Chapter 46
Part 46
[Footnote 80: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 31. See Barth, _op. cit._ p. 34; Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 29; Muir, _op. cit._ v. 20; Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 18.]
[Footnote 81: _Rig-Veda_, i. 122. 9.]
[Footnote 82: _Ibid._ i. 24. 14.]
[Footnote 83: _Ibid._ x. 154. 2.]
[Footnote 84: _Ibid._ x. 154. 3.]
[Footnote 85: _Ibid._ i. 125. 5 _sq._; x. 107. 2; x. 154. 3. Muir, _op. cit._ v. 285. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 536. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 167.]
[Footnote 86: Muir, _op. cit._ v. 301.]
[Footnote 87: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 7 _sq._ Barth, _op. cit._ p. 22 _sq._ Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 165 _sqq._]
[Footnote 88: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 410 _sqq._ Barth, _op. cit._ p. 23. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 167 _sq._]
[Footnote 89: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 155. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 535.]
[Footnote 90: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 8; x. 154. 3. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 535. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 168.]
[Footnote 91: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 10 _sqq._ _Cf._ Zimmer, _op. cit._ p. 421; Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 147.]
[Footnote 92: Zimmer, _op. cit._ p. 418. Scherman, _Indische Visionslitteratur_, p. 123. _Idem_, 'Eine Art visionärer Höllenschilderung aus dem indischen Mittelalter,' in _Romanische Forschungen_, v. 569. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 537.]
[Footnote 93: _Rig-Veda_, iv. 5. 5; vii. 104. 3, 11, 17. _Atharva-Veda_, v. 19. 3, 12 _sqq._; xii. 4. 3, 36.]
In post-Vedic times ritualism grew more important still. Sometimes the gods are represented as beings indifferent to every moral distinction, and the most indelicate stories are unscrupulously related of them.[94] In the Taittirîya Samhitâ of the Yajur Veda we are told that if anybody wishes to injure another, he need only say to Sûrya, one of the most important among the solar deities,[95] "Smite such a one, and I will give you an offering," and Sûrya, to get the offering, will smite him.[96] Çiva, who is connected with the Vedic god Rudra, is in the Mahabharata clothed in terrible "forms," being armed with the trident and wearing a necklace of skulls; he exacts a bloody cultus, and is the chief of the mischievous spirits and vampires that frequent places of execution and burial grounds.[97] Vishnu, the other great god of Hinduism, though less fierce than Çiva, is nevertheless, on one side of his character, an inexorable god;[98] and Krishna, as accepted by Vishnuism, is a crafty hero of a singularly doubtful moral character.[99] In Brahmanism religion is largely replaced by magic, the rites themselves are raised to the rank of divinities, the priests become the gods of gods.[100] And the point of view from which these man-gods look upon human conduct is expressed in the Satapatha Brâhmana, where it is said that fees paid to priests are like sacrifices offered to other gods--those who gratify them are placed in a state of bliss.[101] Ritual observances are essential for a man's wellbeing both in this life and in the life to come, where paradise, hell, or transmigration {710} awaits the dead. In the Brâhmanas immortality, or at least longevity, is promised to those who rightly understand and practise the rites of sacrifice, whilst those who are deficient in this respect depart before their natural term of life to the next world, where they are weighed in a balance and receive good or evil according to their deeds.[102] To repeat sacred texts a certain number of times is also laid down as a condition of salvation,[103] and the doctrine is gradually developed that a single invocation of the divine name cancels a whole life of iniquity and crime. Hence the importance attached--as early as the Bhagavad Gîtâ--to the last thought before death, and the idea of attaining complete possession of this thought by an act of suicide.[104] According to the Purânas it is sufficient even in the case of the vilest criminal, when at the point of death, to pronounce by chance some syllables of the names Vishnu or Çiva in order to obtain salvation;[105] and in the preface to the Prem Sâgar, which displays the religion of the Hindus at the present day, it is said that those who even ignorantly sing the praises of the greatness of Krishn Chand are rewarded with final beatitude, just as a person would acquire eternal life by partaking of the drink of immortality though he did not know what he was drinking.[106] On the other hand, "according to the Hindu Scriptures, whatever a man's life may have been, if he do not die near some holy stream, if his body is not burned on its banks, or at any rate near some water as a representative of the stream; or where this is impracticable, if some portion of his body be not thrown into it--his spirit must wander in misery, unable to obtain the bliss for which he has done and suffered so much in life."[107] At the same time we also find a great variety of social duties {711} inculcated in the sacred books of India--humanity even to enemies[108] and slaves,[109] filial piety,[110] charity,[111] hospitality,[112] veracity;[113] and in the Sûtras the doctrine appears that in order to obtain the chief fruit of sacrifice it is necessary to practise the moral virtues in addition to the rite.[114] But this doctrine is singularly free from any reference to the justice of gods. In the Upanishads and Buddhistic books it is distinctly formulated in the idea of _karma_, according to which each act of the soul, good or bad, inevitably and naturally works out its full effect to the sweet or bitter end without the intervention of any deity to apportion the reward or punishment.[115]
[Footnote 94: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 46 _sq._ Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 76.]
[Footnote 95: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 20.]
[Footnote 96: _Taittirîya Samhitâ_, vi. 4 _sqq._, quoted by Goblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God_, p. 85.]
[Footnote 97: Barth, _op. cit._ pp. 159, 164.]
[Footnote 98: _Ibid._ p. 174.]
[Footnote 99: _Ibid._ p. 172.]
[Footnote 100: _Supra_, ii. 657.]
[Footnote 101: _Satapatha Brâhmana_, ii. 2. 2. 6.]
[Footnote 102: Weber, 'Eine Legende des Çatapatha-Brâhma[n.]a über die strafende Vergeltung nach dem Tode,' in _Zeitschr. d. Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellsch._ ix. 238 _sq._ See also Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 168; Hopkins, _op. cit._ pp. 190, 193; _Vish['n]u Purá['n]a_, p. 44.]
[Footnote 103: _Aitareya Brahmanam_, ii. 17.]
[Footnote 104: _Bhagavad Gîtâ_, ch. 8. Barth, _op. cit._ p. 228.]
[Footnote 105: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 228.]
[Footnote 106: _Prem Ságar_, p. 56. _Cf._ Wilson, in _Vish['n]u Purá['n]a_, p. 210, n. 13; _Idem_, 'Religious Sects of the Hindus,' in _Asiatic Researches_, xvi. 115.]
[Footnote 107: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 439 _sq._]
[Footnote 108: _Supra_, i. 342.]
[Footnote 109: _Supra_, i. 689.]
[Footnote 110: _Supra_, i. 612.]
[Footnote 111: _Supra_, i. 550 _sq._]
[Footnote 112: _Supra_, i. 578 _sq._]
[Footnote 113: _Supra_, ii. 91.]
[Footnote 114: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 49. See, _e.g._, _Âpastamba_, i. 7. 20. 1 _sqq._; i. 8. 23. 6.]
[Footnote 115: Barth, _op. cit._ pp. 77, 78, 115 _sq._ Müller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 301. _Dhammapada_, i. 1 _sq._ Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on the History of Buddhism_, p. 85. Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 289. Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 319 _sq._]
Buddha did not base his system on any belief in gods, hence there is no place in it for a ritual nor for sin in the sense of offending a supernatural being. He that is pure in heart is the true priest, not he that knows the Vedas; the Vedas are nothing, the priests are of no account, save as they be morally of repute.[116] If the genuine Buddhist can be said to worship any higher power, it is the moral order which never fails to assert itself in the law of cause and effect. But Buddha's followers were less metaphysical, and "the clouds returned after the rain." The old gods of Brahmanism came back, Buddha himself was deified as an omniscient and everlasting god, and Buddhism incorporated most of the local deities and demons of those nations it sought to convert.[117] From being originally a metaphysical and ethical doctrine, it was thus transformed into a religion full of ritualism, and, it should be added, profusely mixed with magic. In Lamaism, especially, {712} ritual is elevated to the front rank of importance; we find there pompous services closely resembling those of the Church of Rome, litanies and chants, offerings and sacrifice.[118] And the muttering of certain mystic formulas and short prayers is alleged to be far more efficacious than mere moral virtue as a means of gaining the glorious heaven of eternal bliss, the paradise of the fabulous Buddha of boundless light.[119] So also in China the teachers of Buddhism "were by no means rigorous in enforcing the obligations of men to morality. To expiate sins, offerings to the idols and to the priests were sufficient. A temple built in honour of F[)o], and richly endowed, would suffice to blot out every stain of guilt, and serve as a portal to the blessed mansions of Buddha."[120]
[Footnote 116: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 319.]
