Part 11

Passing to the emotion of gratitude, we find a similar resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to this emotion and those which call forth moral approval. We may feel some kind of retributive affection for inanimate objects which have given us pleasure; "a man grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use of, and conceives something like a real love and affection for them."[13] But gratitude, involving a desire to please the benefactor, can reasonably be felt towards such objects only as are themselves capable of feeling pleasure. Moreover, on due deliberation we do not feel grateful to a person who benefits us by pure accident. Since gratitude is directed towards the assumed cause of pleasure, and since a person is regarded as a cause only in his capacity of a volitional being, gratitude presupposes that the pleasure shall be due to his will. For the same reason motives are also taken into consideration by the benefited party. As Hutcheson observes, "bounty from a donor apprehended as morally evil, or extorted by force, or conferred with some view of self-interest, will not procure real good-will; nay, it may raise indignation."[14] {319} Like moral approval, gratitude may be called forth not only by acts and volitions, but by absence of volitions, in so far as this absence is traceable to a good disposition of will. And, like the moral judge, the grateful man is, in his retributive feeling, influenced by the notion he forms of the benefactor's character.

[Footnote 13: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 136.]

[Footnote 14: Hutcheson, _Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil_, p. 157.]

The cognitions by which non-moral resentment and gratitude are determined are thus, as regards their general nature, precisely similar to those which determine moral indignation and approval. Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain. This solves a problem which necessarily baffles solution in the hands of those who fail to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments, and which, when considered at all, has, I think, never been fully understood by those who have essayed it. It has been argued, for instance, that moral praise and blame are not applied to inanimate things and those who commit involuntary deeds, because they are administered only "where they are capable of producing some effect";[15] that moral judgment is concerned with the question of compulsion, because "only when a man acts morally of his own free will is society sure of him";[16] that we do not regard a lunatic as responsible, because we know that "his mind is so diseased that it is impossible by moral reprobation alone to change his character so that it maybe subsequently relied upon."[17] The bestowal of moral praise or blame on such or such an object is thus attributed to utilitarian calculation;[18] whereas in reality it is determined by the nature of the moral emotion which lies at the bottom of the judgment. And, as Stuart Mill observes (though he never seems to have realised the full import of his objection), whilst we may administer praise and blame with the express design of influencing conduct, "no anticipation of salutary effects {320} from our feeling will ever avail to give us the feeling itself."[19]

[Footnote 15: James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 370.]

[Footnote 16: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 56 _sq._]

[Footnote 17: Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, p. 296.]

[Footnote 18: See also James Mill, _op. cit._ pp. 261, 262, 375.]

[Footnote 19: Stuart Mill, in a note to James Mill's _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_, ii. 323.]

* * * * *

The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to another important problem--a problem which has called forth endless controversies--namely, the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect. It has been argued that responsibility, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes; that "either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." The argument has been well summed up by Sir Leslie Stephen as follows:--"Moral responsibility, it is said, implies freedom. A man is only responsible for that which he causes. Now the _causa causæ_ is also the _causa causati_. If I am caused as well as cause, the cause of me is the cause of my conduct; I am only a passive link in the chain which transmits the force. Thus, as each individual is the product of something external to himself, his responsibility is really shifted to that something. The universe or the first cause is alone responsible, and since it is responsible to itself alone, responsibility becomes a mere illusion."[20] We are told that, if determinism were true, human beings would be no more proper subjects of moral valuation than are inanimate things; that the application of moral praise and blame would be "in itself as absurd as to applaud the sunrise or be angry at the rain";[21] that the only admiration which the virtuous man might deserve would be the kind of admiration "which we justly accord to a well-made machine."[22] Nor are these inferences from the doctrine of determinism only weapons forged by its opponents; they are shared by many of its own adherents. Richard Owen and his followers maintained that, since a man's character is made _for_ him, not _by_ him, there is no justice in punishing {321} him for what he cannot help.[23] To Stuart Mill responsibility simply means liability to punishment, inflicted for a utilitarian purpose.[24] So also Prof. Sidgwick--whose attitude towards the free-will theory is that of a sceptic--argues that the common retributive view of punishment, and the ordinary notions of "merit," "demerit," and "responsibility," involve the assumption that the will is free, and that these terms, if used at all, have to be used in new significations. "If the wrong act," he says, "and the bad qualities of character manifested in it, are conceived as the necessary effects of causes antecedent or external to the existence of the agent, the moral responsibility--in the ordinary sense--for the mischief caused by them can no longer rest on him. At the same time, the Determinist can give to the terms 'ill-desert' and 'responsibility' a signification which is not only clear and definite, but, from an utilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning. In this view, if I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful act, I mean that it is right to punish him for it; primarily, in order that the fear of punishment may prevent him and others from committing similar acts in future."[25]

[Footnote 20: Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, p. 285.]

[Footnote 21: Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 41 _sq._]

[Footnote 22: Balfour, _Foundations of Belief_, p. 25.]

[Footnote 23: Stuart Mill, _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, p. 506.]

[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ p. 506 _sqq._]

[Footnote 25: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 71 _sq._]

If these conclusions are correct it is obvious that, whether the infliction of punishment be justifiable or not, the _feeling_ of moral indignation or moral approval is, from the deterministic point of view, absurd. And yet, as a matter of fact, these emotions are felt by determinists and libertarians alike. Apparently, they are not in the least affected by the notion that the human will is subject to the general law of cause and effect. Emotions are always determined by specific cognitions, and last only as long as the influence of those cognitions lasts. It makes me sorry to hear that some evil has befallen a friend; but my sorrow disappears at once when I find that the rumour was false. I get angry with a person who hurts me; but my anger subsides as soon as I recognise that the hurt was purely accidental. My indignation is aroused by an {322} atrocious crime; but it ceases entirely when I hear that the agent was mad. On the other hand, however convinced I am that a person's conduct and character are in every detail a product of causes, that does not prevent me from feeling towards him retributive emotions--either anger or gratitude, or moral resentment or approval. Hence I conclude that a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will. I hold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else, because they think themselves to be free.[26] And I attribute the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism either to a failure to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments or to insufficient insight into the true nature of the moral emotions. At the same time it seems easy to explain the fallacy which lies at the bottom of that conception.

[Footnote 26: Spinoza, _Ethica_, iii. 49, Note.]

We have seen that the object of moral approval and disapproval is the will, and that a person's responsibility is lessened in proportion as his will is exposed to the pressure of non-volitional conations. Full responsibility thus presupposes freedom from such pressure, and, particularly, freedom from external compulsion. Hence the inference that it also presupposes freedom from causation, and that complete determination involves complete irresponsibility. Compulsion is confounded with causation; and this confusion is due to the fact that the cause which determines the will is actually looked upon in the light of a constraining power outside the will.

