not with a tongue, as men do.[100] He is endowed with knowledge, feelings, and a will.[101] Thus the dematerialised god still retains a mental constitution modelled upon the human soul, with all its bodily desires and imperfections removed, with its higher qualities indefinitely increased, and, above all, endowed with a supernatural power of action.

[Footnote 98: Brinton, _American Hero-Myths_, p. 236.]

[Footnote 99: Goblet d'Alviella, _op. cit._ p. 216. Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_, p. 87. Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 424. Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 117.]

[Footnote 100: Risálah-i-Berkevi, quoted by Sell, _op. cit._ p. 166 _sq._]

[Footnote 101: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 185.]

In following chapters we shall see how the moral ideas of men have been influenced by the attributes they ascribe to supernatural beings.

CHAPTER XLVIII

DUTIES TO GODS

MEN not only believe in the existence of supernatural beings, but enter into frequent relations with them. In every religion we may distinguish between two elements: a belief, and a regardful attitude towards the object of this belief. At the same time the assumption that supernatural beings exist is not necessarily connected with religious veneration of them. Relations may be established with some of them to the exclusion of others. If the relations between man and a certain supernatural being are of a more or less permanent character, the latter is generally called his god.

As man attributes to his gods a variety of human qualities, his conduct towards them is in many respects determined by considerations similar to those which regulate his conduct towards his fellow men. He endows them with rights quite after human fashion, and imposes on himself corresponding duties.

Gods have the rights to life and bodily integrity. They are not necessarily either invulnerable or immortal.[1] According to ancient Egyptian beliefs, the life of a god is indeed longer than that of a man, but death puts an end to the one as well as to the other.[2] The Vedic gods were mortal at first; immortality was only bestowed upon them by Savitr or by Agni, or they obtained it by drinking {603} _soma_, or by practising continence and austerity, or by the performance of certain ceremonies.[3] Nor were the Greek gods eternal by nature; they secured immortality by feasting on nectar and ambrosia.[4] The Scandinavian gods had in Idun's apples a means of preserving perpetual freshness and youth; but for all that they were subject to the encroachments of age, and their death is spoken of without disguise.[5]

[Footnote 1: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 1 _sqq._]

[Footnote 2: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 173. _Cf._ Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 111; Erman, _Life in Ancient Egypt_, p. 265.]

[Footnote 3: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17. Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 176.]

[Footnote 4: _Iliad_, v. 339 _sqq._ _Odyssey_, v. 199. _Cf._ Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 317 _sq._]

[Footnote 5: Grimm, _op. cit._ i. 318 _sqq._]

Though liable to death, the invisible anthropomorphic gods generally run little risk of being killed by men. But the case is different with such supernatural beings as live on earth in a visible and destructible shape. They may be, and occasionally are, slain by human hands, although in this case killing hardly means absolute destruction, the soul surviving the death of the body. But to kill such a being is in ordinary circumstances looked upon as a dangerous act. We have noticed above that people are often reluctant to slay animals of certain species for fear lest either the disembodied spirit of the slain animal or others of its kind should avenge the injury;[6] and the danger is naturally increased when the victim and its whole species are regarded as divine. Savages as a rule avoid killing animals of their own totem, and various statements imply that the act is disapproved of.[7]

[Footnote 6: _Supra_, ii. 491.]

[Footnote 7: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 7 _sqq._; _Idem_, _Totemism and Exogamy_, iv. 6 _sq._]