[Footnote 117: Waddell, _Buddhism in Tibet_, pp. 126, 325 _sq._ Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, pp. 187, 207. Davis, _China_, ii. 51.]
[Footnote 118: Waddell, _op. cit._ 421, 476.]
[Footnote 119: _Ibid._ pp. 142, 148, 573.]
[Footnote 120: Gutzlaff, quoted by Davis, _op. cit._ ii. 51. _Cf._ Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 150.]
In the national religion of China the heaven god, Shang-te, is the supreme being, the creator and sovereign ruler of the universe, whose power knows no bounds, and whose sight equally comprehends the past, the present, and the future, penetrating even to the remotest recesses of the heart.[121] He is the author and upholder not only of the physical but of the moral order of the world, watching over the conduct of men, rewarding the good, and punishing the wicked.[122] Sometimes he appears to array himself in terrors, as in the case of public calamities and the irregularity of the seasons; but these are only salutary warnings intended to call men to repentance.[123] The cult which is offered Shang-te is frigid and ceremonial. The rules of ceremony have their origin in heaven, and the movement of them {713} reaches to earth; their abandonment leads to "the ruin of states, the destruction of families, and the perishing of individuals."[124] The Chinese are inclined to place ritualism on an equality with social morality. Confucius himself humbly submitted to the rules of ceremony, although he denounced hypocrisy. But to him morality was infinitely more important than religion. He altogether avoided the personal term God, and made only use of the abstract term Heaven. He admitted that spiritual beings exist, and even sacrificed to them,[125] but when questioned about matters relating to religion he was systematically silent.[126] Religious duties occupy a very insignificant place in his system. "To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom."[127] Prayer is unnecessary because Heaven does not actively interfere with the soul of man; it has endowed him at his birth with goodness, which, if he will, may become his nature, and the reward or punishment is only the natural or providential result of his conduct.[128] Of punishments in a future life Confucius says nothing, though he maintains that there are rewards and dignity for the good after death.[129] The belief of the Chinese in _post mortem_ punishments comes from Buddhism.[130]
[Footnote 121: Legge, _Notions of the Chinese concerning God_, pp. 33, 34, 100 _sq._ _Idem_, _Chinese Classics_, i. 98. Staunton, _Inquiry into the proper Mode of rendering the Word "God" in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese Language_, p. 8 _sq._ Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, pp. 77, 82.]
[Footnote 122: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 272. Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 98; iii. 46. Smith, _Proverbs of the Chinese_, p. 40. Boone, _Essay on the proper rendering of the Words Elohim and [Greek: The/os] into the Chinese Language_, p. 55. _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, i. 162. Davis, _op. cit._ ii. 26, 34. Douglas, _op. cit._ pp. 77, 78, 83.]
[Footnote 123: Staunton, _op. cit._ p. 9. Legge, _Chinese Classics_, iii. 46 _sq._]
[Footnote 124: _Lî Kî_, vii. 4. 5 _sq._]
[Footnote 125: _Lun Yü_, iii. 12. 1; x. 8. 10.]
[Footnote 126: _Ibid._ vii. 20. _Cf._ Réville, _La religion chinoise_, p. 326.]
[Footnote 127: _Lun Yü_, vi. 20.]
[Footnote 128: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 78. Legge, _Religions of China_, p. 300. Réville, _op. cit._ p. 645.]
[Footnote 129: Legge, _Religions of China_, pp. 115, 299 _sq._ Réville, _op. cit._ p. 345.]
[Footnote 130: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 288. Edkins, _op. cit._ pp. 83, 87 _sqq._ Smith, _Proverbs of the Chinese_, p. 227.]
The gods of ancient Greece were on the whole beneficent beings, who conferred blessings upon those who secured their goodwill. Zeus protects the life of the family, city, and nation; he is a god of victory and victorious peace, who gathers the hosts against Troy, and saves Greece from Persia; he brings the ships to land; he is "the warder off of evil."[131] But neither he nor the other gods bestow their {714} favours for nothing; Xenophon says that they assist with good advice those who worship them regularly,[132] but take revenge on those who neglect them.[133] They punish severely even offences committed against them accidentally,[134] and not infrequently they display actual malevolence towards men by seducing them into sin[135] or inflicting harm upon them out of sheer envy.[136] In other respects, also, they are by no means models of morality; but this does not prevent them from acting as administrators of justice any more than, among men, a judge is supposed to lose all regard for justice because he himself transgresses the rules of morality in some particular of private life.[137] "For great crimes," says Herodotus, "great punishments at the hands of the gods are in store."[138] Dike, or Justice, the terrible virgin "who breathes against her enemies a destructive wrath,"[139] is represented sometimes as the daughter, sometimes as the companion of the all-seeing Zeus;[140] and, as Welcker observes, Zeus was not only a god among other gods, but also the deity solely and abstractedly.[141] We have noticed above that from ancient times the murder of a kinsman was an offence against Zeus and under the ban of the Erinyes, and that later on all bloodshed, if the victim had any rights at all within the city, became a sin which needed purification.[142] Zeus protected guests and suppliants,[143] he punished children who reproached their aged parents,[144] he was a guardian of the family property,[145] he protected boundaries,[146] he was no friend of falsehood,[147] he punished perjury.[148] According to earlier beliefs retribution was exclusively restricted {715} to this earthly existence, and if the guilty person himself escaped the punishment for his deed it fell on some of his descendants.[149] The transference of Menelaus to the Elysian plain, spoken of in the Odyssey,[150] was not a reward for his virtue--indeed, he was not particularly conspicuous for any of the Homeric virtues--but a privilege resulting from his being married to Zeus' daughter Helena;[151] and if the perjurer was tortured in Hades[152] the simple reason was that he had called down upon himself such torture in his oath.[153] In later times we meet with the doctrine of retribution after death, not only in the speculations of isolated philosophers, but as a popular belief;[154] but this belief seems to have been quite unconnected with any notion of Olympian justice.[155] The souls in the world beyond the grave are sentenced by special judges;[156] Aeschylus expressly says that it is another Zeus that administers justice there.[157] For him Hades with the powers by which it is governed exists only as a place where the guilty are punished, whereas for the virtuous he has no word of true hope;[158] and other writers also have much more to tell about future punishments than about future rewards.[159] Particularly prominent among the offences which are punished in Hades are, besides perjury,[160] injuries to parents[161] and guests,[162] that is, offences which in this world are visited with the most powerful curses.[163] According to Aeschylus, the retribution which the Erinyes--personifications of curses--have begun on earth is completed in the nether world, and according to Pythagoras unpurified souls are kept chained there by the Erinyes without any hope of escape.[164] We are, moreover, told that painters used to represent "allegorical figures of curses in connection with their {716} images of wicked dead.[165] From all these facts I conclude that the notion of punishments in Hades did not arise from a belief in the justice of gods, but from the idea that the efficacy of a curse may extend beyond the grave--an idea which we have already met with both in Vedic texts and among certain savages, and of which the supposed punishment of perjury in Hades is only a particular instance.[166] As for the gods it should be added that the vulgar opinion of their character was not shared by all. Euripides affirms that the legends about them which tend to confuse human ideas as to right and wrong are not literally true.[167] "I think," he says, "that none of the gods is bad";[168] "if the gods do aught that is base, they are not gods."[169] Plato opposes the popular views that the deity induces men to commit crimes,[170] that he is capable of feeling envy,[171] and that evil-doers may avert divine punishments by sacrifices offered to the gods as bribes.[172] God is good, he is never the author of evil to any one, and if the wicked are miserable the reason is that they require to be punished and are benefited by receiving punishment from God.[173] Plutarch likewise asserts in the strongest terms that God is perfectly good and least of all wanting in justice and love, "the most beautiful of virtues and the best befitting the Godhead."[174]
[Footnote 131: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 59-61, 83, 107. Vischer, _Kleine Schriften_, ii. 352 _sq._ Preller, _Griechische Mythologie_, i. 146 _sqq._]
[Footnote 132: Xenophon, _Hipparchicus_, ix. 9. _Idem_, _Cyropædia_, i. 6. 46.]