The popular mind has a strong belief in the law of cause and effect. When reflecting on the matter, it admits that everything which happens in this world has a cause; and if the natural cause is hidden, it readily calls in a supernatural cause to account for the event. Now, in the case of human volitions the chain of causation is often particularly obscure; as Spinoza said, whilst men are conscious of their volitions and desires, they "never even {323} dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire."[27] Hence, when in a philosophic mood, they are liable to attribute their acts to the influence of an external power ruling over human affairs, a god or an all-powerful fate. No doubt, Providence and Fate[28] may effect their purposes without the will of man as their tool; what happens "by chance," being frequently no less wonderful than any decree of a human will, may likewise be traced to a supernatural cause. But, on the other hand, the fact that the deeds of men are generally preceded by volitions, is so obvious that it could not escape even the simplest mind--indeed, so strongly are primitive men impressed by this fact that they are apt to attribute every event to a will. Acknowledging, then, the connection between volition and deed, the fatalist regards the former only as an instrument in the hands of a force outside the agent, which compels his will to execute its plans. Sometimes it reaches its goal in a way quite unforeseen by the agent himself. Muhammed said, "When God hath ordered a creature to die in any particular place, He causeth his wants to direct him to that place";[29] and it is a popular saying throughout Islam that "whenas Destiny descends she blindeth human sight."[30] Sometimes the external power causes its victim to will its decree, by exciting in him some irresistible passion, as when Zeus urged Clytemnestra to the slaughter of Agamemnon; or the volitions of a person are themselves regarded as decreed by that power. In Wärend, in Sweden, when somebody has killed another, as also when the manslayer himself suffers the penalty of death, the women say, full of compassion, "Well, this was his destiny, to be sure," or "Poor fellow, it was a pitiful fate."[31] In one of the Pahlavi texts the following words are put into the mouth of the Spirit of {324} Wisdom:--"Even with the might and powerfulness of wisdom and knowledge, even then it is not possible to contend with destiny. Because, when predestination as to virtue, or as to the reverse, comes forth, the wise becomes wanting in duty, and the astute in evil becomes intelligent; the faint-hearted becomes braver, and the braver becomes faint-hearted; the diligent becomes lazy, and the lazy acts diligently. Just as is predestined as to the matter, the cause enters into it, and thrusts out everything else."[32]

[Footnote 27: _Ibid._ pt. i. Appendix.]

[Footnote 28: In a Pahlavi text fate is defined as "that which is ordained from the beginning," and divine providence as that which the sacred beings "also grant otherwise" (_Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxiv. 6 _sq._).]

[Footnote 29: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 6.]

[Footnote 30: Burton, in his translation of the _Arabian Nights_, i. 62, n. 2.]

[Footnote 31: Hyltén-Cavallius, _Wärend och Wirdarne_, i. 206.]

[Footnote 32: _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxiii. 3 _sqq._]

Nor is it only the popular mind that, when human volitions are concerned, interprets causation as compulsion. Even such philosophers as Hamilton[33] and Mansel[34] seemed quite unable to distinguish between determinism and fatalism. Professor Laurie likewise observes:--"Determinism is the term adopted of late years to veil fatalism and confound issues . . . . Freedom or fate, these are the sole alternatives."[35] Surely, it is those who identify determinism with fatalism that "confound issues." And a similar confusion lurks behind the main argument which has been adduced in support of free-will. It is said that "I ought" implies "I can," and that men are not accountable for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true if by "cannot" is meant compulsion, and by "can" freedom from compulsion. But it is certainly not true if "I can" is intended to mean that "I" am a first cause, not determined by anything else.

[Footnote 33: Hamilton, _Lectures on Metaphysics_, ii. 410 _sqq._]

[Footnote 34: Mansel, _Prolegomena Logica_, p. 329 _sqq._]

[Footnote 35: Laurie, _Ethica_, pp. 307, 319.]

When a person's will is believed to be constrained by a power outside him, he can obviously not be held responsible for what he does under the influence of such constraint. We are responsible only for that which is due to our will. A licentious man who has grown up in a corrupt society is less blamable than an equally licentious man who has always lived under conditions favourable to virtue; and if we hear of a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by a band of pickpockets and trained to their profession, we {325} no doubt look upon him with some indulgence. In these cases, however, it may be said that, though the person's conduct is largely due to the influence of external circumstances upon his will, this influence was not irresistible, that he might have saved himself with an effort of will, and that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But in the case of a restraining destiny no escape is possible; the compulsion is complete. Hence the logical outcome of radical fatalism is a denial of all moral imputability, and a repudiation of all moral judgment.[36]

[Footnote 36: Of the inhabitants of North-Eastern Africa, Munzinger observes (_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 66):--"Seien sie Christen, Heiden, odor Mohammedaner, schreiben sie Leben und Tod, Glück und Unglück, Tugend und Verbrechen der unmittelbaren Hand Gottes zu. Mit dieser blinder Nothwendigkeit entschuldigt sich der Missethäter, tröstet sich der Unglückliche." _Cf._ also Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 155, on the Bedouins. However, men are not philosophers in the ordinary practice of life, hence the fatalist is generally as ready as anybody else to judge on his neighbour's conduct. According to various ancient writers, the power of destiny is limited so as not to exclude personal responsibility (see Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 59 _sq._).]

Not so with determinism. Whilst fatalism presupposes the existence of a person who is constrained by an outward power, determinism regards the person himself as in every respect a product of causes. It does not assume any part of his will to have existed previous to his formation by these causes; his will is not constrained by them, it is made by them. When we say of a person that he is influenced by external circumstances or subdued by fate, we regard _him_ as existing independently of that which influences or subdues him, we attribute to him an innate character which is acted upon from the outside. He would have been different if he had grown up under different conditions of life, or if fate had left him alone. But it would be absolutely meaningless to say that he would be different if the causes to which he owes his existence had been different; for instance, if he were the offspring of different parents. This shows that we distinguish between the original self of a person and the self which is partly innate and partly the product of external circumstances. His innate character belongs to his original {326} self; and, strictly speaking, it is on the innate character only that the scrutinising moral judge, so far as possible, passes his judgment, carefully considering the degree of pressure to which it has been exposed both from the non-voluntary part of the individual himself and from the outside world.[37] According to the fatalist, the innate character is _compelled_; hence personal responsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist the innate character is _caused_; but this has nothing whatever to do with the question of responsibility. The moral emotions are no more concerned with the origin of the innate character than the aesthetic emotions are concerned with the origin of the beautiful object. In their capacity of retributive emotions, the moral emotions are essentially directed towards sensitive and volitional entities conceived, not as uncaused themselves, but only as causes of pleasure or pain.

[Footnote 37: That the proper subject of moral judgment is the innate character was emphasised by Schopenhauer in his prize-essays on _Die Freiheit des Willens_ (_Sämmtliche Werke_, vii. 83 _sqq._) and _Die Grundlage der Moral_ (_ibid._ vii. 273 _sqq._). The innate character, he says, that real core of the whole man, contains the germ of all his virtues and vices. And though Schopenhauer be mistaken in his statement that a person's character always remains the same, it seems to me indisputable that the succeeding changes to which it may be subject are imputable to _him_ only in so far as they are caused by his innate character.]

CHAPTER XIV

PRELIMINARY REMARKS--HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

WE have discussed the general nature of those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral blame or moral praise. We have seen that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why this is the case. It now remains for us to examine the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and to consider how these modes of conduct are judged of by different peoples and in different ages.

If carried out in every detail such an investigation could never come to an end. Among other things, it would have to take into account all customs existing among the various races of men, since every custom constitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such undertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent to which the conduct of man, and especially of savage man, is hampered by custom. Among the Wanika, for instance, "if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows, he is instantly fined."[1] If, during the performance of a ceremony, the ancestors of an Australian native were in the habit of painting a white line across the forehead, their descendant must do the same.[2] Dr. Nansen's statement with reference to the Greenlanders, {328} that their communities had originally customs and fixed rules for every possible circumstance,[3] is essentially true of many, if not all, of the lower races.

[Footnote 1: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa_, p. 110.]

[Footnote 2: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 11.]

[Footnote 3: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 104.]

It is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups separately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere description of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.

* * * * *

It is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty which we owe our fellow-creatures is to respect their lives. I venture to believe that this holds good not only among civilised nations, but among the lower races as well; and that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral obligations at all to his neighbours, he considers the taking of their lives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of injury inflicted upon them.

Among various uncivilised peoples, however, human life is said to be held very cheap.

The Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle kill their dearest friend.[4] In Fiji there is an "utter disregard of {329} the value of human life."[5] A Masai will murder his friend or neighbour in a fight over a herd of captured cattle, and "live not a whit the less merrily afterwards."[6] Among the Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, murder "excites little sensation, excepting in the family of the person who has been murdered; and brings, it is said, no disgrace upon him who has committed it; nor uneasiness, excepting the fear of their revenge."[7] The Oráons of Bengal "are ready to take life on very slight provocation," and Colonel Dalton doubts whether they see any moral guilt in it.[8] Some of the Himalayan mountaineers are reported to put men to death merely for the satisfaction of seeing the blood flow and of marking the last struggles of the victim.[9] Among the Pathans, on the north-western frontier of the Punjab, "there is hardly a man whose hands are unstained," and each person "counts up his murders."[10]

[Footnote 4: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 258.]