It has been suggested that this regard for the life of a totemic animal is due to the notion that a man is akin to his totem.[8] But the various taboos imposed upon him with reference to it, and the nature of the penalties incurred by the taboo-breaker,[9] indicate that the relation between a human individual and the animal members of his totem are after all somewhat different from that between cousins. It seems that the totemic animal is in {604} the first place looked upon as a supernatural being, and that a person's attitude towards it depends on the degree of dread or veneration which he feels for it. Such sacred animals as are not conceived to be of one stock with their devotees are equally tabooed; in ancient Egypt, we are told, offences against holy animals were punished even with death.[10] On the other hand, so little respect is not seldom felt for the totem that it is treated in a way to which there is no parallel in the treatment of human relatives. Speaking of the native tribes of Central Australia, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen observe, "That the totemic animal or plant is not regarded exactly as a close relative, whom it would be wrong to kill, or to assist any one else to kill, is very evident; on the contrary, the members of one totem not only, as it were, give their permission to those who are not of the totem to kill and eat the totemic animal or plant, but . . . they will actually help in the destruction of their totems."[11] The South Australian Narrinyeri kill their totemic animals if they are good for food.[12] A Bechuana will kill his totem if it be a hurtful animal, for instance a lion; the slayer then only makes an apology to the beast and goes through a form of purification for the sacrilege.[13] Among the Menomini Indians a man belonging to the Bear clan may kill a bear, although he must first address himself to his victim and apologise for depriving it of life.[14] The Indian tribes in the South-Eastern States had no respect for their totems and would kill them when they got the chance.[15] Among the Thlinkets a Wolf man will hunt wolves without hesitation, although he calls them his relatives when praying them not to hurt him.[16]

[Footnote 8: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 285. _Cf._ Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 7.]

[Footnote 9: See Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 11 _sqq._; Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, pp. 322, 324 _sq._]

[Footnote 10: Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 279.]

[Footnote 11: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 207.]

[Footnote 12: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 63.]

[Footnote 13: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 211.]

[Footnote 14: Hoffman, 'Menomini Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xiv. 44.]

[Footnote 15: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 16.]

[Footnote 16: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes of Canada_, p. 23. For some other instances see Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 19.]

In certain cases divine animals are killed as a religious {605} or magical ceremony. Several instances of this have been pointed out by Sir J. G. Frazer.[17] Sometimes, when the revered animal is habitually spared, it is nevertheless killed on rare and solemn occasions. In other cases, when the revered animal is habitually killed, there is a special annual atonement, at which a select individual of the species is slain with extraordinary marks of respect and devotion. Frazer has offered ingenious explanations of both customs. As regards the former one he argues that the savage apparently thinks that a species left to itself will grow old and die like an individual, and that the only means he can think of to avert the catastrophe is to kill a member of the species in whose veins the tide of life is still running strong and has not yet stagnated among the fens of old age; "the life thus diverted from one channel will flow, he fancies, more freshly and freely in a new one."[18] The latter custom, again, is explained by Frazer as a kind of atonement; by showing marked deference to a few chosen individuals of a species the savage thinks himself entitled to exterminate with impunity all the remainder upon which he can lay hands.[19] These explanations, as Frazer himself is the first to admit, are only hypothetical, but, so far as I know, they are the only ones yet offered. However, it is worth noticing that certain acts accompanying the slaughter of divine animals sometimes clearly indicate a desire in the worshippers to transfer to themselves supernatural benefits--as when they eat the flesh of the animal, or sprinkle themselves with its blood, or by other means place themselves in contact with it; and it may be that in such cases the animal is killed for the express purpose of communicating to the people the sanctity, or beneficial magic energy, with which it is endowed. The Madi or Moru tribe of Central Africa furnish an instructive example. Once a year, as it seems, a very choice lamb is killed by a man belonging to a kind of priestly order, who {606} sprinkles some of the blood four times over the assembled people and then smears each individual with the same fluid. But this ceremony is also observed on a small scale at other times--if a family is in any great trouble, through illness or bereavement, their friends and neighbours come together and a lamb is killed with a view to averting further evil.[20] Among the Arunta and some other tribes in Central Australia, as we have noticed above, at the time of Intichiuma, totemic animals are killed with the object of being eaten. But here the sacramental meal is a magical ceremony intended to multiply the species, so as to increase the food supply for other totemic groups; the fundamental idea being that the members of each totemic group are responsible for providing other individuals with a supply of their totem.[21]

[Footnote 17: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 366 _sqq._]

[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ ii. 368.]

[Footnote 19: _Ibid._ ii. 435.]