[Footnote 133: _Idem_, _Anabasis_, v. 3. 13; vii. 8. 4.]
[Footnote 134: Nägelsbach, _Die nachhomerische Theologie des griechischen Volksglaubens_, p. 331 _sqq._]
[Footnote 135: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 231 _sqq._]
[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ i. 79 _sqq._]
[Footnote 137: _Cf._ Nägelsbach, _Homerische Theologie_, pp. 288, 317 _sqq._; Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 48 _sqq._; Maury, _Histoire des religions de la Grèce antique_, i. 342; Gladstone, _Studies on Homer_, ii. 384.]
[Footnote 138: Herodotus, ii. 120.]
[Footnote 139: Aeschylus, _Choephor[oe]_, 949 _sqq._]
[Footnote 140: _Ibid._ 949. Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 256 (254). Usener, _Götternamen_, p. 197. Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 71, Darmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 106 _sq._]
[Footnote 141: Welcker, _Griechische Götterlehre_, i. 181.]
[Footnote 142: _Supra_, i. 379.]
[Footnote 143: _Supra_, i. 579, 585.]
[Footnote 144: _Supra_, i. 624.]
[Footnote 145: _Supra_, ii. 60.]
[Footnote 146: _Supra_, ii. 61.]
[Footnote 147: _Supra_, ii. 116.]
[Footnote 148: _Supra_, ii. 121.]
[Footnote 149: _Supra_, i. 49 _sq._]
[Footnote 150: _Odyssey_, iv. 561 _sqq._]
[Footnote 151: _Cf._ Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 74.]
[Footnote 152: _Iliad_, iii. 278 _sq._; xix. 259 _sq._]
[Footnote 153: _Cf._ Rohde, _op. cit._ p. 60.]
[Footnote 154: Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 99 _sqq._ Nägelsbach, _Nachhomerische Theologie_, p. 35 _sq._]
[Footnote 155: _Cf._ Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 104.]
[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ i. 101.]
[Footnote 157: Aeschylus, _Supplices_, 230 _sq._]
[Footnote 158: _Cf._ Westcott, _Essays in the History of Religious Thought_, p. 87.]
[Footnote 159: Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 101 _sq._]
[Footnote 160: Aristophanes, _Ranæ_, 150, 275.]
[Footnote 161: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 175, 267 _sqq._, 335 _sqq._ Pausanias, x. 28. 4 _sq._ Aristophanes, _Ranæ_, 147-150, 274.]
[Footnote 162: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 269 _sq._ Aristophanes, _Ranæ_, 147 _sq._]
[Footnote 163: See _supra_, i. 584 _sqq._, 621 _sqq._]
[Footnote 164: Diogenes Laertius, _De vitis philosophorum_, viii. 1. 31.]
[Footnote 165: Demosthenes (?), _Contra Aristogitonem oratio I._ 52.]
[Footnote 166: The Arabs of the Ulád Bu [(]Azîz in Southern Morocco maintain that there are three classes of persons who are infallibly doomed to hell, namely, those who have been cursed by their parents, those who have been guilty of unlawful homicide, and those who have burned corn. They say that every grain curses him who burns it.]
[Footnote 167: _Cf._ Westcott, _op. cit._ p. 104.]
[Footnote 168: Euripides, _Iphigenia in Tauris_, 391.]
[Footnote 169: _Idem_, _Bellerophon_, 17 (_Fragmenta_, 300).]
[Footnote 170: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 379 _sq._]
[Footnote 171: _Idem_, _Phædrus_, p. 247. _Idem_, _Timæus_, p. 29.]
[Footnote 172: _Idem_, _Respublica_, ii. 364 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Leges_, x. 905 _sqq._; xii. 948.]
[Footnote 173: _Idem_, _Respublica_, ii. 379 _sq._ _Cf._ Aeschylus, _Agamemnon_, 176 _sqq._]
[Footnote 174: Plutarch, _De defectu oraculorum_, See also _Idem_, _De adulatore et amico_, 22.]
The gods of the Romans were on the whole unsympathetic and lifeless beings, some of them even actually pernicious, as the god of Fever, who had a temple on the Palatine hill, and the god of Ill-Fortune, who had an altar on the Esquiline hill.[175] The relations between the gods {717} and their worshippers were cold, ceremonial, legal. The chief thing was not to break "the peace of the gods," or, when it was broken, to restore it.[176] They were rendered propitious by "sanctity" and "piety."[177] But sanctity was defined as "the knowledge of how we ought to worship them," and piety was only "justice towards the gods," the return for benefits received; Cicero asks, "What piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing?"[178] The divine law, _fas_, was distinguished from the human law, _jus_. To the former belonged not only the religious rites but the duties to the dead, as also the duties to certain living individuals.[179] Offences against parents were avenged by the _divi parentum_;[180] the duty of hospitality was enforced by the _dii hospitales_ and Jupiter;[181] boundaries were protected by Jupiter Terminalis and Terminus;[182] and Jupiter, Dius Fidius, and Fides, were the guardians of sworn faith.[183]
[Footnote 175: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 25.]
[Footnote 176: Leist, _Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 219 _sqq._ Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, p. 217.]
[Footnote 177: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 3.]
[Footnote 178: _Idem_, _De natura deorum_, i. 41.]
[Footnote 179: On the distinction between _fas_ and _jus_ see von Jhering, _Geist des römischen Rechts_, i. 258.]
[Footnote 180: _Supra_, i. 624.]
[Footnote 181: _Supra_, i. 580.]
[Footnote 182: _Supra_, ii. 61.]
[Footnote 183: _Supra_, ii. 96, 121 _sq._ Wissowa, _Religion und Kultus der Römer_, pp. 48, 103, 104, 123 _sq._]
The god of Israel was a powerful protector of his chosen people, but he was a severe master who inspired more fear than love. In the pre-prophetic period at least, he was no model of goodness. He had unaccountable moods, his wrath often resembled "rather the insensate violence of angered nature, than the reasonable indignation of a moralised personality"[184]--as appears, for instance, from the suggestion of David that Saul's undeserved enmity might be due to the incitement of God.[185] At the same time his severity was also a guardian of human relationships. It turned against children who were disrespectful to their parents, against murderers, adulterers, thieves, false witnesses--indeed, the whole criminal law was a revelation of the Lord. He was moreover a protector of {718} the poor and needy,[186] and a preserver of strangers.[187] But offences against God were, in the Ten Commandments, mentioned before offences against man; religious rites were put on the same level with the rules of social morality; neglect of circumcision, or disregard of the precepts of ceremonial cleanliness, or sabbath-breaking, was punished with the same severity as the greatest crimes.[188] "To the ordinary man," says Wellhausen, "it was not moral but liturgical acts that seemed to be truly religious."[189] A different opinion, however, was expressed by the Prophets. They opposed the vice of the heart to the outward service of the ritual.[190] God was said by them to desire not sacrifice but mercy,[191] and to hate the hypocritical service of Israel with its feast-days and solemn assemblies;[192] and the true fast was declared to consist in moral welldoing.[193] To them righteousness was the fundamental virtue of Yahveh, and if he punished Israel his anger was no longer a merely fitful outburst, unrelated to Israel's own wrongdoing, but an essential element of his righteousness.[194] However, as M. Halévy observes, the truly national conceptions of the Hebrews were not those which the Prophets maintained, but those which they opposed.[195] The importance of ritual was more than ever emphasised in the post-prophetic priestly code.
[Footnote 184: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 38.]
[Footnote 185: _1 Samuel_, xxvi. 19.]
[Footnote 186: _Supra_, i. 552, 565.]
[Footnote 187: _Supra_, i. 580.]
[Footnote 188: Montefiore, _op. cit._ pp. 327, 470. Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, ii. 276.]
[Footnote 189: Wellhausen, _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_, p. 468.]
[Footnote 190: _Cf._ Caird, _Evolution of Religion_, ii. 119.]
[Footnote 191: _Hosea_, vi. 6.]
[Footnote 192: _Amos_, v. 21 _sqq._]
[Footnote 193: _Isaiah_, lviii. 6 _sqq._]
[Footnote 194: _Cf._ Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 122 _sq._]
[Footnote 195: Halévy, _Mélanges de critique et d'histoire relatifs aux peuples sémitiques_, p. 371.]