[Footnote 5: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 115.]

[Footnote 6: Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419.]

[Footnote 7: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa_, ii. 554.]

[Footnote 8: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 256.]

[Footnote 9: Fraser, _Journal of a Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_, p. 267.]

[Footnote 10: Temple, quoted by Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 343. For other instances of the indifference of savages to human life, see Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 123; Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 177; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in _Meddeleser om Grönland_, x. 87, 179 _sq._; Coxe, _Russian Discoveries between Asia and America_, p. 257 (Aleuts of Unalaska); Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamtschatka_, p. 204; Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_, p. 294; Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 116 (Malays); Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 262 (aborigines of New Britain); Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per antropologia e la etnologia_, xiv. 26; Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, ii. 310 (Gowane); Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 286 (Bongo); Arnot, _Garenganze_, p. 71 (Barotse); Tuckey, _Expedition to Explore the River Zaire_, p. 383 (Congo natives); Waul, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 105 (Bolobo).]

On the other hand, there are uncivilised peoples among whom homicide or murder is said to be hardly known.

Among the Omahas, "before liquor was introduced there were no murders, even when men quarrelled."[11] Captain Lyon could learn of no instances of manslaughter having ever occurred among the Eskimo of Igloolik.[12] In Tutuila, of the Samoa group, according to Brenchley, there had been but one case of assassination in the course of twenty years.[13] The Veddahs of Ceylon know of manslaughter only as a punishment.[14] {330} The Bedouin of the Euphrates, says Mr. Blunt, "is essentially humane, and never takes life needlessly. If he has killed a man in war he rather conceals the fact than proclaims it aloud, while murder or even homicide is almost unknown among the tribes."[15] Among the Bakwiri, in Cameroon, Zoller never heard of any person having killed a member of his own community.[16] Murders, says Caillié, "are rare among the Bambaras, and never committed by the Mandingoes."[17] Among the Wanika "wilful cold-blooded murders are almost unknown."[18] Among the Basutos perfect safety is enjoyed "on roads where the traveller might have been robbed a hundred times over without the least hope of aid, and in houses where the doors and windows have neither bolts nor bars," and cases of murder are very rare.[19]

[Footnote 11: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 369.]

[Footnote 12: Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 350.]

[Footnote 13: Brenchley, _Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. "Curaçoa" among the South Sea Islands_, p. 58.]

[Footnote 14: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 539. _Cf._ Tennent, _Ceylon_, ii. 444. Hartshorne, in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. p. 320.]

[Footnote 15: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 203. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 207.]

[Footnote 16: Zöller, _Kamerun_, i. 188.]

[Footnote 17: Caillié, _Travels through Central Africa_, i. 353.]

[Footnote 18: New, _op. cit._ p. 98.]

[Footnote 19: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 301. For other instances, see Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 571 (Eskimo); Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 148; Turner, _Samoa_, p. 178; Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 429; Brooke, _Ten Years in Saráwak_, i. 61 (Sea Dyaks); Low, _Sarawak_, p. 133; Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 471 (Poggi Islanders); Steller, _De Sangi-Archipel_, p. 26; Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua_, p. 41 (Ambon and Uliase Islanders); von Siebold, _Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, pp. 11, 35; Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 532 (Barea and Kunáma); Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 319 (Marutse); Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, pp. 61, 143 _sq._; Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 137.]

In other instances homicide is expressly said to be regarded as wrong.

The Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen hold it atrocious to kill a fellow-creature, except in some particular cases.[20] The Dacotahs say that it is a great crime to take their fellow's life, unless in revenge, "because all have a right to live."[21] In Tierra del Fuego homicide rarely occurs, as Mr. Bridges remarks, because of an inveterate custom according to which human life is held sacred: "le meurtrier est mis au ban de ses compatriotes; isolé de tous, il est fatalement condamné à périr de faim ou à tomber un jour sous les coups d'un groupe de justiciers improvisés."[22] The Andaman Islanders condemn murder as _y[=u]bda_, or sin.[23] The natives of Botany Bay, New {331} South Wales, though a trivial offence in their ideas justifies the murder of a man, "highly reprobate the crime when committed without what they esteem a just cause."[24] According to Mr. Curr's experience, the Australian Black undoubtedly feels that murder is wrong, and its committal brings remorse; even after the perpetration of infanticide or massacres, though both are practised without disguise, those engaged in them are subject to remorse and low spirits for some time.[25]

[Footnote 20: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 162.]

[Footnote 21: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, ii. 195.]

[Footnote 22: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_, vii. 374, 243.]

[Footnote 23: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112.]

[Footnote 24: Barrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 19. _Cf._ Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 126 (natives of Northern Queensland).]

[Footnote 25: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 100, 43 _sq._ For other instances, see Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River_, i. 127 (Potawatomis); Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the Interior of North America_, p. 348 (Indians on the east side of the Rocky Mountains); Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 572 (Eskimo); Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 162; Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 208 (Efatese); Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 145; Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 322 (Bechuanas); Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikra's_, p. 322 (Hottentots).]

It is of particular importance in this connection to note that, in early civilisation, blood-revenge is regarded not as a private matter only, but as a duty, and that, where this custom does not prevail, the community punishes the murderer, frequently with death. We may without hesitation accept Professor Tylor's statement that "no known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately."[26] In every society--even where human life is, generally speaking, held in low estimation--custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men. But the radius of the circle varies greatly.

[Footnote 26: Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in _Contemporary Review_, xxi. 714.]

Savages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases allowed, and often regarded as praiseworthy. It is a very common notion in savage ethics that the chief virtue of a man is to be successful in war and to slay many enemies.

Among the Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush "killing strangers might or might not be considered inexpedient, but it would {332} hardly be considered a crime"; killing fellow-tribesmen, on the other hand, is looked upon in a very different light.[27] The Koriaks do not regard murder as a great crime, unless it occur within their own tribe.[28] The early Aleuts considered the killing of a companion a crime worthy of death, "but to kill an enemy was quite another thing."[29] To an Aht Indian the murder of a man is no more than the killing of a dog, provided that the victim is not a member of his own tribe.[30] According to Humboldt, the natives of Guiana "detest all who are not of their family, or their tribe; and hunt the Indians of a neighbouring tribe, who live at war with their own, as we hunt game."[31] In the opinion of the Fuegians, "a stranger and an enemy are almost synonymous terms," hence they dare not go where they have no friends, and where they are unknown, as they would most likely be destroyed.[32] The Australian Black nurtures an intense hatred of every male at least of his own race who is a stranger to him, and would never neglect to assassinate such a person at the earliest moment that he could do so without risk to himself.[33] In Melanesia, also, a stranger as such was generally throughout the islands an enemy to be killed.[34]

[Footnote 27: Scott Robertson, _Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 194.]

[Footnote 28: Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 232.]

[Footnote 29: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the Untied States_, p. 155.]

[Footnote 30: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 152.]

[Footnote 31: von Humboldt, _Personal Narrative of Travels_, v. 422.]

[Footnote 32: Stirling, in _South Ammerican Missionary Magazine_, iv. 11. Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 210.]

[Footnote 33: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 64, 85 _sq._ Mathew, in _Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales_, xviii. 398.]

[Footnote 34: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 345.]