[Footnote 20: Felkin, 'Madi or Moru Tribe of Central Africa,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xii. 336 _sq._]

[Footnote 21: _Supra_, ii. 210 _sq._ Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, ch. vi. _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, ch. ix. _sq._]

Frazer has also called attention to various instances in which a man-god or divine king is put to death by his worshippers, and has suggested the following explanation of this custom:--Primitive people sometimes believe that their own safety and even that of the world is bound up with the life of one of these god-men or human incarnations of the divinity. They therefore take the utmost care of his life, out of a regard for their own. But no amount of care and precaution will prevent the divine king from growing old and feeble and at last dying. And in order to avert the catastrophes which may be expected from the enfeeblement of his powers and their final extinction in death, they kill him as soon as he shows symptoms of weakness, and his soul is transferred to a vigorous successor before it has been seriously impaired by the threatened decay. But some peoples appear to have thought it unsafe to wait for even the slightest symptom of decay and have preferred to kill the divine king while he is still in the full vigour of life. Accordingly, they have fixed a term beyond which he {607} may not reign, and at the close of which he must die, the term fixed upon being short enough to exclude the probability of his degenerating physically in the interval. Thus it appears that in some places the people could not trust the king to remain in full bodily and mental vigour for more than a year; whilst in Ngoio, a province of the ancient kingdom of Congo, the rule obtains that the chief who assumes the cap of sovereignty one day shall be put to death on the next.[22]

[Footnote 22: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 5 _sqq._]

Every reader of _The Golden Bough_ must admire the ingenuity, skill, and learning with which its author has worked out his theory, even though he may fail to find the argument in every point convincing. It is obvious that the supernatural power of divine kings is frequently supposed to be influenced by the condition of their bodies. In some cases it is also obvious that they are killed on account of some illness, corporal defect, or symptom of old age, and that the ultimate reason for this lies in the supposed connection between physical deterioration and waning divinity. But, as Frazer himself observes, in the chain of his evidence a link is wanting: he can produce no direct proof of the idea that the soul of the slain man-god is transmitted to his royal successor.[23] In the absence of such evidence I venture to suggest a some what different explanation, which seems to me more in accordance with known facts--to wit, that the new king is supposed to inherit, not the predecessor's soul, but his divinity or holiness, which is looked upon in the light of a mysterious entity, temporarily seated in the ruling sovereign, but separable from him and transferable to another individual.

[Footnote 23: _Ibid._ ii. 56.]

This modification of Frazer's theory is suggested by certain beliefs prevalent among the Moors. The Sultan of Morocco, who is regarded by the people as "the vicegerent of God," appoints before his death some member of his family--by preference one of his sons--as his successor, and this implies that his _baraka_, or holiness, will {608} be transferred to the new sovereign. But his holiness may also be appropriated by a pretender during his lifetime, which proves that it is regarded as something quite distinct from his soul. Thus the people told me that the pretender Bu[h.]amâra had come into possession of the Sultan's _baraka_, and that he would subsequently hand it over to one of the Sultan's brothers, who was then denied his liberty. Like the sultans of Morocco, the divine Kafir kings of Sofala, who were put to death if afflicted with some disease, nominated their successors.[24] In ancient Bengal, again, whoever killed the king and succeeded in placing himself on the royal throne, was immediately acknowledged as king; the people said, "We are faithful to the throne, whoever fills the throne we are obedient and true to it."[25] In the kingdom of Passier, on the northern coast of Sumatra, whose sacred monarch was not allowed by his subjects to live long, "the man who struck the fatal blow was of the royal lineage, and as soon as he had done the deed of blood and seated himself on the throne he was regarded as the legitimate king, provided that he contrived to maintain his seat peaceably for a single day."[26] In these cases, it seems, the sanctity was considered to be inherent in the throne and to be partly communicated to persons who came into close contact with it.[27]

[Footnote 24: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 10.]

[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ ii. 16.]

[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ ii. 16.]