The opposition against ritualism which was started by the Prophets reached its height in Christ. Men are defiled not by external uncleanness, but by evil thoughts and evil deeds.[196] "It is lawful to do well on the sabbath days."[197] Those whose righteousness does not exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.[198] The first and great commandment is that which {719} enjoins love to God, but the second, according to which a man shall love his neighbour as himself, "is like unto it."[199] At the same time there are in the New Testament passages in which God's judgment of men seems to be represented as determined by theological dogma.[200] The only sin which can never be forgiven either in this world or in the world to come, is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost;[201] and the belief in Jesus is laid down as indispensable for salvation.[202] According to St. Paul, a man is justified by faith alone, without the deeds of the law.[203] This doctrine, which makes man's salvation dependent upon his acceptance of the Messiahship of Jesus, has had a lasting influence upon Christian theology, and has, together with certain other dogmas, led to that singular discrepancy between the notions of divine and human justice which has up to the present day characterised the chief branches of the Christian Church.
[Footnote 196: _St. Matthew_, xv. 19 _sq._ _St. Mark_, vii. 6 _sqq._]
[Footnote 197: _St. Matthew_, xii. 12.]
[Footnote 198: _Ibid._ v. 20.]
[Footnote 199: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 37 _sqq._]
[Footnote 200: Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_, p. 82 _sq._]
[Footnote 201: _St. Matthew_, xii. 31 _sq._ _St. Mark_, iii. 28 _sq._]
[Footnote 202: _St. Mark_, xvi. 16. _St. John_, iii. 18, 36; viii. 24.]
[Footnote 203: _Romans_, iii. 28.]
Some of the early Fathers maintained that the interference and suffering of Christ, in itself, unconditionally saved all souls and emptied hell for ever;[204] but this theory never became popular. According to St. Augustine and, subsequently, Calvinian theology, the benefits of the atonement are limited to those whom God, of his sovereign pleasure, has from eternity arbitrarily elected, the effect of faith and conversion being not to save the soul, but simply to convince the soul that it is saved. A third theory--that of Pelagius, Armenius, and Luther--attributes to the sufferings of Christ a conditional efficacy, depending upon personal faith in his vicarious atonement, whereas those who for some reason or other do not possess such faith are excluded from salvation. A fourth doctrine, which early began to be constructed by the Fathers and was adopted by the Roman Catholic and the consistent portion of the Episcopalian Church, declares that by Christ's vicarious {720} suffering power is given to the Church, a priestly hierarchy, to save those who confess her authority and observe her rites, whilst all others are lost. Certain sectarians, like the Unitarians, or those "liberal Christians" who do not feel themselves tied by the dogmas of any special creed, are the only ones among whom we meet with the opinion that a free soul, who by the immutable laws which the Creator has established may choose between good and evil, is saved or lost just so far and so long as it partakes of either the former or the latter.[205]
[Footnote 204: Alger, _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_, pp. 550-552, 563. Farrar, _Mercy and Judgment_, p. 58 _sq._]
[Footnote 205: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 553 _sqq._]
According to the leading doctrines of Christianity, then, the fates of men beyond the grave are determined by quite other circumstances than what the moral consciousness by itself recognises as virtue or vice. They are all doomed to death and hell in consequence of Adam's sin, and their salvation, if not absolutely predestined, can only be effected by sincere faith in the atonement of Christ or by valid reception of sacramental grace at the hands of a priest. Persons who on intellectual or moral grounds are unable to accept the dogma of atonement or to acknowledge the authority of an exacting hierarchy, are subject to the most awful penalties for a sin committed by their earliest ancestor, and so are the countless millions of heathen who never even had an opportunity to embrace the Christian religion. Luther was considered to have shown an exceptional boldness when he expressed the hope that "our dear God would be merciful to Cicero, and to others like him."[206] In the Westminster Confession of Faith the Divines declared the opinion that men not professing Christianity may be saved to be "very pernicious, and to be detested";[207] and in their Larger Catechism they expressly said that "they who, having never heard the gospel, know not Jesus Christ, and believe not in him, cannot be saved, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, or the laws of that religion which they profess."[208] This doctrine has had many {721} adherents up to the present time,[209] although a more liberal view in favour of virtuous heathen has obviously been gaining ground.[210] Even in the case of Christians errors in belief on such subjects as church government, the Trinity, transubstantiation, original sin, and predestination, have been declared to expose the guilty to eternal damnation.[211] In the seventeenth century it was a common theme of certain Roman Catholic writers that "Protestancy unrepented destroys salvation,"[212] while the Protestants on their part taxed Du Moulin with culpable laxity for admitting that some Roman Catholics might escape the torments of hell.[213] Nathanael Emmons, the sage of Franklin, tells us that "it is absolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation in order to be saved."[214]
[Footnote 206: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146.]
[Footnote 207: _Confession of Faith_, x. 4.]
[Footnote 208: _Larger Catechism_, Answer to Question 60.]
[Footnote 209: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146 _sq._]
[Footnote 210: Prentiss, 'Infant Salvation,' in _Presbyterian Review_, iv. 576. For earlier instances of this opinion see Abbot, 'Literature of the Doctrine of a Future Life,' forming an Appendix to Alger's _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_, pp. 859, 863, 865.]
[Footnote 211: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 863.]
[Footnote 212: Wilson, _Charity Mistaken, with the Want whereof Catholickes are unjustly charged, for affirming . . . that Protestancy unrepented destroys Salvation_.]
[Footnote 213: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 860.]
[Footnote 214: Emmons, _Works_, iv. 336.]
Besides the heathen there is another large class of people whom Christian theology has condemned to hell for no fault of theirs, namely, infants who have died unbaptised. From a very early age the water of baptism was believed by the Christians to possess a magic power to wipe away sin,[215] and since the days of St. Augustine it was deemed so indispensable for salvation that any child dying without "the bath of regeneration" was regarded as lost for ever.[216] St. Augustine admitted that the punishment of such children was of the mildest sort,[217] but other writers were more severe; St. Fulgentius condemned to "everlasting punishment in eternal fire" even infants who died in their mother's womb.[218] However, {722} the notion that unbaptised children will be tormented, gradually gave way to a more humane opinion. In the middle of the twelfth century Peter Lombard determined that the proper punishment of original sin, when no actual sin is added to it, is "the punishment of loss," that is, loss of heaven and the sight of God, but not "the punishment of sense," that is, positive torment. This doctrine was confirmed by Innocentius III. and shared by the large majority of the schoolmen, who assumed the existence of a place called _limbus_, or _infernus puerorum_, where unbaptised infants will dwell without being subject to torture.[219] But the older view was again set up by the Protestants, who generally maintained that the due punishment of original sin is, in strictness, damnation in hell, although many of them were inclined to think that if a child dies by misfortune before it is baptised the parents' sincere intention of baptising it, together with their prayers, will be accepted with God for the deed.[220] In the Confession of Augsburg the Anabaptistic doctrine is emphatically condemned;[221] and although Zwingli rejected the dogma that infants dying without baptism are lost, and Calvin, in harmony with his theory of election, refused to tie the salvation of infants to an outward rite, the necessity of baptism as the ordinary channel of receiving grace appears to have been a general belief in the Reformed churches throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[222] The damnation of infants was in fact an acknowledged doctrine of Calvinism,[223] though an exception was made for the children of pious parents.[224] But in the latter part of the eighteenth century Toplady, who was a vehement Calvinist, avowed {723} his belief in the universal salvation of all departed infants, whether baptised or unbaptised.[225] And a hundred years later Dr. Hodge thought he was justified in stating that the common opinion of evangelical Protestants was that "all who die in infancy are saved."[226] The accuracy of this statement, however, seems somewhat doubtful. In 1883 Mr. Prentiss wrote of the doctrine of infant salvation independently of baptism:--"My own impression is that, had it been taught as unequivocally in the Presbyterian Church even a third of a century ago, by a theologian less eminent than Dr. Hodge for orthodoxy, piety, and weight of character, it would have called forth an immediate protest from some of the more conservative, old-fashioned Calvinists."[227]
[Footnote 215: Tertullian, _De baptismo_, 1 _sqq._ (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, i. 1197 _sqq._). Harnack, _History of Dogma_, i. 206 _sq._; ii. 227. Stanley, _Christian Institutions_, p. 16. Lewis, _Paganism surviving in Christianity_, pp. 72, 73, 129, 144 _sq._]
[Footnote 216: Bingham, _Works_, iii. 488 _sqq._ Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 549.]