In Savage Island the slaying of a member of another tribe--that is, a potential enemy--"was a virtue rather than a crime."[35] To a young Samoan it was the realisation of his highest ambition to be publicly thanked by the chiefs for killing a foe in mortal combat.[36] "According to Fijian beliefs, men who have not slain any enemy are, in the other world, compelled to beat dirt with their clubs--the most degrading punishment the native mind can conceive--because they used their club to so little purpose;[37] and in Futuna it was deemed no less necessary to have poured out blood on the field of battle in order to hold a part in the happy future life.[38] In the Western islands of Torres Straits "it was a meritorious deed to kill foreigners either in fair fight {333} or by treachery, and honour and glory were attached to the bringing home of the skulls of the inhabitants of other islands slain in battle."[39] In the Solomon Islands,[40] New Guinea,[41] and various parts of the Malay Archipelago, he who has collected the greatest number of human heads is honoured by his tribe as the bravest man; and some peoples do not allow a man to marry until he has cut off at least one human head.[42] Among many of the North American Indians, again, he who can boast of the greatest number of scalps is the person most highly esteemed.[43] Among the Seri Indians the highest virtue "is the shedding of alien blood; and their normal impulse on meeting an alien is to kill, unless deterred by fear."[44] Among the Chukchi "it is held criminal to thieve or murder in the family or race to which a person belongs; but these crimes committed elsewhere are not only permitted, but held honourable and glorious."[45] So, too, the Gallas consider it honourable to kill an alien, though criminal to kill a countryman.[46]

[Footnote 35: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 104. See also _ibid._ p. 94.]

[Footnote 36: Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, p. 57.]

[Footnote 37: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 401. _Cf._ Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 97 _sq._; Erskine, _Islands of the Western Pacific_, p. 248.]

[Footnote 38: Smith, in _Jour. Polynesian Society_, i. 39.]

[Footnote 39: Haddon, in _Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits_, v. 277.]

[Footnote 40: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 73. Penny, _Ten Years in Melanesia_, p. 46. Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 345.]

[Footnote 41: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 76.]

[Footnote 42: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, pp. 216, 221, &c. (Dyaks). Bickmore, _Travels in the East Indian Archipelago_, p. 205 (Alfura of Ceram). Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 40 (Nagas of Upper Assam).]

[Footnote 43: The well-known practice of scalping, though very common, was not universal among the North American Indians (see Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon,' in _Contributions to N. American Ethnology_, i. 192; Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 321).]

[Footnote 44: McGee, 'Seri Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethnol._ xvii. 132.]

[Footnote 45: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 183.]

[Footnote 46: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 229. For other instances, see Harmon, _op. cit._ p. 301 (Tacullies); Burton, _City of the Saints_, p. 139 (Dacotahs); Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 94 (Kandhs); MacMahon, _Far Cathay_, p. 262 (Indo-Burmese border tribes); Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 194 _sq._ (Eastern Central Africans); Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419 (Masai).]

At the same time there are, among the lower races, various instances in which the rule, "Thou shalt not kill," applies even to foreigners. Hospitality, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, is a stringent duty in the savage world. Custom requires that the host should entertain and protect a stranger who comes as his guest, and by killing him the host would perpetrate an outrage hardly possible. Moreover, even in the case of intertribal relations, we must not conclude that what is allowed in war is also allowed in times of peace. The prohibition of homicide may extend beyond the tribal border, to {334} members of different tribes who for some reason or other are on friendly terms with each other.[47] We must not suppose that a tribe of savages generally either lives in a state of complete isolation, or is always at odds with its neighbours. In Australia, for instance, one tribe of natives, as a rule, entertains amicable relations with one, two, or more other tribes.[48] Among the Central Australian natives, say Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, "there is no such thing as one tribe being in a constant state of enmity with another"; on the contrary, where two tribes come into contact with one another on the border land of their respective territories, friendly feelings are maintained between the members of the two.[49] Some uncivilised peoples are even said to have no wars. The Veddahs of Ceylon never make war upon each other.[50] According to the reports of the oldest inhabitants of Umnak and Unalaska, the people there had never been engaged in war either among themselves or with their neighbours, except once with the natives of Alaska.[51] To the Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen war is "incomprehensible and repulsive, a thing for which their language has no word."[52]

[Footnote 47: See, _e.g._, Scott Robertson, _op. cit._ p. 194 (Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush).]

[Footnote 48: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 62 _sq._]

[Footnote 49: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 32.]

[Footnote 50: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 488.]

[Footnote 51: Coxe, _op. cit._ p. 244.]

[Footnote 52: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 162.]

That savages to some extent recognise the existence of intertribal rights in times of peace is obvious from certain customs connected with their wars. Some South Sea Islanders and North American Indians consider it necessary for a party which is about to attack another to give notice beforehand of their intention, in order that their opponents may be prepared to meet them.[53] The cessation of hostilities is often accompanied by the conclusion of a special treaty and by ceremonies calculated to make it binding.[54] The Tahitians, for instance, wove a wreath of {335} green boughs furnished by each side, exchanged two young dogs, and, having also made a band of cloth together, offered the wreath and the band to the gods with imprecations on the side which should first violate so solemn a treaty of peace.[55] Nor does savage custom always allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare. The inviolability of heralds is not infrequently recognised.[56] Among the aborigines of New South Wales the tribal messenger known to be a herald by the red net which he wears round his forehead, passes in safety between and through hostile tribes;[57] and among the North American Omahas "the bearer of a peace pipe was generally respected by the enemy, just as the bearer of a flag of truce is regarded by the laws of war among the so-called civilised nations."[58] And many uncivilised races have made it a rule in war to spare the weak and helpless.

[Footnote 53: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 72 (Micronesians). Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 190 (Indians of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon).]

[Footnote 54: See Farrer, _Military Manners and Customs_, p. 162 _sq._]

[Footnote 55: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 318.]

[Footnote 56: See Farrer, _Militarv Manners and Customs_, p. 161.]

[Footnote 57: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 41.]

[Footnote 58: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 368.]

The Samoans considered it cowardly to kill a woman;[59] and even in Fiji the "enlightened party" objected to the killing of women, urging that it is "just as cowardly to kill a woman as a baby."[60] The Abipones, in their wars, "generally spared the unwarlike, and carried away innocent boys and girls unhurt."[61] An old Spanish writer tells us of the Guanches of Gran Canaria that, "in their wars, they held it as base and mean to molest or injure the women and children of the enemy, considering them as weak and helpless, therefore improper objects of their resentment";[62] and similar views prevail among the Berbers (Shlu[h.]) of Southern Morocco, as also among the Algerian Kabyles[63] and the Touareg.[64] Though the Masai and Wa-kikuyu "are eternally at war to the knife with each other, there is a compact between them not to molest the womenfolk of either party."[65] "The Masai," says Mr. Hinde, "never interfere with women in their raids, and the women cheer {336} loudly and encourage their relatives during the fight."[66] Among the Latukas, though women are employed as spies and thus become exceedingly dangerous in war, there is nevertheless a general understanding that no woman shall be killed.[67] The Basutos maintain that respect should be paid during war to women, children, and travellers, as also that those who surrender should be spared and open to ransom; and, though these rules are not invariably respected, the public voice always disapproves of their violation.[68]

[Footnote 59: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 304.]

[Footnote 60: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 180.]

[Footnote 61: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 141.]

[Footnote 62: Abreu de Galindo, _History of the Discovery and Conquest of the Canary Islands_, p. 66.]

[Footnote 63: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 76.]

[Footnote 64: Hourst, _Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs_, p. 223 _sq._]

[Footnote 65: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 177.]

[Footnote 66: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 6, n.*]

[Footnote 67: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 355.]

[Footnote 68: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 223 _sq._ For regard paid to women, old people, and children in war, see also Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 367 (Western Eskimo); Catlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 240; Azara, _Voyages_, ii. 145 (Payaguas).]

Sometimes custom even requires that the life of the captive shall be spared.