[Footnote 27: Since the above was written, Sir J. G. Frazer himself has kindly drawn my attention to some statements in his _Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship_ (p. 121 _sqq._) from which it appears that in some parts of the Malay region the regalia are regarded as wonder-working talismans or fetishes, the possession of which carries with it the right to the throne. Among the Yorubas of West Africa, a miraculous virtue seems to be attributed to the royal crown, and the king sometimes sacrifices sheep to it (_ibid._ p. 124, n. 1). See _infra_, Additional Notes.]

Now, as we have noticed before, holiness is generally held to be exceedingly susceptible to any polluting influence,[28] and this would naturally suggest the idea that, in order to remain unimpaired, it has to be removed from a body which is defiled by disease or blemish. Such an idea may be supposed to underlie those cases in which {609} even the slightest bodily defect is a sufficient motive for putting the divine king to death. It is of the greatest importance for the community that the holiness on which its welfare depends should not be attached to an individual whose organism is no longer a fit receptacle for it, and who is consequently unable to fulfil the duties incumbent upon a divine monarch; and it may be thought that the only way of removing the holiness from him is to kill him. The same explanation would seem to apply to the killing of kings or magicians who have actually proved incapable of bringing about the benefits expected from them, such as rain or good crops,[29] although in these instances the murderous act may also be a precaution against the revenge they might otherwise take for being deposed, or it may be a punishment for their failure,[30] or have the character of a sacrifice to a god.[31] Moreover, the disease, weakness, or physical deterioration of the king might cause his death; and, owing to the extremely polluting effect ascribed to natural death, this would be the greatest catastrophe which could happen to the holiness seated in him. The people of Congo believed that if their pontiff, the Chitomé, were to die a natural death, the world would perish, and the earth, which he alone sustained by his power and merit, would immediately be annihilated; hence, when he fell ill and seemed likely to die, the man who was destined to be his successor entered the pontiff's house with a rope or a club and strangled or clubbed him to death.[32] Similar motives may also have induced people to kill their divine king after a certain period, as everybody is sooner or later liable to fall ill or grow weak and die. But I can also imagine another possible reason for this custom. Supernatural {610} energy is sometimes considered so sensitive to external influences that it appears to wear away almost by itself in the course of time. I have heard from Arabs in Morocco that a pretender's holiness usually lasts only for half a year. And it may be that some of the divine kings mentioned by Frazer were exposed to a similar fatality and therefore had to be slain in time.

[Footnote 28: See especially _supra_, ii. 294-296, 352, 353, 415 _sqq._]

[Footnote 29: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 158 _sq._ Landtman, _Origin of Priesthood_, p. 144 _sqq._]

[Footnote 30: Landtman, _op. cit._ p. 144. Divine animals are sometimes treated in a similar way. In ancient Egypt, if the sacred beasts could not, or would not, help in emergency, they were beaten; and if this measure failed to prove efficacious, then the creatures were punished with death (Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 178; _Idem_, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 428 _sq._).]

[Footnote 31: _Supra_, i. 443.]

[Footnote 32: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 8.]

As the right to life, generally granted to gods, is thus in certain circumstances abrogated for the benefit of their worshippers, so their right to bodily integrity may be suspended if their behaviour does not answer the expectations of their devotees. Men punish their gods as they punish their fellow men. Among the Amazulu, when it thunders or, as they say, "the heaven is coming badly," the doctors go out and scold it; "they take a stick and say they are going to beat the lightning of heaven."[33] The negro cudgels his fetish unmercifully to make it submissive.[34] The Samoyede flogs his idol or throws it away if he does not succeed in his doings.[35] The idols of the Typees, in the Marquesas Islands, "received more hard knocks than supplications."[36] When his guardian spirit proves stubborn, the Hudson Bay Eskimo deprives it of food, or strips it of its garments.[37]

[Footnote 33: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_, p. 404.]

[Footnote 34: Bastian, _Afrikanische Reisen_, p. 61.]

[Footnote 35: von Struve, in _Ausland_, 1880 p. 795.]

[Footnote 36: Melville, _Typee_, p. 261.]

[Footnote 37: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 194.]