[Footnote 217: St. Augustine, _De peccatorum meritis et remissione_, i. 16 (Migne, _op. cit._ xliv. 16).]
[Footnote 218: St. Fulgentius, _De fide_, 27 (Migne, _op. cit._ lxv. 701).]
[Footnote 219: Wall, _History of Infant-Baptism_, i. 460 _sq._]
[Footnote 220: _Ibid._ i. 462, 468. Luther and his followers, however, speak more doubtfully about the efficacy of the parents' unrealised intention, and lay much stress on actual baptism (_ibid._ i. 469).]
[Footnote 221: _Augsburg Confession_, i. 9.]
[Footnote 222: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 550.]
[Footnote 223: Calvin, _Institutio Christiana religionis_, iv. 15. 10, vol. ii. 371. Norton, _Tracts concerning Christianity_, p. 179 _sqq._]
[Footnote 224: Calvin, _op. cit._ iv. 16. 9, vol. ii. 383 _sq._ Wall, _op. cit._ i. 469. Anderson, 'Introductory Essay,' to Logan's _Words of Comfort for Parents bereaved of Little Children_, p. xxi.]
[Footnote 225: Toplady, _Works_, p. 645 _sq._]
[Footnote 226: Hodge, _Systematic Theology_, i. 26 _sq._]
[Footnote 227: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 559. See also Anderson, _loc. cit._ p. xxiii.]
In order fully to realise the true import of the dogma of damnation it is necessary to consider the punishment in store for the condemned. The immense bulk of the Christians have always regarded hell and its agonies as material facts.[228] Origen, who was a Platonist and an heretic on many points, was severely censured for saying that the fire of hell was inward and of the conscience rather than outward and of the body;[229] and in the later Middle Ages Scotus Erigena showed unusual audacity in questioning the locality of hell and the material tortures of the condemned.[230] The punishment is burning--a penalty which even in the most barbaric codes is reserved for the very gravest crimes; and some great divines, like Jeremy Taylor and Jonathan Edwards, have been anxious to point out that the fire of hell is infinitely more painful than any fire on earth, being "fierce enough to melt the very rocks and elements."[231] This awful punishment also exceeds in dreadfulness anything which even the most vivid imagination can conceive, because it will last not for a passing moment, {724} nor for a year or a hundred, thousand, million, or milliard years, but for ever and ever. In case any doubt should arise as regards the physical capacity of the damned to withstand the heat, we are assured by some modern theologians that their bodies will be annealed like glass or asbestos-like or of the nature of salamanders.[232] This, then, is the future state of the large majority of men, quite independently of any fault of their own, or of the degree of their "guilt."[233] It would seem that even the felicity of the few who are saved must be seriously impaired by their contemplation of this endless and undescribable misery, but we are told that the case is just the reverse. They become as merciless as their god. Thomas Aquinas says that a perfect sight of the punishment of the damned is granted to them that they "may enjoy their beatitude and the grace of God more richly."[234] And the Puritans, especially, have revelled in the idea that "the sight of hell torments will exalt the happiness of the saints for ever," as a sense of the opposite misery always increases the relish of any pleasure.[235]
[Footnote 228: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516.]
[Footnote 229: _Ibid._ p. 516.]
[Footnote 230: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ix. 88, n. k.]
[Footnote 231: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516 _sq._]
[Footnote 232: Alger, _op. cit._ pp. 518, 520. _Cf._ St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, xxi. 2 _sqq._]
[Footnote 233: For the numbers of souls supposed to be lost see Alger, _op. cit._ p. 530 _sqq._ St. Chrysostom (_In Acta Apostolorum Homil. XXIV._ 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, lx. 189]) doubted whether out of the many thousands of souls constituting the Christian population of Antioch in his day one hundred would be saved. And at the end of the seventeenth century a History Professor at Oxford published a book to prove "that not one in a hundred thousand (nay probably not one in a million) from Adam down to our times, shall be saved" (Du-Moulin, _Moral Reflections upon the Number of the Elect_, title page).]
[Footnote 234: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, iii. Supplementum, qu. xciv. 1. 2 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Secunda, iv. 1393).]
[Footnote 235: Jonathan Edwards, _Works_, vii. 480. Alger, _op. cit._ p. 541.]
In the present times there is a distinct tendency among Christian theologians to humanise somewhat the doctrines of the future life.[236] But if Christianity is to be judged from the dogmas which almost from its beginning until quite recent times have been recognised by the immense majority of its adherents, it must be admitted that its {725} conception of a heavenly Father and Judge has been utterly inconsistent with all ordinary notions of goodness and justice. Calvin himself avowed that the decree according to which the fall of Adam involved, without remedy, in eternal death so many nations together with their infant children, was a "horrible" one. "But," he adds, "no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his own decree."[237]
[Footnote 236: Thus the doctrine of endless torments is opposed by a considerable number of theologians (Alger, _op. cit._ p. 546), and, "if held, is not practically taught by the vast majority of the English clergy" (Stanley, _op. cit._ p. 94).]
[Footnote 237: Calvin, _op. cit._ iii. 23. 7, vol. ii. 151.]
Like Christianity, Muhammedanism adorns its godhead with the highest moral attributes and at the same time ascribes to him decrees and actions which flatly contradict even the most elementary notions of human justice. The god of Islam is addressed as the compassionate and merciful; but his love is restricted to "those who fear,"[238] and his mercy can only be gained by that submissiveness or self-surrender which is indicated by the very name of Islam. He demands a righteous life, he punishes the wrongdoer and rewards the charitable.[239] Through his Prophet he has revealed to mankind both the rules of morality and the elements of a social system containing minute regulations for a man's conduct in various circumstances of life, with due rewards or penalties according to his fulfilment of these regulations.[240] The whole constitution of the State has on it a divine stamp; as an Arab proverb says, "country and religion are twins."[241] But foremost among duties is to believe in God and his Prophet. "God," it is said, "does not pardon polytheism and infidelity, but He can, if He willeth, pardon other crimes."[242] And the "pillars of religion" are the five duties of reciting the Kalimah or creed, of performing the five stated daily prayers, of fasting--especially in the month of Rama[d.]ân,--of giving the legal alms, and of making the pilgrimage to Mecca.[243] These duties are based on clear {726} sentences of the Koran, but the traditions have raised the most trivial ceremonial observances into duties of the greatest importance. It is true that hypocrisy and formalism without devotion were strongly condemned by Muhammed. "Righteousness," he said, "is not that ye turn your faces towards the East or the West, but righteousness is, one who believes in God, and the last day, and the angels, and the Book, and the prophets, and who gives wealth for His love to kindred, and orphans, and the poor, and the son of the road, and beggars, and those in captivity; and who is steadfast in prayer, and gives alms; and those who are sure of their covenant when they make a covenant; and the patient in poverty, and distress, and in time of violence; these are they who are true, and these are those who fear."[244] Yet in Muhammedanism, as in other ritualistic religions, the chief importance is practically attached to the punctual performance of outward ceremonies, and the virtue of prayer is made dependent upon an ablution.[245] In the future life the felicity or suffering of each person will be proportionate to his merits or demerits,[246] but the admittance into paradise depends in the first place on faith. "Those who believe, and act righteously, and are steadfast in prayer, and give alms, theirs is their hire with their Lord."[247] Those who have acknowledged the faith of Islam and yet acted wickedly will be punished in hell for a certain period, but will finally enter paradise.[248] As regards the future state of certain infidels the Koran contains contradictory statements. In one place it is said, "Verily, whether it be of those who believe, or those who are Jews or Christians or Sabaeans, whosoever believe in God and {727} the last day and act aright, they have their reward at their Lord's hand, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve."[249] But this passage is considered to have been abrogated by another where it is stated that whoso desires any other religion than Islam shall in the next world be among the lost.[250] The punishments inflicted upon unbelievers are no less horrible than the torments of the Christian hell. Yet in one point the Muhammedan doctrine of the future life is more merciful than the dogmas of Christianity. The children of believers will all go to paradise, and the children of unbelievers are generally supposed to escape hell. Some think they will be in A[(]ráf, a place situated between heaven and hell; whilst others maintain that they will be servants to the true believers in paradise.[251]
[Footnote 238: _Koran_, iii. 70.]
[Footnote 239: _Supra_, i. 553.]
[Footnote 240: _Cf._ Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, iii. 295 _sq._; Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 101.]