It is against Masai tradition to kill prisoners of war.[69] Among the Kabyles "il faut que l'exaspération des partis soit extrême pour qu'un blessé ou un prisonnier soit mis à mort."[70] The Touareg do not kill their prisoners after a fight.[71] Among the Bedouins of the Euphrates "the person of the enemy is sacred when disarmed or dismounted; and prisoners are neither enslaved nor held to other ransom than their mares."[72] "Captives," says Mr. Dorsey, "were not slain by the Omahas and Ponkas. When peace was declared the captives were sent home, if they wished to go. If not they could remain where they were, and were treated as if they were members of the tribe."[73] Among the Wyandots prisoners of war were frequently adopted into the tribe. "The warrior taking the prisoner has the first right to adopt him. If no one claims the prisoner for this purpose, he is caused to run the gauntlet as a test of his courage. If at his trial he behaves manfully claimants are not wanting, but if he behaves disgracefully he is put to death."[74]

[Footnote 69: Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 64.]

[Footnote 70: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _op. cit._ 75.]

[Footnote 71: Hourst, _op. cit._ p. 207.]

[Footnote 72: Blunt, _op. cit._ ii. 239.]

[Footnote 73: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 332.]

[Footnote 74: Powell, _ibid._ i. 68.]

Thus we notice even among uncivilised races very obvious traces of what is called "international law,"[75] if not as a rule, at least as an exception. On the other hand, the {337} readiness with which war is engaged in, not only in self-defence or out of revenge, but for the sake of gain, indicates how little regard is paid to human life outside the tribe. The Kandhs, for instance, maintain "that a state of war may be lawfully presumed against all tribes and nations with whom no express agreement to the contrary exists."[76] And if a few savage peoples live in perpetual peace, it seems that the chief reason for this is not a higher standard of morality, but the absence of all inducements to war.

[Footnote 75: See also Wheeler, _The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations in Australia_, _passim_.]

[Footnote 76: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, iii. 75.]

When we from the lower races pass to peoples more advanced in culture, we find that the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the tribe, and that the circle within which homicide is prohibited as a crime of the first order has been extended accordingly. But the old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains. Even when the subject is not touched upon in the laws referring to homicide we may, from the general attitude of the people towards members of other nations, infer that public opinion is not very scrupulous as to the taking of their lives. How the Chinese looked upon the "red-haired barbarians," the "foreign devils," is well known from recent history. In former days, Japan's attitude towards her neighbours and the whole world was that of an enemy and not of a friend.[77] The Vedic hymns are full of imprecations of misfortune upon men of another race.[78] That among the ancient Teutons the lot of a stranger was not an enviable one is testified even by language; the German word _elender_ has acquired its present meaning from the connotation of the older word which meant an "outlandish" man.[79] The stranger as such--unless he belonged to a friendly, neighbouring tribe--had originally no legal rights at all; for his protection he was dependent on individual {338} hospitality, and hospitality was restricted by custom to three days only.[80] According to the Swedish Westgöta-Lag, he who killed a foreigner had to pay no compensation to the dead man's relatives, nor was he outlawed, nor exiled.[81] The Laws of King Ine let us understand in what light a stranger was looked upon:--"If a far-coming man, or a stranger, journey through a wood out of the highway, and neither shout nor blow his horn, he is to be held for a thief, either to be slain or redeemed."[82] However, as commerce increased and the stranger was more often seen in Teutonic lands, royal protection was extended to him; and a consequence of this was that thenceforth he who killed the stranger had to pay a _wergeld_, part, or the whole, of which went to the king.[83] In Greece, in early times, the "contemptible stranger"[84] had no legal rights, and was protected only in case he was the guest of a citizen;[85] and even later on, at Athens, whilst the intentional killing of a citizen was punished with death and confiscation of the murderer's property, the intentional killing of a non-citizen was punished only with exile.[86] The Latin word _hostis_ was originally used to denote a foreigner;[87] and the saying of Plautus, that a man is a wolf to a man whom he does not know,[88] was probably an echo of an old Roman proverb. Mommsen suggests that in ancient days the Romans did not punish the killing of a foreigner, unless he belonged to an allied nation; but already in the prehistoric period a change was introduced, the foreigner being placed under the protection of the State.[89]

[Footnote 77: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 129.]

[Footnote 78: Roth, 'On the Morality of the Veda,' in _Jour. American Oriental Society_, iii. 338.]

[Footnote 79: _Cf._ Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer_, p. 396; Gummere, _Germanic Origins_, p. 288.]

[Footnote 80: Grimm, _op. cit._ p. 397 _sqq._ Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtgeschichte_, i. 273.]

[Footnote 81: _Westgöta-Lagen I._ Af mandrapi, v. 4 p. 13.]

[Footnote 82: _Laws of Ine_, 20. _Cf._ _Laws of Wihtræd_, 28.]

[Footnote 83: Brunner, _op. cit._ i. 273 _sq._ Gummere, _op. cit._ p. 288. Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of Edward I._ i. 52.]

[Footnote 84: _Iliad_, ix. 648.]

[Footnote 85: Hermann-Blümner, _Lehrsbüch der griechischen Privatalterthümer_, p. 492. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 325.]

[Footnote 86: Meier and Schömann, _Der altische Process_, p. 379.]

[Footnote 87: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 12.]

[Footnote 88: Plautus, _Asinaria_, ii. 4. 88.]

[Footnote 89: Mommsen, _Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 622 _sqq._]

How little regard is felt for the lives of strangers also appears from the readiness with which war is waged on {339} foreign nations, combined with the estimation in which the successful warrior is held by his countrymen. The ancient Mexicans were never at a loss for an excuse to pick a quarrel with their neighbours, so as to be able to procure victims for sacrifices to their gods.[90] "No profession was held in more esteem amongst them than the profession of arms. The deity of war was the most revered by them, and regarded as the chief protector of the nation."[91] The Mayas not only wanted to increase their dominions by encroachments upon their neighbours' territory, but undertook raids with no other object than that of obtaining captives for sacrifice.[92] Speaking of the wars of the ancient Egyptians, M. Amélineau observes, "Nous n'avons pas un seul mot dans la littérature égyptienne, même dans les [oe]uvres égypto-chrétiennes, qui nous fasse entendre le plus léger cri de réprobation pour la guerre et ses horreurs."[93] Among the Hebrews the most cruel wars of extermination were expressly sanctioned by their religion. That an idolatrous people had no right to live was taken as a matter of course; but wars were also unscrupulously waged from worldly motives, and in their moral code there is no attempt to distinguish between just and unjust war.[94] Among the Mohammedans it is likewise the unbeliever, not the foreigner as such, that is regarded as the most proper object of slaughter. Although there is no precept in the Koran which, taken with the context, justifies unprovoked war,[95] the saying that "Paradise is under the shadow of swords"[96] is popularly applied to all warfare against infidels. Among the Celts[97] and Teutons a man's highest aspiration was to acquire military glory. The Scandinavians considered it a disgrace for a man to die {340} without having seen human blood flow;[98] even the slaying of a tribesman they often regarded lightly when it had been done openly and bravely. In Greece, in ancient times at least, war was the normal relation between different states, and peace an exception, for which a special treaty was required;[99] while to conquer and enslave barbarians was regarded as a right given to the Greeks by Nature. The whole statecraft of the early Republic of Rome was no doubt based upon similar principles;[100] and in later days, also, the war policy of the Romans was certainly not conducted with that conscientiousness which was insisted upon by some of their writers.

[Footnote 90: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 420. Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 371.]

[Footnote 91: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 363.]

[Footnote 92: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 740, 745.]

[Footnote 93: Amélineau, _L'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte ancienne_, p. 344.]

[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Seldeft, _De Synedriis et Præfecturis Juridicis veterum Ebræorum_, iii. 12, p. 1179 _sqq._; Lament, _Études sur l'histoire de l'humanité_, i. 384 _sq._]

[Footnote 95: This was later on admitted by Lane (_Modern Egyptians_, p. 574), who had previously maintained that the duty of waging holy war is strongly urged in the Koran.]

[Footnote 96: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 246.]