* * * * *

In normal circumstances men regard it as a duty, not only to refrain from killing or injuring their gods, but positively to promote their existence and comfort. According to early beliefs, supernatural beings are subject to human needs. The gods of the heathen Siberians laboured for their subsistence, engaged in hunting and fishing, and laid up provisions of roots against times of dearth.[38] When the heavens appear checkered with white clouds on a blue surface, the Maoris of New Zealand say that the god is planting his potatoes and {611} other divine edibles.[39] The Fijian gods are described as enormous eaters.[40] The Vedic gods wore clothes, were great drunkards, and suffered from constant hunger;[41] I need only refer to the numerous passages in the Rig-Veda where mention is made of the appetite or thirst of Indra and the pleasure he has in filling his belly.[42] An Egyptian god cannot be conceived without his house in which he lives, in which his festivals are solemnised, and which he never leaves except on professional days. His dwelling has to be cleaned, and he is assisted at his toilet by his attendants; the priest has to dress and serve his god, and places every day on his table offerings of food and drink.[43] So also the Chaldean gods had to be nourished, clothed, and amused; and the stone or wooden statues erected to them in the sanctuaries furnished them with bodies which they animated with their breath.[44]

[Footnote 38: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 259.]

[Footnote 39: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_, i. 244.]

[Footnote 40: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, pp. 184, 195.]

[Footnote 41: Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, pp. 304, 366 _sqq._ Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 36, n. 2.]

[Footnote 42: _Rig-Veda_, ii. 11. 11; viii. 4. 10; viii. 17. 4; viii. 78. 7; x. 86. 13 _sqq._]

[Footnote 43: Erman, _op. cit._ pp. 273, 275, 279. Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 110.]

[Footnote 44: Ball, 'Glimpses of Babylonian Religion,' in _Proceed. Soc. Biblical Archæology_, xiv. 153 _sqq._ Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 679.]

The idea that supernatural beings have human appetites and human wants leads to the practice of sacrifice. Whatever means they may have of earning their livelihood, they are certainly not indifferent to gifts offered by men. If such offerings fail them they may even suffer want and become feeble and powerless. The Egyptian gods, says M. Maspero, "were dependent upon the gifts of mortals, and the resources of each individual deity, and consequently his power, depended on the wealth and number of his worshippers."[45] We meet with the same idea at every step in the Vedic hymns.[46] Should sacrifices cease for an instant to be offered, the gods would cease to send rain, {612} to bring back at the appointed hour Aurora and the sun, to raise and ripen harvests--not only because they would be unwilling, but because they would be unable to do so.[47] It was by sacrifice that the gods delivered the world from chaos, and it is by sacrifice that man prevents it from lapsing back into the same state;[48] in the 'Laws of Manu' it is said that sacrifices support "both the movable and the immovable creation."[49] The Zoroastrian books likewise represent the sacrifice as an act of assistance to the gods, by which they become victorious in their combats with the demons.[50] When not strengthened by offerings they fly helpless before their foes. Overcome by the demon Apaosha, the bright and glorious Tistrya cries out in distress:--"Woe is me, O Ahura Mazda! . . . Men do not worship me with a sacrifice in which I am invoked by my own name. . . . If men had worshipped me with a sacrifice in which I had been invoked by my own name, as they worship the other Yazatas with sacrifices in which they are invoked by their own names, I should have taken to me the strength of ten horses, the strength of ten camels, the strength of ten bulls, the strength of ten mountains, the strength of ten rivers."[51]

[Footnote 45: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 302. _Cf._ Wiedemann, _Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul_, p. 19.]

[Footnote 46: _Rig-Veda_, ii. 15. 2; x. 52. 5 _sq._; x. 121. 7. _Cf._ _Atharva-Veda_, xi. 7. 14 _sq._; Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 149; Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 31; Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 329.]

[Footnote 47: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 36.]

[Footnote 48: _Rig-Veda_, x. 130. Barth, _op. cit._ p. 37.]

[Footnote 49: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 75 _sqq._]

[Footnote 50: See Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 327; _Idem_, in _Sacred Books of the East_ (1st edit.), iv. p. lxviii.]