[Footnote 241: Sell, _Faith of Islám_, pp. 19, 39.]
[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ p. 241.]
[Footnote 243: _Ibid._ p. 251.]
[Footnote 244: _Koran_, ii. 172.]
[Footnote 245: _Cf._ Polak, _Persien_, i. 9; Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iv. 284 _sq._; Sell, _op. cit._ p. 256.]
[Footnote 246: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, i. 95 _sq._ Sell, _op. cit._ p. 231. Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 319.]
[Footnote 247: _Koran_, ii. 277.]
[Footnote 248: Lane, _op. cit._ i. 95. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 228. The Mu[(]tazilas, however, teach that the Muslim who enters hell will remain there for ever. They maintain that the person who, having committed great sins, dies unrepentant, though not an infidel, ceases to be a believer, and hence suffers as the infidels do, though the punishment is lighter than that which an infidel receives (Sell, _op. cit._ pp. 229, 241).]
[Footnote 249: _Koran_, ii. 59.]
[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ iii. 79. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 359 _sq._]
[Footnote 251: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 204 _sq._]
The formalism of Muhammedan orthodoxy has from time to time called forth protests from minds with deeper aspirations. The earlier Muhammedan mystics sought to impart life to the rigid ritual;[252] and in the nineteenth century Bábíism revolted against orthodox Islam, opposing bigotry and enjoining friendly intercourse with persons of all religions.[253] At present there are some liberal Muhammedans who set aside the scholastic tradition, maintain the right of private interpretation of the Koran, and warmly uphold the adaptability of Islam to the most advanced ideas of civilisation.[254] To them Muhammed's mission was chiefly that of a moral reformer. "In Islam," says Syed Ameer Ali, "the service of man and the good of humanity constitute pre-eminently the service and worship of God."[255]
[Footnote 252: _Ibid._ p. 110.]
[Footnote 253: _Ibid._ p. 136 _sqq._]
[Footnote 254: Ameer Ali, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_, _passim_. _Idem_, _Ethics of Islâm_, _passim_. _Cf._ Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 324; Sell, _op. cit._ p. 198 _sq._]
[Footnote 255: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islâm_, p. 3 _sq._ _Idem_, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_, p. 274.]
In the next chapter I shall try to explain the chief facts now set forth relating to gods as guardians of **worldly morality.
CHAPTER LII
GODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_concluded_)
WE have seen that the gods of uncivilised races are to a very large extent of a malevolent character, that they as a rule take little interest in any kind of human conduct which does not affect their own welfare, and that, if they show any signs of moral feelings, they may be guardians either of tribal customs in general or only of some special branch of morality. Among peoples of a higher culture, again, the gods are on the whole benevolent to mankind, when duly propitiated. They by preference resent offences committed against themselves personally; but they also avenge social wrongs of various kinds, they are superintendents of human justice, and are even represented as the originators and sustainers of the whole moral order of the world. The gods have thus experienced a gradual change for the better; until at last they are described as ideals of moral perfection, even though, when more closely scrutinised, their goodness and notions of justice are found to differ materially from what is deemed good and just in the case of men.
The malevolence of savage gods is in accordance with the theory that religion is born of fear. The assumed originators of misfortunes were naturally regarded as enemies to be propitiated, whilst fortunate events, if attracting sufficient attention and appearing sufficiently marvellous to suggest a supernatural cause, were commonly ascribed to beings who were too good to require {729} worship. But growing reflection has a tendency to attribute more amiable qualities to the gods. The religious consciousness of men becomes less exclusively occupied with the hurts they suffer, and comes more and more to reflect upon the benefits they enjoy. The activity of a god which displays itself in a certain phenomenon, or group of phenomena, appears to them on some occasions as a source of evil, but on other occasions as a source of good; hence the god is regarded as partly malevolent, partly benevolent, and in all circumstances as a being who must not be neglected. Moreover, a god who is by nature harmless or good may by proper worship be induced to assist man in his struggle against evil spirits.[1] This protective function of gods becomes particularly important when the god is more or less disassociated from the natural phenomenon in which he originally manifested himself. Nothing, indeed, seems to have contributed more towards the improvement of nature gods than the expansion of their sphere of activity. When supernatural beings can exert their power in the various departments of life, men naturally choose for their gods those among them who with great power combine the greatest benevolence. Men have selected their gods according to their usefulness. Among the Maoris "a mere trifle, or natural casualty, will induce a native (or a whole tribe) to change his Atua."[2] The negro, when disappointed in some of his speculations, or overtaken by some sad calamity, throws away his fetish, and selects a new one.[3] When hard-pressed, the Samoyede, after invoking his own deities in vain, addresses himself to the Russian god, promising to become his worshipper if he relieves him from his distress; and in most cases he is said to be faithful to his promise, though he may still try to keep on good terms with his former gods by occasionally {730} offering them a sacrifice in secret.[4] North American Indians attribute all their good or bad luck to their Manitou, and "if the Manitou has not been favourable to them, they quit him without any ceremony, and take another."[5] Among many of the ancient Indians of Central America there was a regular and systematical selection of gods. Father Blas Valera says that their gods had annual rotations and were changed each year in accordance with the superstitions of the people. "The old gods were forsaken as infamous, or because they had been of no use, and other gods and demons were elected. . . . Sons when they inherited, either accepted or repudiated the gods of their fathers, for they were not allowed to hold their pre-eminence against the will of the heir. Old men worshipped other greater deities, but they likewise dethroned them, and set up others in their places when the year was over, or the age of the world, as the Indians had it. Such were the gods which all the nations of Mexico, Chiapa, and Guatemala worshipped, as well as those of Vera Paz, and many other Indians. They thought that the gods selected by themselves were the greatest and most powerful of all the gods."[6] These are crude instances of a process which in some form or other must have been an important motive force in religious evolution by making the gods better suited to meet the wants of their believers.
[Footnote 1: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 162 (Niase). Howard, _Life with Trans-Siberian Savages_, p. 192 (Ainu). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 273 _sq._ (shamanistic peoples of Siberia). Buch, 'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennicæ_, xii. 633. _Supra_, ii. 701, 702, 704 _sq._]
[Footnote 2: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_, i. 233.]
[Footnote 3: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 212.]
[Footnote 4: Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennicæ_, xiv. 240.]
[Footnote 5: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, p. 103. Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 55.]
[Footnote 6: Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas_, i. 124 _sq._]
But men not only select as their gods such supernatural beings as may be most useful to them in their struggle for life, they also magnify their good qualities in worshipping them. Praise and exaggerating eulogy are common in the mouth of a devout worshipper. In ancient Egypt the god of each petty state was within it held to be the ruler of the gods, the creator of the world, and the giver of all good things.[7] So also in Chaldea the god of {731} a town was addressed by its inhabitants with the most exalted epithets, as the master or king of all the gods.[8] The Vedic poets were engrossed in the praise of the particular deity they happened to be invoking, exaggerating his attributes to the point of inconsistency.[9] "Every virtue, every excellence," says Hume, "must be ascribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections with which he is endowed."[10] The tendency of the worshipper to extol his god beyond all measure is largely due to the idea that the god is fond of praise,[11] but it may also be rooted in a sincere will to believe or in genuine admiration. That nations of a higher culture have especially a strong faith in the power and benevolence of their gods is easy to understand when we consider that these are exactly the peoples who have been most successful in their national endeavours.[12] As the Greeks attributed their victory over the Persians to the assistance of Zeus,[13] so the Romans maintained that the grandeur of their city was the work of the gods whom they had propitiated by sacrifices.[14]
[Footnote 7: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 11.]
[Footnote 8: Mürdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens_, p. 24.]
[Footnote 9: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 16 _sq._ Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 26. Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 139.]
[Footnote 10: Hume, _Philosophical Works_, iv. 353.]
[Footnote 11: See _supra_, ii. 653 _sq._]
[Footnote 12: _Cf._ Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 281; Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 18.]
[Footnote 13: _Supra_, ii. 713.]
[Footnote 14: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 2.]