[Footnote 97: Logan, _The Scottish Gael_, i. 101. de Valroger, _Les Celtes_, p. 186.]

[Footnote 98: _Njála_, ch. 40, vol. i. 167. Maurer, _Rekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii. 172.]

[Footnote 99: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 280. Laurent, _op. cit._ i. 46. Plato, _Leges_, i. 625. Livy, xxxi. 29: "Cum alienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est."]

[Footnote 100: _Cf._ Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 257.]

However, the foreigner is not entirely, or under all circumstances, devoid of rights. Among the nations of archaic civilisation, as among the lower races, hospitality is a duty, and the life of a guest is as sacred as the life of any of the permanent members of the household. In various cases the commencement of international hostilities is preceded by special ceremonies, intended to justify acts which are not considered proper in times of peace. In ancient Mexico it was usual to send a formal challenge or declaration of war to the enemy, as it was held discreditable to attack a people unprepared for defence;[101] and, according to the fecial law of the Romans, no war was just unless it was undertaken to reclaim property, or unless it was solemnly denounced and proclaimed beforehand.[102] In some cases warfare is condemned, or a distinction is made between just and unjust war with reference to the purpose for which the war is waged. The Chinese philosophers were great advocates of peace.[103] According to Lao-Tsze, a superior man uses weapons "only on the compulsion of necessity";[104] there is no calamity greater {341} than lightly engaging in war,[105] and "he who has killed multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest grief."[106] In the Indian poem, Mahabharata, needless warfare is condemned; it is said that the success which is obtained by negotiations is the best, and that the success which is secured by battle is the worst.[107] Among the Hebrews the sect of the Essenes went so far in their reprobation of war that they would not manufacture any martial instruments whatever.[108] Roman historians, even in the case of wars with barbarians, often discuss the sufficiency or insufficiency of the motives "with a conscientious severity a modern historian could hardly surpass."[109] According to Cicero, a war, to be just, ought to be necessary, the sole object of war being to enable us to live undisturbed in peace. There are two modes of settling controversies, he says, one by discussion, the other by a resort to force. The first is proper to man, the second is proper to brutes, and ought never to be adopted except where the first is unavailable.[110] Seneca regards war as a "glorious crime," comparable to murder:--"What is forbidden in private life is commanded by public ordinance. Actions which, committed by stealth, would meet with capital punishment, we praise because committed by soldiers. Men, by nature the mildest species of the animal race, are not ashamed to find delight in mutual slaughter, to wage wars, and to transmit them to be waged by their children, when even dumb animals and wild beasts live at peace with one another."[111] History attests that the Romans, in their intercourse with other nations, did not act upon Cicero's and Seneca's lofty theories of international morality; as Plutarch observes, the two names "peace" and "war" are mostly used only as coins, to procure, not what is just, but what is expedient.[112] Yet there seems to have been a general {342} feeling in Rome that the waging of a war required some justification. In declaring it, the Roman heralds called all the gods to witness that the people against whom it was declared had been unjust and neglectful of its obligations.[113]

[Footnote 101: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 370. Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 420, 421, 423.]

[Footnote 102: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]

[Footnote 103: _Cf._ Lanessan, _Morale des philosophes chinois_, pp. 54, 107.]

[Footnote 104: _Táo Teh King_, xxxi. 2.]

[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ lxix. 2.]

[Footnote 106: _Ibid._ xxxi. 3.]

[Footnote 107: _Mahabharata_, Bhisma Parva, iii. 81 (pt. xii. _sq._ p. 6).]

[Footnote 108: Philo, _Quod liber sit quisquis virtuti studet_, p. 877.]

[Footnote 109: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 258.]

[Footnote 110: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]

[Footnote 111: Seneca, _Epistulæ_, 95.]

[Footnote 112: Plutarch, _Vita Pyrrhi_, xii. 3, p. 389.]

[Footnote 113: Livy, i. 32.]

Even in war the killing of an enemy is, under certain circumstances, prohibited either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion. Among the ancient Nahuas, who never accepted a ransom for a prisoner of war, the person of an ambassador was at all events held sacred.[114] In the 'Book of Rewards and Punishments,' which embodies popular Taouism, it is said, "Do not massacre the enemies who yield themselves, nor kill those who offer their submission."[115] The Hebrews, whilst being commanded to "save alive nothing that breatheth" of the cities which the Lord had given them for an inheritance, were to deal differently with cities which were very far off from them: to kill only the men, and to take to themselves the women and the little ones.[116] The Laws of Manu lay down very humane rules for a king who fights with his foes in battle:--"Let him not strike with weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. Let him not strike one who in flight has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands in supplication, nor one who flees with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says 'I am thine'; nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another foe; nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted with sorrow, nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight; but in all these cases let him remember the duty of honourable warriors."[117] The Mahabharata contains expressions of {343} similar chivalrous sentiments in regard to enemies. A car-warrior should fight only with a car-warrior, a horse-man with a horse-man, a foot-soldier with a foot-soldier. "Always being led by consideration of fitness, willingness, bravery, and strength, one should strike another after having challenged him. None should strike another who is confiding or who is panic-striken. One fighting with another, one seeking refuge, one retreating, one whose weapon is broken, and one who is not clad in armour should never be struck. Charioteers, animals, men engaged in carrying weapons, those who play on drums and those who blow conchs should never be smitten."[118] Among the Greeks, in the Homeric age, it was evidently regarded as a matter of course that, on the fall of a city, all the men were slain, and the women and children carried off as slaves;[119] but in historic times such a treatment of a vanquished foe grew rarer, and seems, under ordinary circumstances, to have been disapproved of.[120] The rulers of this land, says the messenger in the 'Heraclidæ,' do not approve of slaying enemies who have been taken alive in battle.[121] In Rome the customs of war underwent a similar change. In ancient days the normal fate of a captive was death, in later times he was generally reduced to slavery; but many thousands of captives were condemned to the gladiatorial shows, and the vanquished general was commonly slain in the Mamertine prison.[122] On the other hand, nations or armies that voluntarily submitted to Rome were habitually treated with great leniency. Cicero says:--"When we obtain the victory we must preserve those enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war; for example, our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans, the Aequi, the Volscians, the Sabines, and the Hernici, but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia. . . . And, while we {344} are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by force, so those should be received into our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of our general, and lay down their arms, even though the battering rams should have struck their walls."[123]

[Footnote 114: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 426, 412.]

[Footnote 115: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 261.]

[Footnote 116: _Deuteronomy_, xx. 13 _sqq._]

[Footnote 117: _Laws of Manu_, vii. 90 _sq._]

[Footnote 118: _Mahabharata_, Bhisma Parva, i. 27 _sqq._ (pt. xii. _sq._ p. 2).]

[Footnote 119: _Iliad_, ix. 593 _sq._]

[Footnote 120: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 281 _sqq._]

[Footnote 121: Euripides, _Heraclidæ_, 966.]

[Footnote 122: Laurent, _op. cit._ iii. 20 _sq._ Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 257.]

[Footnote 123: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]

CHAPTER XV

HOMICIDE IN GENERAL (continued)

CHRISTIANITY introduced into Europe a higher regard for human life than was felt anywhere in pagan society. The early Christians condemned homicide of any kind as a heinous sin. And in this, as in all other questions of moral concern, the distinction of nationality or race was utterly ignored by them.