[Footnote 51: _Yasts_, viii. 23 _sq._]

Men are induced by various motives to offer sacrificial gifts to supernatural beings. In early religion the most common motive is undoubtedly a desire to avert evils; and we have reason to believe that such a desire was the first source of religious worship. In spite of recent assertions to the contrary, the old saying holds true that religion was born of fear. Those who maintain that the savage is little susceptible to this emotion,[52] and that he for the most part takes his gods joyously,[53] show ignorance {613} of facts. One of his characteristics is great nervous susceptibility,[54] and he lives in constant apprehension of danger from supernatural powers. We are told of the Samoyedes that a sudden blow on the outside of a tent will sometimes throw the occupants into spasms. "The Indian," says Parkman, "lived in perpetual fear. The turning of a leaf, the crawling of an insect, the cry of a bird, the creaking of a bough, might be to him the mystic signal of weal or woe."[55] From all quarters of the uncivilised world we hear that terror or fear is the predominant element in the religious sentiment, that savages are more inclined to ascribe evil than good to the influence of supernatural agents, that their sacrifices and other acts of worship more frequently have in view to avert misfortunes than to procure positive benefits, or that, even though benevolent deities are believed in, much more attention is paid to malignant ones.[56] And even among peoples who have passed beyond the stage of {614} savagery fear still remains a prominent factor in their religion. The great bulk of Homeric cult-operations lay in propitiatory rites in avoidance of evil.[57] "No one," says Sir Monier-Williams, "who has ever been brought into close contact with the Hind[=u]s in their own country can doubt the fact that the worship of at least ninety per cent. of the people of India in the present day is a worship of fear."[58] In one of the Pahlavi texts we read that "he is not to be considered as faithful who has no fear of the sacred beings."[59] The Egyptian Amon Râ, who is praised as "the beautiful and beloved god, who giveth life by all manner of warmth, by all manner of fair cattle," is at the same time styled "Lord of fear, great one of terror."[60] The Psalmist says that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,"[61] and, as Nöldeke points out, "the fear of God" was used in its literal sense.[62] Although the Koran has much to tell about the loving kindness of God, the god of Islam evokes much more fear than love. Faith is said by Muhammedan theologians to "stand midway between hope and fear."[63]

[Footnote 52: Gruppe, _Die griechischen Culte und Mythen_, p. 244 _sq._]

[Footnote 53: Grant Allen, _Evolution of the Idea of God_, p. 347.]

[Footnote 54: See Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 14.]

[Footnote 55: Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. lxxxiv.]

[Footnote 56: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 391 (American Indians generally). Müller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_, pp. 84, 171, 214, 260. von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 243 (Coroados). Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 361 _sq._; Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 367 _sq._ Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians,' in _Magazine of American History_, viii. 736. McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xv. 184. Murdoch, 'Ethn. Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,' _ibid._ ix. 432 (Point Barrow Eskimo). Ross, 'Eastern Tinneh,' in _Smithsonian Report_, 1866, p. 306. Radloff, _Schamanenthum_, p. 15 (Turkish tribes of the Altai). Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 57. Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 163 _sq._ Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 181 _sq._ (Santals). Mouhot, _Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China_, ii. 29 (Bannavs of Cambodia). Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 157. Wilken, _Het animisme bij de volken van den Indischen Archipel_, p. 207 _sq._ St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, i. 69, 70, 178; Low, _Sarawak_, p. 253; Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. in (Dyaks). von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 216. Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Jour. des Museum Godeffroy_, iv. 44 (Pelew Islanders). Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 189. Percy Smith, 'Uea,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 114. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 21. Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 336 (Tahitians). Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, pp. 104, 148; Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 141; Polack, _op. cit._ i. 244 (Maoris). Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's_, pp. 338, 339, 341 (Hottentots). Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 153 (Matabele). Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 435 (peoples inhabiting the country north of the Zambesi). Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 2 (Negroes of Accra). See also Karsten, _Origin of Worship_, p. 44 _sqq._; _infra_, p. 665 _sqq._]

[Footnote 57: _Cf._ Keller, _Homeric Society_, p. 115 _sq._]

[Footnote 58: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_, p. 230.]

[Footnote 59: _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxxix. 33.]