The benevolence of a god, however, does not imply that he acts as a moral judge. A friendly god is not generally supposed to bestow his favours gratuitously; it is hardly probable, then, that he should meddle with matters of social morality out of sheer kindliness and of his own accord. But by an invocation he may be induced to reward virtue and punish vice. We have often noticed how closely the retributive activity of gods is connected with the blessings and curses of men. In order to give efficacy to their good or evil wishes men appeal to some god, or simply bring in his name when they pronounce a blessing or a curse; and if this is regularly done in connection with some particular kind of conduct, the idea may grow up that the god rewards or punishes it even independently of {732} any human invocation. Moreover, powerful curses, as those uttered by parents or strangers, may be personified as supernatural beings, like the Greek Erinyes; or the magic energy inherent in a blessing or a curse may become an attribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such a god to attract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his general nature.[15] So also, the notion of a persecuting ghost may be changed into the notion of an avenging god.[16] Various departments of social morality have thus come to be placed under the supervision of gods: the rights of life[17] and property,[18] charity[19] and hospitality,[20] the submissiveness of children,[21] truthspeaking and fidelity to a given promise.[22] That gods are so frequently looked upon as guardians of truth and good faith is, as we have seen, mainly a result of the common practice of confirming a statement or promise by an oath; and where the oath is an essential element in the judicial proceedings, as was the case in the archaic State,[23] the consequence is that the guardianship of gods is extended to the whole sphere of justice. Truth and justice are repeatedly mentioned hand in hand as matters of divine concern. We have seen how frequently the same gods as are appealed to in oaths or ordeals are described as judges of human conduct.[24] "En Égypte," says M. Amélineau, "la vérité et la justice n'avaient qu'un seul et même nom, _Mât_, qui veut aussi bien dire vérité que justice, et justice que vérité."[25] Zeus presided over assemblies and trials;[26] according to a law of Solon, the judges of Athens had to swear by him.[27] And the Erinyes, the personifications of oaths and curses, are sometimes represented by poets and philosophers as guardians of right in general.[28]
[Footnote 15: See _supra_, ii. 68.]
[Footnote 16: _Supra_, i. 378 _sq._]
[Footnote 17: _Supra_, i. 379 _sqq._]
[Footnote 18: _Supra_, ii. 59 _sqq._]
[Footnote 19: _Supra_, i. 561 _sqq._]
[Footnote 20: _Supra_, i. 578 _sqq._]
[Footnote 21: _Supra_, i. 621 _sqq._]
[Footnote 22: _Supra_, ii. 114 _sqq._]
[Footnote 23: Leist, _Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 228.]
[Footnote 24: _Supra_, ii. 115, 116, 121, 122, 686, 687, 699.]
[Footnote 25: Amélineau, _L'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte ancienne_, p. 187. See also _supra_, ii. 115, 699.]
[Footnote 26: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 58.]
[Footnote 27: Pollux, _Onomasticum_, viii. 12. 142.]
[Footnote 28: Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 246.]
{733} It has been said that when men ascribe to their gods a mental constitution similar to their own they also _eo ipso_ consider them to approve of virtue and disapprove of vice.[29] But this conclusion is certainly not true in general. Malevolent gods cannot be supposed to feel emotions which essentially presuppose altruistic sentiments; and, as we have just noticed, an invocation is frequently required to induce benevolent gods to interfere with the worldly affairs of men. Moreover, where the system of private retaliation prevails, not even the extension of human analogies to the world of supernatural beings would lead to the idea of a god who of his own accord punishes social wrongs. But it is quite probable that such analogies have in some cases made gods guardians of morality at large, especially ancestor gods who may readily be supposed not only to preserve their old feelings with regard to virtue and vice but also to take a more active interest in the morals of the living, and who are notoriously opposed to any deviation from ancient custom.[30] I also admit that the conception of a great or supreme god may perhaps, independently of his origin, involve retributive justice as a natural consequence of his power and benevolence towards his people. Yet it is obvious that even a god like Zeus was more influenced by the invocation of a suppliant than by his sense of justice. Dr. Farnell points out that the epithets which designate him as the god to whom those stricken with guilt can appeal are far more in vogue in actual Greek cult than those which attribute to him the function of vengeance and retribution.[31] Hermes was addressed by thieves as their patron.[32] According to the Talmud "the thief invokes God while he breaks into the house."[33] And the Italian bandit begs the Virgin herself to bless his endeavours.
[Footnote 29: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 232 _sq._ Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 95. Tiele, _Elements of the Science of Religion_, i. 92 _sq._]
[Footnote 30: See _supra_, ii. 519 _sq._ _Cf._ Tylor, _Anthropology_, p. 369; Macdonald, _Religion and Myth_, p. 229.]
[Footnote 31: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 66 _sq._]
[Footnote 32: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 136.]
[Footnote 33: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]
At the same time we must again remember that men {734} ascribe to their gods not only ordinary human qualities but excellences of various kinds, and among these may also be a strong desire to punish wickedness and to reward virtue. The gods of monotheistic religions in particular have such a multitude of the most elevated attributes that it would be highly astonishing if they had remained unconcerned about the morals of mankind. If flattery and admiration make the deity all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, they also make him the supreme judge of human conduct. And there is yet another reason for investing him with the moral government of the world. The claims of justice are not fully satisfied on this earth, where it only too often happens that virtue is left unrewarded and vice escapes unpunished, that right succumbs and wrong triumphs; hence persons with deep moral feelings and a religious or philosophical bent of mind are apt to look for a future adjustment through the intervention of the deity, who alone can repair the evils and injustices of the present. This demand of final retribution is sometimes so strongly developed that it even leads to the belief in a deity when no other proof of his existence is found convincing. Kant maintained that we must postulate a future life in which everybody's happiness is proportionate to his virtue, and that such a postulate involves the belief in a God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness who governs the moral as well as the physical world. Not even Voltaire could rid himself of the notion of a rewarding and avenging deity, whom, if he did not exist, "it would be necessary to invent."
The belief in a god who acts as a guardian of **worldly morality undoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules. To the social and legal sanctions a new one is added, which derives particular strength from the supernatural power and knowledge of the deity. The divine avenger can punish those who are beyond the reach of human justice and those whose secret wrongs even escape the censure of their fellow men. But on the other hand there are also certain circumstances which considerably detract from the {735} influence of the religious sanction when compared with other sanctions of morality. The supposed punishments and rewards of the future life have the disadvantage of being conceived as very remote; and fear and hope decrease in inverse ratio to the distance of their objects. Men commonly live in the happy illusion that death is far off, even though it in reality is very near, hence also the retribution after death appears distant and unreal and is comparatively little thought of by the majority of people who believe in it. Moreover, there seems always to be time left for penance and repentance. Manzoni himself admitted, in his defence of Roman Catholicism, that many people think it an easy matter to procure that feeling of contrition by which, according to the doctrine of the Church, sins may be cancelled, and therefore encourage themselves in the commission of crime through the facility of pardon. The frequent assumption that the moral law would hardly command obedience without the belief in retribution beyond the grave is contradicted by an overwhelming array of facts. We hear from trustworthy witnesses that unadulterated savages follow their own rules of morality no less strictly, or perhaps more strictly, than civilised people follow theirs. Nay, it is a common experience that contact with a higher civilisation exercises a deteriorating influence upon the conduct of uncultured races, although we may be sure that Christian missionaries do not fail to impart the doctrine of hell to their savage converts.
It has also been noticed that a high degree of religious devotion is frequently accompanied by great laxity of morals. Of the Bedouins Mr. Blunt writes that, with one or two exceptions, "the practice of religion may be taken as the sure index of low morality in a tribe."[34] Wallin, who had an intimate and extensive knowledge of Muhammedan peoples, often found that those Muslims who attended to their prayers most regularly were the greatest scoundrels.[35] "One of the most remarkable traits {736} in the character of the Copts," says Lane, "is their bigotry"; and at the same time they are represented as "deceitful, faithless, and abandoned to the pursuit of worldly gain, and to indulgence in sensual pleasure."[36] Among two hundred Italian murderers Ferri did not find one who was irreligious; and Naples, which has the worst record of any European city for crimes against the person, is also the most religious city in Europe.[37] On the other hand, according to Dr. Havelock Ellis, "it seems extremely rare to find intelligently irreligious men in prison";[38] and Laing, who himself was anything but sceptical, observed that there was no country in Europe where there was so much morality and so little religion as Switzerland.[39] Most religions contain an element which constitutes a real peril to the morality of their votaries. They have introduced a new kind of duties--duties towards gods;--and, as we have noticed above, even where religion has entered into close union with worldly morality, much greater importance has been attached to ceremonies or worship or the niceties of belief than to good behaviour towards fellow men. People think that they may make up for lack of the latter by orthodoxy or pious performances. A Christian bishop of the seventh century, who was canonised by the Church of Rome, described a good Christian as a man "who comes frequently to church; who presents the oblation which is offered to God upon the altar; who doth not taste of the fruits of his own industry until he has consecrated a part of them to God; who, when the holy festivals approach, lives chastely even with his own wife during several days, that with a safe conscience he may draw near the altar of God; and who, in the last place, can repeat the Creed and the Lord's Prayer."[40] A scrupulous observance of external ceremonies--that is all which in this description is required {737} of a good Christian. And since then popular ideas on the subject have undergone but little change. Smollett observes in his 'Travels into Italy' that it is held more infamous to transgress the slightest ceremonial institution of the Church of Rome than to transgress any moral duty; that a murderer or adulterer will be easily absolved by the Church, and even maintain his character in society; but that a man who eats a pigeon on a Saturday is abhorred as a monster of reprobation.[41] In the nineteenth century Simonde de Sismondi could write:--"Plus chaque homme vicieux a été régulier à observer les commandemens de l'Église, plus il se sent dans son c[oe]ur dispensé de l'observation de cette morale céleste, à laquelle il faudroit sacrifier ses penchans dépravés."[42] And how many a Protestant does not imagine that by going to church on Sundays he can sin more freely on the six days between.