The sanctity which they attached to the life of every human being led to a total condemnation of warfare, sharply contrasting with the prevailing sentiment in the Roman Empire. In accordance with the general spirit of their religion, as also with special passages in the Bible,[1] they considered war unlawful under all circumstances. Justin Martyr quotes the prophecy of Isaiah, that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,"[2] and proceeds to say that the instruction in the word of God which was given by the twelve Apostles "had so good effect that we, who heretofore were continually devouring each other, will not now so much as lift up our hand against our enemies."[3] Lactantius asserts that "to engage in war cannot be lawful for the righteous man, whose warfare is that of righteousness itself."[4] Tertullian asks, "Can it be lawful to {346} handle the sword, when the Lord Himself has declared that he who uses the sword shall perish by it?"[5] And in another passage he states that "the Lord by his disarming of Peter disarmed every soldier from that time forward."[6] Origen calls the Christians the children of peace, who, for the sake of Jesus, never take up the sword against any nation; who fight for their monarch by praying for him, but who take no part in his wars, even though he urge them.[7] It is true that, even in early times, Christian soldiers were not unknown; Tertullian alludes to Christians who were engaged in military pursuits together with their heathen countrymen.[8] But the number of Christians enrolled in the army seems not to have been very considerable before the era of Constantine,[9] and, though they were not cut off from the Church, their profession was looked upon as hardly compatible with their religion. St. Basil says that soldiers, after their term of military service has expired, are to be excluded from the sacrament of the communion for three whole years.[10] And according to one of the canons of the Council of Nice, those Christians who, having abandoned the profession of arms, afterwards returned to it, "as dogs to their vomit," were for some years to occupy in the Church the place of penitents.[11]

[Footnote 1: _St. Matthew_, v. 9, 39, 44. _Romans_, xii. 17. _Ephesians_, vi. 12.]

[Footnote 2: _Isaiah_, ii. 4.]

[Footnote 3: Justin Martyr, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 39 (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, Ser. Graeca, vi. 387 _sq._).]

[Footnote 4: Lactantius, _Divinæ institutiones_, vi. ('De vero cultu') 20 (Migne, _op. cit._ vi. 708).]

[Footnote 5: Tertullian, _De corona_, 11 (Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 92).]

[Footnote 6: Tertullian, _De idolatria_, 19 (Migne, _op. cit._ i. 691).]

[Footnote 7: Origen, _Contra Celsum_, v. 33; viii. 73 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xi. 1231 _sq._, 1627 _sq._).]

[Footnote 8: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 42 (Migne, _op. cit._ i. 491).]

[Footnote 9: Le Blant, _Inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule_, i. 84 _sqq._]

[Footnote 10: St. Basil, _Epistola CLXXXVIII._, _ad Amphilochium_, can. 13 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xxxii. 681 _sq._).]

[Footnote 11: _Concilium Nicænum_, A.D. 325, can. 12 (Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 674).]

A divine law which prohibited all resistance to enemies could certainly not be accepted by the State, especially at a time when the Empire was seriously threatened by foreign invaders. Christianity could therefore never become a State-religion unless it gave up its attitude towards war. And it gave it up. Already in 314 a Council condemned soldiers who, from religious motives, {347} deserted their colours.[12] The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries did not altogether disapprove of war. Chrysostom and Ambrose, though seeing the difficulty of reconciling it with the theory of Christian life which they found in the New Testament, perceived that the use of the sword was necessary to preserve the State.[13] St. Augustine went much farther. He tried to prove that the practice of war was quite compatible with the teachings of Christ. The soldiers mentioned in the New Testament, who were seeking for a knowledge of salvation, were not directed by our Lord to throw aside their arms and renounce their profession, but were advised by him to be content with their wages.[14] St. Peter baptised Cornelius, the centurion, in the name of Christ, without exhorting him to give up the military life,[15] and St. Paul himself took care to have a strong guard of soldiers for his defence.[16] And was not the history of David, the "man after God's own heart," an evidence of those being wrong who say that "no one who wages war can please God"?[17] When Christ declared that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,"[18] He referred to such persons only as arm themselves to shed the blood of others without either command or permission of any superior or lawful authority.[19] A great deal depends on the causes for which men undertake war, and on the authority they have for doing so. Those wars are just which are waged with a view to obtaining redress for wrongs, or to chastising the undue arrogance of another State. The monarch has the power of making war when he thinks it advisable, and, even if he be a sacrilegious {348} king, a Christian may fight under him, provided that what is enjoined upon the soldier personally is not contrary to the precept of God.[20] In short, though peace is our final good, though in the City of God there is peace in eternity,[21] war may sometimes be a necessity in this sinful world.

[Footnote 12: _Concilium Arelatense I._ A.D. 314, can. 3 (Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ii. 471). _Cf._ Le Blant, _op. cit._ i. p. lxxxii.]

[Footnote 13: Gibb, 'Christian Church and War,' in _British Quarterly Review_, lxxiii. 83.]

[Footnote 14: St. Augustine, _Epist. CXXXVIII._, _ad Marcellinum_, 15 (Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 531 _sq._).]

[Footnote 15: St. Augustine, _Epist. CLXXXIX._, _ad Bonifacium_, 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 855).]

[Footnote 16: St. Augustine, _Epistola XLVII._, _ad Publicolam_, 5 (Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 187).]

[Footnote 17: St. Augustine, _Epist. CLXXXIX._, _ad Bonifacium_, 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 855).]

[Footnote 18: _St. Matthew_, xxvi. 52.]

[Footnote 19: St. Augustine, _Contra Faustum Manichæum_, xxii. 70 (Migne, _op. cit._ xlii, 444).]

[Footnote 20: St. Augustine, _Contra Faustum Manichæum_, xxii. 75 (Migne, _op. cit._ xlii. 448).]

[Footnote 21: St. Augustine, _De civitate Dei_, xix. 11.]

By the writings of St. Augustine the theoretical attitude of the Church towards war was definitely settled, and later theologians only reproduced or further elaborated his views. Yet it was not with a perfectly safe conscience that Christianity thus sanctioned the practice of war. There was a feeling that a soldier scarcely could make a good Christian. In the middle of the fifth century, Leo the Pope declared it to be contrary to the rules of the Church that persons after the action of penance--that is, persons then considered to be pre-eminently bound to obey the law of Christ--should revert to the profession of arms.[22] Various Councils forbade the clergy to engage in warfare,[23] and certain canons excluded from ordination all who had served in an army after baptism.[24] Penance was prescribed for those who had shed blood on the battle-field.[25] Thus {349} the ecclesiastical canons made in William the Conqueror's reign by the Norman prelates, and confirmed by the Pope, directed that he who was aware that he had killed a man in a battle should do penance for one year, and that he who had killed several should do a year's penance for each.[26] Occasionally the Church seemed to wake up to the evils of war in a more effective way; there are several notorious instances of wars being forbidden by popes. But in such cases the prohibition was only too often due to the fact that some particular war was disadvantageous to the interests of the Church. And whilst doing comparatively little to discourage wars which did not interfere with her own interests, the Church did all the more to excite war against those who were objects of her hatred.

[Footnote 22: Leo Magnus, _Epistola XC._, _ad Rusticum_, inquis. 12 (Migne, _op. cit._ liv. 1206 _sq._).]

[Footnote 23: One of the Apostolic Canons requires that any bishop, priest, or deacon who devotes himself to military service shall be degraded from his ecclesiastical rank (_Canones ecclesiastici qui dicuntur Apostolorum_, 83 [74] [Bunsen, _Analecta Ante-Nicæna_, ii. 31]). The Councils of Toulouse, in 633 (ch. 45, in Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ x. 630), and of Meaux, in 845 (can. 37, _ibid._ xiv. 827), condemned to a similar punishment those of the clergy who ventured to take up arms. Gratian says (_Decretum_, ii. 23. 8. 4) that the Church refuses to pray for the soul of a priest who died on the battle-field. Notwithstanding the canons of Councils and the decrees of popes, ecclesiastics frequently participated in battles (Nicolaus I. _Epistolæ et Decreta_, 83 [Migne, _op. cit._ cxix. 922]. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 330, 385. Ward, _Foundation and History of the Law of Nations_, i. 365 _sq._ Buckle, _History of Civilisation in England_, i. 204; ii. 464. Bethune-Baker, _Influence of Christianity on War_, p. 52. Dümmler, _Geschichte des Ostfränkischen Reichs_, ii. 637).]