[Footnote 34: Mr. Blunt, in Lady Anne Blunt's _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 217.]
[Footnote 35: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iii. 166.]
[Footnote 36: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p. 551.]
[Footnote 37: Havelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 156.]
[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ p. 159.]
[Footnote 39: Laing, _Notes of a Traveller_, pp. 323, 324, 333.]
[Footnote 40: Robertson, _History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V._ i. 282 _sq._]
[Footnote 41: Smollett, quoted by Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv. 380.]
[Footnote 42: Simonde de Sismondi, _Histoire des républiques italiennes du moyen-âge_, xvi. 419.]
It should also be remembered that the religious sanction of moral rules only too often leads to an external observance of these rules from purely selfish motives. Christianity itself has, essentially, been regarded as a means of gaining a blessed hereafter. As for its influence upon the moral life of its adherents I agree with Professor Hobhouse that its chief strength lies not in its abstract doctrines but in the simple personal following of Christ.[43] In moral education example plays a more important part than precept. But even in this respect Christianity has unfortunately little reason to boast of its achievements.
[Footnote 43: Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, ii. 159.]
CHAPTER LIII
CONCLUSION
WE have completed our task. Only a few words will be added to emphasise the leading features of our theory of the moral consciousness and to point out some general conclusions which may be drawn as regards its evolution.
Our study of the origin and development of the moral ideas was divided into three main sections. As moral ideas are expressed in moral judgments, we had to examine the general nature of both the predicates and the subjects of such judgments, as well as the moral valuation of the chief branches of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind concerns itself. And in each case our aim was not only to describe or analyse but also to explain the phenomena which came under our observation.
The theory was laid down that the moral concepts, which form the predicates of moral judgments, are ultimately based on moral emotions, that they are essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval. It was therefore necessary for us to investigate the nature and origin of these emotions, and subsequently to consider their relations to the various moral concepts.
We found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of emotions, which may be described as retributive; that moral disapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to {739} anger and revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly emotion, akin to gratitude. At the same time they differ from kindred non-moral emotions by their disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and flavour of generality. As for the origin of the retributive emotions, we may assume that they have been acquired by means of natural selection in the struggle for existence; both resentment and retributive kindly emotion are states of mind which have a tendency to promote the interests of the individuals who feel them. This explanation also applies to the moral emotions in so far as they are retributive: it accounts for the hostile attitude of moral disapproval towards the cause of pain, and for the friendly attitude of moral approval towards the cause of pleasure. Our retributive emotions are always reactions against pain or pleasure felt by ourselves; this holds true of the moral emotions as well as of revenge and gratitude. But how shall we explain those elements in the moral emotions by which they are distinguished from other, non-moral retributive emotions? First, why should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain evoking indignation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure calling forth approval because he is benefited?
We noticed that sympathy aided by the altruistic sentiment--sympathy in the common sense of the word--tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions. In all animal species which possess the altruistic sentiment in some form or other we may be sure to find sympathetic resentment as its accompaniment. And this sentiment may also give rise to disinterested retributive kindly emotion, even though it is more readily moved by the sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure and though sympathetic retributive kindliness has a powerful rival in the feeling of envy. Moreover, sympathetic retributive emotions may not only be reactions against sympathetic pain or pleasure, but may also be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of resentment or of the signs of retributive kindliness. Punishments and {740} rewards tend to reproduce the emotions from which they sprang, and language communicates retributive emotions by terms of condemnation and by terms of praise. Finally, there are cases of disinterested retributive emotions into which sympathy does not enter at all--sentimental antipathies and likings quite disinterested in character.
There are thus various ways in which disinterested retributive emotions may originate. But how shall we explain the fact that disinterestedness together with apparent impartiality and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which the so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions? To this question the following answer was given:--Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness. The first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of isolated individuals but emotions which were felt by the community at large. Public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval and public approval the prototype of moral approbation. And these public emotions are characterised by generality, individual disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality.
The moral emotions give rise to a variety of moral concepts, which are in different ways connected with the emotions from which they were derived. Thus moral disapproval is at the bottom of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, ought and duty, right and rights, justice and injustice; whilst moral approval has led to the concepts good, virtue, and merit. It has, in particular, been of fundamental importance for the whole of our investigation to recognise the true contents of the notions of ought and duty. If these concepts were unanalysable, as they have often been represented to be, any attempt to explain the origin and development of the moral ideas would, in my opinion, be a hopeless failure.
From the predicates of moral judgments we proceeded to consider their subjects. Generally speaking, such judgments are passed on conduct or character, and {741} allowance is made for the various elements of which conduct and character are composed in proportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened. It is only owing to ignorance or lack of due reflection if, as is often the case, moral estimates are influenced by external events which are entirely independent of the agent's will; if individuals who are incapable of recognising any act of theirs as right or wrong are treated as responsible beings; if motives are completely or partially disregarded; if little cognisance is taken of forbearances in comparison with acts; if want of foresight or want of self-restraint is overlooked when the effect produced by it is sufficiently remote. We were also able to explain _why_ moral judgments are passed on conduct and character. This is due to the facts that moral judgments spring from moral emotions; that the moral emotions are retributive emotions; that a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or something looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and that a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will. It is a circumstance of the greatest importance that not only moral emotions but non-moral retributive emotions are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in their general nature to those on which moral judgments are passed. How could we account for this remarkable coincidence unless the moral judgments were based on emotions and the moral emotions were retributive emotions akin to gratitude and revenge?
Our theory as to the nature of the moral concepts and emotions is further supported by another and very comprehensive set of facts. In our discussion of the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation and of the judgments passed on them by different peoples and in different ages, this theory has constantly been called in to explain the data before us. It is noteworthy that the very acts, forbearances, and omissions {742} which are condemned as wrong are also apt to call forth anger and revenge, and that the acts and forbearances which are praised as morally good are apt to call forth gratitude. This coincidence, again, undoubtedly bears testimony both to the emotional basis of the moral concepts and to the retributive character of the moral emotions. Thus the conclusions arrived at in the first section of the work, while helping to explain the facts mentioned in the two other sections, are at the same time greatly strengthened by these facts. Any attempt to discover the nature and origin of the moral consciousness must necessarily take into account the moral ideas of mankind at large. And though painfully conscious of the incompleteness of the present treatise, I think I may confidently ask, with reference to its fundamental thesis, whether any other theory of the moral consciousness has ever been subjected to an equally comprehensive test.
The general uniformity of human nature accounts for the great similarities which characterise the moral ideas of mankind. But at the same time these ideas also present radical differences. A mode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is among another people viewed with indifference or regarded as praiseworthy or enjoined as a duty. One reason for these variations lies in different external conditions. Hardships of life may lead to the killing of infants or abandoning of aged parents or eating of human bodies; and necessity and the force of habit may deprive these actions of the stigma which would otherwise be attached to them. Economic conditions have influenced moral ideas relating, for instance, to slavery, labour, and cleanliness; whilst the form of marriage and the opinions concerning it have been largely determined by such a factor as the numerical proportion between the sexes. But the most common differences of moral estimates have undoubtedly a psychical origin.