[Footnote 24: Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, i. 2. 10. 10. Bingham, _Antiquities of the Christian Church_, iv. 4. 1 (_Works_, ii. 55).]

[Footnote 25: _P[oe]nitentiale Bigotianum_, iv. i. 4 (Wasserschleben, _Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche_, p. 453). _P[oe]nit. Vigilanum_, 27 (_ibid._ p. 529). _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 15 (_ibid._ p. 587 _sq._). _Cf._ _Mort de Garin le Loherain_, p. 213: "Ainz se repent et se claime cheti; Ses pechiés plore au soir et au matin, De ce qu'il a tans homes mors et pris."]

[Footnote 26: Wilkins, _Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ_, i. 366.]

It has been suggested that the transition from the peaceful tenets of the primitive Church to the essentially military Christianity of the crusades, was chiefly due to the terrors and the example of Islam. "The spirit of Muhammedanism," says Mr. Lecky, "slowly passed into Christianity, and transformed it into its image." Until then, "war was rather condoned than consecrated, and, whatever might be the case with a few isolated prelates, the Church did nothing to increase or encourage it."[27] But this view is hardly consistent with facts. Christianity had entered on the war-path already before it came into contact with Muhammedanism. Wars against Arian peoples had been represented as holy wars, for which the combatants would be rewarded by Heaven.[28] The war which Chlodwig made upon the Visigoths was not only undertaken with the approval of the clergy, but it was, as Mr. Greenwood remarks, "properly their war, and Chlodwig undertook it in the capacity of a religious champion in all things but the disinterestedness which ought to distinguish that character." Remigius of Reims assisted him by his countenance and advice, and the {350} Catholic priesthood set every engine of their craft in motion to second and encourage him.[29] In the Church itself there were germs out of which a military spirit would naturally develop itself. The famous dictum, "Nulla salus extra ecclesiam," was promulgated as early as the days of Cyprian. The general view of mediæval orthodoxy was, that those beyond the pale of the Church, heathen and heretics alike, were unalterably doomed to hell, whereas those who would acknowledge her authority, confess their sins, receive the sacrament of baptism, partake of the eucharist and obey the priest, would be infallibly saved. If war was allowed by God, could there be a more proper object for it than the salvation of souls otherwise lost? And for those who refuse to accept the gift of grace offered to them, could there be a juster punishment than death? Moreover, had not the Israelites fought great battles "for the laws and the sanctuary"?[30] Had not the Lord Himself commissioned them to attack, subdue, and destroy his enemies? Had He not commanded them to root out the natives of Canaan, who, because of their abominations, had fallen under God's judgment, and to kill man and beast in the Israelitish cities which had given themselves to idolatry, and to burn all the spoil, with the city itself, as a whole offering to Yahveh?[31] There was no need, then, for the Christians to go to the Muhammedans in order to learn the art of religious war. The Old Testament, the revelation of God, gave better lessons in it than the Koran, and was constantly cited in justification of any cruelty committed in the name of religion.[32]

[Footnote 27: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 251 _sq._]

[Footnote 28: Gibb, _loc. cit._ p. 86.]

[Footnote 29: Greenwood, _First Book of the History of the Germans_, p. 518.]

[Footnote 30: _1 Maccabees_, xiii. 3. Thomas Aquinas (_Summa theologica_, ii-ii. 188. 3) quotes this passage in support of the doctrine, that fighting may be directed to the preservation of divine worship.]

[Footnote 31: _Deuteronomy_, xiii. 15 _sq._]

[Footnote 32: _Cf._ Constant, _De la religion_, ii. 229 _sq._]

It was thus in perfect consistency with the general teachings of the Church that she regarded an exploit achieved against the infidels as a merit which might obliterate the guilt of the most atrocious crimes. Such a {351} deed was the instrument of pardon to Henry II. for the murder of Becket,[33] and was supposed to be the means of cure to St. Louis in a dangerous illness. Fighting against infidels took rank with fastings, penitential discipline, visits to shrines, and almsgivings, as meriting the divine mercy.[34] He who fell in the battle could be confident that his soul was admitted directly into the joys of Paradise.[35] And this held good not only of wars against Muhammedans. The massacres of Jews and heretics seemed no less meritorious than the slaughter of the more remote enemies of the Gospel. Nay, even a slight shade of difference from the liturgy of Rome became at last a legitimate cause of war.

[Footnote 33: Lyttelton, _History of the Life of King Henry the Second_, iii. 96.]

[Footnote 34: _Cf._ Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, iv. 209.]

[Footnote 35: _Cf._ Laurent, _Études sur l'histoire de l'humanité_, vii. 257.]

It is true that these views were not shared by all. At the Council of Lyons, in 1274, the opinion was pronounced, and of course eagerly attacked, that it was contrary to the examples of Christ and the Apostles to uphold religion with the sword and to shed the blood of unbelievers.[36] In the following century, Bonet maintained that, according to Scriptures, a Saracen or any other disbeliever could not be compelled by force to accept the Christian faith.[37] Franciscus a Victoria declared that "diversity of religion is not a cause of just war";[38] and a similar opinion was expressed by Soto,[39] Covarruvias a Leyva,[40] and Suarez.[41] According to Balthazar Ayala, the most illustrious Spanish lawyer of the sixteenth century, it does not belong to the Church to punish infidels who {352} have never received the Christian faith, whereas those who, having once received it, afterwards endeavour to prevent the propagation of the Gospel, may, like other heretics, be justly persecuted with the sword.[42] But the majority of jurisconsults, as well as of canonists, were in favour of the orthodox view that unbelief is a legitimate reason for going to war.[43] And this principle was, professedly, acted upon to an extent which made the history of Christianity for many centuries a perpetual crusade, and transformed the Christian Church into a military power even more formidable than Rome under Cæsar and Augustus. Very often religious zeal was a mere pretext for wars which in reality were caused by avarice or desire for power. The aim of the Church was to be the master of the earth rather than the servant of heaven. She preached crusades not only against infidels and heretics, but against any disobedient prince who opposed her boundless pretensions. And she encouraged war when rich spoils were to be expected from the victor, as a thankoffering to God for the victory He had granted, or as an atonement for the excesses which had been committed.

[Footnote 36: Bethune-Baker, _op. cit._ p. 73.]

[Footnote 37: Bonet, _L'arbre des batailles_, iv. 2, p. 86: "Selon la sainte Escripture nous ne pouvons et si ne devons contredire ne efforcer ung mescreant à recepvoir ne le saint bapteme ne la sainte foy ainsi les devons laisser en leur franche volonté que Dieu leur a donnée."]

[Footnote 38: Franciscus a Victoria, _Relectiones Theologicæ_, vi. 10, p. 231: "Caussa iusti belli non est diuersitas religionis." Yet infidels may be constrained to allow the Gospel to be preached (_ibid._ v. 3. 12, p. 214 _sq._).]

[Footnote 39: Soto, _De justititia et jure_, v. 3. 5, fol. 154.]

[Footnote 40: Covariuvias a Leyva, _Regulæ_, _Pecatum_, ii. 10. 2 (_Opera omnia_, i. 496): "Infidelitas non priuat infideles dominio, quod habent iure humano, vel habuerunt ante legem Euangelicam in prouinciis et regnis, quae obtinent."]

[Footnote 41: Suarez, cited by Nys, _Droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius_, p. 98.]

[Footnote 42: Ayala, _De iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari_, i. 2. 29 _sq._]

[Footnote 43: Nys, _op. cit._ p. 89. _Idem_, in his Introduction to Bonet's _L'arbre des batailles_, p. xxiv. According to Conradus Brunus (_De legationibus_, iii. 8, p. 115), for instance, any war waged by Christians against the enemies of the Christian faith is just, as being undertaken for the defence of religion and the glory of God in order to recover the possession of dominions unjustly held by infidels.]